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Abstract 
 
In 2007-08, the world experienced the greatest financial crisis since 1929, which turned 
– in the following years – in one of the deepest and most prolonged periods of economic 
stagnation of modern history. While there were multiple conditions that originated the 
so-called Great Financial Crisis, a general consensus emerged that financial derivatives 
played an important role in the outbreak of the crisis and in posing a credible threat that 
the entire global financial system could melt down. As a reaction, several countries in 
the world and international organizations agreed on a policy response to reformulate the 
global architecture for the regulation of the financial system, including the financial 
derivatives industry. Yet, the fundamental question of whether the contemporary system 
of derivatives regulation can effectively shield the financial system from sources of 
systemic risk is still undecided, for reasons that especially relate to the complexity of 
the networked structure of the financial derivatives industry. As a way to contribute to 
tackle this issue, this work aims to investigate whether an important component part of 
the present system of financial derivatives regulation – namely, Central Counterparts 
(CCPs) Clearing Houses – provide a more resilient financial system. The research 
question is addressed through a simulation approach based on an agent-based modeling 
of the financial derivatives industry. The results of the simulation show that the 
introduction of a CCP improves the resilience of the simulated financial derivatives 
industry, although it does not completely shield the financial system from disruptions 
that may especially depend from the degree of interconnectedness of financial operators 
and the magnitude of defaults. In sum, this work offers some methodological guidance 
for enriching the repertoire of tools at disposal of financial regulatory authorities in 
anticipating the consequences of interventions in the financial industry. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
In 2007-08, the world experienced the greatest financial crisis since 1929, which turned – in 
the following years – in one of the deepest and most prolonged periods of economic 
stagnation of modern history. While many explanations have been put forward to account 
for the causes of the so-called Great Financial Crisis, a general consensus emerged that 
financial derivatives played an important role to create, first, the conditions for the crisis to 
happen and, then, to facilitate the escalation of defaults in the US sub-prime mortgage 
industry to the threat of a meltdown of the global financial system. During the 2010’s, 
several countries in the world and super-national organizations aimed to reconfigure the 
regulation of the financial system in a way that included, inter alia, stricter regulation of 
derivatives. At the time of writing, the present regime of financial regulation is still 
evolving at different pace and coordinated efforts in various countries, but the issue of 
whether the new financial regulatory architecture provides solid foundations for making the 
financial system immune from new crises in the future is still unresolved. 
 
Financial derivatives have long played an important role in the working of the market 
economy, especially in protecting traders from the risks related to fluctuations of prices of 
commodities, exchange rates, and interest rates. The emergence of neo-liberalist policies in 
the 1980’s especially in the US and the UK, however, progressively lifted up regulatory 
barriers that had limited the extent to which financial derivatives could be used to perform 
additional functions, including opportunities for arbitrage and speculative investment. 
Together with the tendencies to the globalization of finance and the concentration of market 
power in relatively few large financial institutions, the deregulation of financial derivatives 
resulted in the monumental growth of the financial derivatives markets and in the formation 
of an ‘opaque’ network of financial derivative contracts. Financial regulators became 
unable to effectively monitor the concentration of risks and anticipate the aggregated 
consequences of potential default events. When the Great Financial Crises erupted, it 
became clear that – without any checks on their conduct – financial institutions had created 
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concatenations of financial derivatives contracts that had come to expose the financial 
system to sources of systemic risk. Financial derivatives – colorfully characterized by 
American investor Warren Buffet as “financial weapons of mass destruction” – took a 
central place in the concerns of policy-makers as central objects of regulation if the stability 
of the financial system was to be preserved. 
 
The contemporary regime of financial regulation includes various instruments that are 
intended to prevent financial crises that can occasionally affect individual financial 
institutions or parts of the financial system and to protect the financial system from sources 
of systemic risk (i.e., so-called macro-prudential regulation). Many of these tools provide 
the means for regulating derivatives and derivatives markets, both in relation to the finely 
structured organization of standardized derivative products and to the more heterogeneous 
and – until the Great Financial Crisis – largely unregulated trade of so-called Over-The-
Counter (OTC) derivatives. Among the tools for the regulation of financial derivatives, the 
introduction of Central Counterparts (CCPs) is a relatively innovative means of 
reconfiguring the network of financial derivative contracts. CCPs are expected to provide 
greater resilience of the financial systems to shocks that could – in principle – threaten 
financial stability. CCPs are financial institutions that play the role of intermediaries 
between two parties that – in their absence – would directly trade derivatives with each 
other. By substituting (through ‘novation’) an existing derivative contract between two 
counterparts with two contracts having each a CCP as counterpart, the presence of CCPs 
can result in better monitoring, supervision, and safeguards that derivatives are executed – 
especially, because the CCPs would act as ‘guarantors’ for the obligations that one 
counterpart of the derivative contract might not be able to fulfill. 
 
The capacity of CCPs to counteract sources of systemic risk, however, is still controversial. 
CCPs may, in principle, ‘absorb’ or ‘cushion’ the financial system from losses that 
originate from financial derivatives and that can spread throughout the network of 
derivative contract counterparts. CCPs, however, may not effectively protect the financial 
system from the consequences of relatively unlikely – but still possible – events, such as the 
occurrence of losses that hit financial institutions that are highly interconnected with the 
rest of the financial system and the possibility that relatively large losses disrupt the 
stability of particular financial operators. The aim of this study is precisely to address the 
questions of whether CCPs are able to effectively perform a stabilizing role when facing 
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some of the actual conditions under which financial market operate, e.g., the high level of 
connectivity between financial institutions (that engage in multiple derivative contracts to 
hedge their positions and for speculative purposes), the presence of both systemic and 
institution-specific shocks, and the possibility that relatively large defaults impair the 
stability of the whole financial system. 
 
The aim of this study is attained through a simulation approach based on agent-based 
modeling methodology. The choice for this particular – and relatively novel and rarely 
implemented – methodology originates from the relevance of agent-based modeling for 
investigating the aggregated behavior of complex system such as, precisely, the financial 
derivatives industry. The financial derivatives industry presents some of the typical features 
of complex systems. The financial derivatives industry is populated by heterogeneous 
actors, the structure of the industry is articulated in a networked form, and the dynamics of 
the industry is one where past events have important feedback effects that influence the 
trajectory of the industry in the future. Complex systems have particular properties, such as, 
for instance, that their dynamic trajectory is highly sensible to initial conditions and that the 
aggregated behavior of the system can present irregularities and discontinuities. The 
financial derivatives industry presents such traits: because of the interconnectedness 
between financial institutions, losses on any particular derivative contract may escalate into 
larger repercussions on a wider number of financial institutions and the magnitude of such 
disruptions may appear in a largely unanticipated way. 
 
This study contains the development of an agent-based model of financial derivatives 
industry that includes an algorithmic computation of trades of derivative contracts and of 
the consequences of losses that originate from random events. The model is constructed 
with specific reference to credit protection derivative contracts (i.e., swaps) that take place 
between banks and other financial institutions (credit protection sellers), which, in turn, can 
trade (re-protect) their exposure to credit default risk with other financial institutions. The 
model is developed in two variants, that either only include banks and credit protections 
sellers (Model A) or include banks, credit protection sellers, and CCPs (Model B). By 
contrasting and comparing the different trajectories of aggregated behavior of the simulated 
financial derivatives industry (i.e., number of financial institutions and total amount of 
credits, assets, and reserves of the financial institutions involved), the simulation provides 
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some evidence that can assist the evaluation of the expected effects of the presence of CCPs 
on the stability of the financial system on the whole. 
 
The rest of the work is organized as follows. Chapter 2 will provide a definition of financial 
derivatives (and of the variety of financial derivatives contracts), an assessment of the costs 
and benefits of derivatives, and an overview of the features of derivatives markets. Chapter 
3 will discuss the importance of financial stability and the emergence of macro-prudential 
regulation, especially in relation to the Great Financial Crisis and to the role that financial 
derivatives played in the origin of the 2007-08 crises and its following trajectory. Chapter 
4, then, will present the principles of financial regulation and assess the weaknesses and 
limitations of the present system of financial regulation, before discussion the measures that 
have been taken to regulate OTC derivatives in particular. The chapter ends with a 
discussion of CCPs and the issues that arise about the capacity of these institutions to 
protect the financial system from sources of systemic risk. 
 
The methodology followed in the present study is illustrated in Chapter 5, which introduces 
the simulation method in general and the features of agent-based modeling in particular, 
with particular reference to the use of the technique in economics, finance, and derivatives 
market research. Chapter 6, then, presents the design and implementation of the model of 
financial derivatives industry, that is developed in the Netlogo language. Chapter 7 presents 
the results from the simulation of the model, both in the variants without (Model A) and 
with (Model B) the presence of CCPs, and contrasts and compares the results obtained from 
the simulation. Finally, Chapter 8 presents the conclusions of the study. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Derivatives and Derivatives Markets 
 
2.1 What are Derivatives? 
Within the field of finance, the term ‘derivative’ has not a unique meaning. A general 
definition of derivatives is ‘financial arrangements whose returns are linked to, or derived 
from, changes in the value of stocks, bonds, commodities, currencies, interest rates, stock 
indexes or other assets’ (Acharya et al.. 2009; Cohen, 1994; Faubus, 2010; Lynch, 2011). 
As such, a derivative is a category of financial contracts that encompasses a wide range of 
instruments, such as traditional securities (e.g., derivative futures of corporate, municipal 
and mortgage bonds), exchange-traded instruments (e.g., options and futures with 
standardized contracts in relation to size, maturity and delivery), and so-called ‘over-the-
counter’ (OTC) instruments (i.e., contracts that are negotiated privately and that are 
typically customized to meet specific needs of counterparts). While each of these types of 
derivatives has special features, all derivatives share some common traits. All derivatives, 
in particular, are written and agreed by counterparts for arranging a risk-shifting 
transaction, i.e., one party agrees, upon receipt of a fee, to take on the risk of potential loss 
of the other party when a specified event materializes, especially in the relation to the value 
of another (‘underlying’ or ‘reference’) asset (Awrey, 2010; D’Souza et al., 2009; Samuel, 
2009). As we shall review below, this common trait of derivatives makes them a valuable 
component part of nowadays’ financial industry. 
 
The way derivative contracts are structured makes them akin to a ‘quasi-guarantee’ or 
‘quasi-insurance’ contract (Lynch, 2011). Via derivatives, some parties can shift risk to 
other parties by making them enter into certain transactions - or by exiting certain 
transactions - so that losses are charged on the counterparts. These features of derivatives 
make them functional to assist economic agents (i.e., business companies, investors, 
financial intermediaries, etc.) to partially ‘shield’ themselves from the losses that they 
would incur if any risky event happens: one party of the derivative contract can ‘hedge’ 
themselves by paying the counterpart to carry part of the risk related to an investment 
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position. As a matter of fact, however, these features of derivatives also make this kind of 
contract functional to placing ‘bets’ on the direction of change of values of the underlying 
assets: indeed, derivatives may be written and traded without any need to actually ‘own’ the 
underlying asset (Baker, 2009; Lynch, 2011).  
 
Derivative contracts come in several formats (Minehan and Simons, 1995). Before 
discussing the role of derivatives in nowadays’ financial industry (and, relatedly, the 
regulation of derivatives), we briefly review the main types of derivative contracts. These 
include four main categories, namely forward, futures, options, and swaps (Samuel, 2009). 
In addition, derivative contracts can be distinguished into two classes, depending on 
whether they are traded via specialized derivatives markets or not (i.e., OTC derivatives). 
Moreover, derivatives can be distinguished depending on the kind of underlying asset (e.g., 
commodities, equity, bonds, interest rates, credits, and foreign currencies), although 
generally options are related to stocks, forwards and futures to commodities, and swaps to 
debts (and interest rates) (Samuel, 2009). Taking into account the variety of derivatives, 
and also how versatile these financial instruments are to service particular needs or aims of 
the counterparts, it should not come as a surprise that derivatives constitute the highest 
growing segment of the financial industry in the last a few decades (Minehan and Simons, 
1995). Indeed, since the early surveys of the derivative market (e.g., Kambhu et al., 1996) it 
became apparent that writing and trading of derivatives were set to grow all over the 
industrialized world.  
 
Forwards: A forward contract is ‘an agreement between two parties to buy or sell an asset 
at a specified future time, referred to as the delivery date, for a specified price’ (Romano, 
1996). The forward contract creates the obligation for the buyer (who assumes a ‘long 
position’) to acquire the underlying asset from the seller (who assumes a ‘short position’) at 
a certain future date and at a certain agreed-upon price. As such, the forward contract 
removes the risk of fluctuation of the asset price for both parties, who are certain about the 
price of the transaction at the future date. If parties had to make the transaction at the future 
date without the possibility of the forward contract, then they would now know the price in 
the future spot market until the future date. The forward contract, then, is valuable because 
it provides the parties the certainty that the transaction occurs at a given price. Of course, 
while both parties have the benefit of price certainty, if the price of the underlying asset 
fluctuates over time then the forward price may be more advantageous to one party then the 
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other one: for example, if the price of the underlying asset is higher than the forward 
contract price at the expiration date, then the buyer party gains from purchasing at a 
forward contract price that is lower than the market price while the seller party loses from 
giving away the underlying asset at a price that is lower than the market price; at the 
opposite, if the price of the underlying asset is lower than the forward contract price at the 
expiration date, then it is the seller party that gains from the sale of the underlying asset at a 
forward contract price that is higher than the market price while the buyer party loses from 
having to acquire the underlying asset at a price that is higher than the market price. At 
expiration, then, the value of the forward contract is the difference between the forward 
contract price and the market (spot) price of the underlying asset. 
 
Futures: A future contract is a standardized form of forward contract (Romano, 1996). The 
future contract contains the obligation for one party to buy or sell an asset at a specified 
future date and for an agreed-upon price. Differently from forwards, that can be designed 
on an ad hoc basis depending on the aims of the parties, future contracts include 
conventional provisions that make them relatively easy to transfer in publicly organized 
market (exchanges). Future contracts are written on a variety of underlying assets, such as 
physical commodities (e.g., agriculture, natural resources, precious metal, etc.) and 
financial assets (e.g., equity, interest rates, bonds, foreign currencies, etc.). As in the 
forwards, future contracts arise from parties’ intention to reduce risk about the future price 
of the underlying asset. While the market price of the underlying assets fluctuates, the 
parties can use the future to agree upon the price of the transaction at a future date. As such, 
when future contracts are written the parties make use of the best available information 
about price tendencies of the underlying asset, with the effect that the strike price of the 
future contract and the market price of the underlying asset tend to coincide on the 
expiration date (else, there is an opportunity for arbitrage). Along the process, futures play 
an important role as ‘price-discovery’ mechanism for the spot price of the underlying asset 
(Minehan and Simons, 1995), because parties who possess new information about the value 
of the underlying asset would enter the future market and disclose their information along 
their trading behavior.  
 
Options: An option contract is an agreement that grants to a party the right to buy (call 
option) or to sell (put option) an asset at a specified price (exercise or strike price) on or 
before a specified future date (expiry date) (Romano, 1996). More precisely, an option is 
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structured as an American option if the party can exercise the right to buy or to sell at any 
time by the expiry date, while it is structured as an European option if the party can 
exercise the right to buy or to sell at the expiry date only. As in futures, in option contracts 
parties agree to reallocate the risk that the price of the underlying asset fluctuates in the 
future. In particular, the buyer of a call option exercises the right to buy the underlying 
asset if the price of the asset raises above the strike price, while the buyer of a put option 
would sell the underlying asset if the price of the asset falls under the strike price. 
Differently from forwards and futures, options include the attribution of rights to the buyer 
- not of obligations - to make a transaction at an agreed-upon price. The owner of an option, 
therefore, pays for the option a value (option premium) that relates to the estimation of the 
gain that the party would make if the right (to buy or to sell) is exercised and of the 
likelihood that the scenario where the exercise of the option is advantageous materializes 
(i.e., that the price of the underlying asset raises above the strike price in a call option or 
that the price of the underlying asset falls under the strike price in the put option). The 
seller of the option (option’s writer), instead, is obliged to perform, i.e., to sell the asset if 
the call option is exercised or to buy the asset if the put option is exercised. Consequently, 
the prospects for gain and loss for the buyer and seller of an option contract are 
asymmetrical: the premium payment is both the maximum loss for the buyer of the option 
and the maximum gain for the writer of the option; the buyer can gain the (theoretically 
unlimited) difference between the asset value at the time of exercise and the strike price in a 
call option, or the difference between the strike price and the asset value at the time of 
exercise in a put option; the seller can lose the (theoretically unlimited) difference between 
the asset value at the time of exercise and the strike price in a call option, or the difference 
between the strike price and the asset value at the time of exercise in a put option. Because 
of this payoff structure, the value of an option is generally dependent on the volatility of the 
underlying asset, i.e., the gain for the buyer of the option is higher, the higher is the asset 
value with respect to the strike price at the time of exercise in a call option, or the lower is 
the asset value with respect to the strike price at the time of exercise in a put option. 
 
Swaps: A swap contract is an agreement between two parties to exchange a series of cash 
flows, based on the underlying value of an asset, over time (Romano, 1996). Generally, 
swaps are written on underlying assets such as foreign currencies, interest rates, 
commodities, equity, or other financial instruments. A relatively simple swap, for instance, 
is the ‘plain vanilla’ interest rate swap, where one party agrees to make a fixed-rate 
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payment to the counterpart, who agrees to make a floating-rate payment in return. In 
practice, rather than each path paying its respective payment, only the net difference 
between the two cash flows is paid by one party to the other. A swap contract like this one, 
in all effects, provides a reallocation of risk from one party to the other one: depending on 
the relative value of the agreed-upon fixed interest rate and of the floating interest rate, it is 
one party that provides a flow of payment to the other one or the other way round. A related 
way to reallocate risk is the one provided by combinations of swap and options contracts, 
i.e., swaptions, where the buyer is given the right to enter into a swap contract at a later 
date, or to terminate or extend an existing swap contract at a later date. For example, an 
interest rate swap can be combined with an option to form so-called caps or floors 
contracts, that provide the owner the possibility to set a maximum or minimum interest rate 
payment for the floating side of the swap contract. A cap and a floor contract, moreover, 
can be combined into a collar contract, that provides the possibility for the owner to keep 
the floating of an interest rate-related flow of payments within an agreed-upon volatility 
range (i.e., the buyer of a cap contract can also sell a floor contract in order to make the net 
premium more affordable or nil). Swap contracts are typically customized (i.e., they are 
made ‘ad hoc’ for the particular aims of the counterparts) and therefore they are not traded 
on exchanges.  
 
Not every type of derivative can be traded in derivative exchanges. Derivatives markets - 
such as the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) - tend to include only those types of derivative 
contracts that can be standardized, i.e., whose contractual terms are specified in 
conventional provisions and clauses, so that derivatives of the same type can be 
indifferently traded among financial and economic operators. Futures and options are the 
two types of derivatives contracts that are typically traded in regulated exchanges, where 
intermediary operators (market-makers) provide the market infrastructure needed for 
hosting the activity of buyers and sellers. Those derivatives whose contractual terms are 
customized, i.e., designed ad hoc depending on the needs and aims of the counterparts, are 
agreed upon by the parties and they are not typically traded in exchanges. Customized 
derivatives - generally called over the counter or OTC - include forwards, swaps, and 
various types of option contracts whose contractual terms are specifically tailored to the 
particular agreement between the counterparts. As OTC derivatives are not traded in 
exchanges, they are not subjected to the same reporting, standardization, and margin 
requirements as exchange-traded derivatives (D’Souza et al., 2009). 
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Among the OTC derivatives, those that relate to underlying credit assets deserve some 
particular attention, especially because of the role that they played in the 2007-2008 
financial crisis. Generally, credit derivatives consist of a particular type of derivative 
contract where the underlying asset is a credit (Faubus, 2010; Lynch, 2011). In this kind of 
derivatives, the quality of credit is pivotal: depending on credit quality, credit risk - that is, 
generally understood as the probability of default of an outstanding obligation - affects the 
market value of the underlying debt. Various types of credit derivatives exist, while most of 
them consist of credit default swaps, total return swaps, credit linked notes and 
collateralized debt obligations. In all these types of credit derivatives, one party (the 
‘protection seller’) provides some sort of guarantee or coverage of losses related to the 
underlying credit to the other party (the ‘protection buyer’). 
 
A credit default swap (CDS) is a contract where the protection buyer pays a premium 
(called CDS spread) to the protection seller for being compensated for any loss resulting 
from a credit event incurred by the reference entity. For example, a CDS may be bought by 
a corporate or sovereign bond holder and sold by an insurance company, which would 
compensate the loss that the buyer of the CDS incurs if the reference entity - a business 
company or a government - defaults its debt. A CDS can reference a particular debt security 
(e.g., a bond) or a portfolio of debt securities.  
 
A total return swap is a contract where the protection buyer rents out an asset to the 
protection seller. The protection seller pays a stream of regular payments, while the 
protection buyer transfers income and capital changes from the reference asset to the 
protection seller. The protection seller takes all the gains and losses incurred by the asset, 
that remains in the ownership (and balance sheet) of the protection buyer. While the CDS 
provides that the protection seller makes a payment to the protection buyer just in case of 
default of the underlying debt, in the total retune swap the protection seller agrees to make 
the flow of payments to the protection buyer regardless of the performance of the 
underlying credit. 
 
A credit linked note is a contract where the protection seller raises capital from investors 
with the purpose of providing credit protection to the protection buyer. Typically, the 
operation entails the creation of a special-purpose vehicle (SPV) or entity that acts as the 
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protection seller. The buyer pays a premium to the seller, which then uses part of this 
money to pay investors for their funds. In principle, the scheme allows to remove the entire 
credit default risk because the money is raised for the sole purpose of protecting the credit 
of the protection buyer.  
 
Finally, a collateralized debt obligation (CDO) is a financial product that pools together 
various cash-generating assets (e.g., debt obligations) and repackages them together into 
different tranches of assets that are then sold to investors. The scheme is typically 
implemented through SPVs, that raise money for buying the cash-generating assets by 
offering various tranches with different levels of risk-and-return profiles. Most senior 
tranches have relatively lower returns and risks, while equity tranches (that typically 
provide relatively small amounts of capital) have highest return expectation and risk. The 
SPV earns the difference in the spread between the return for the investments and the 
aggregate amount of returns that are paid to the various tranches. 
 
Although OTC derivatives are not traded in exchanges, nevertheless an institutional 
infrastructure is typically needed to assist the negotiation and legal definition of the terms 
of OTC derivative contracts. At least two scenarios are possible. In a fully decentralized 
market, participants negotiate, write, trade and settle their positions directly with one 
another. In a more structured interaction, participants negotiate, write, and trade OTC 
derivatives in a decentralized fashion, but the market is provided with an agent - called 
Central Counterpart Clearing House (CCP) - that assists the clearing of the derivative 
positions. The kind of institutional organization of the OTC derivative market has 
important consequences for the risks and for the techniques employed to deal with it.  
 
In a fully decentralized market, participants manage counterpart risk through contractual 
arrangements that include collaterals and bilateral netting. Collaterals relate to the 
requirement to daily post collaterals that reflect the mark to market changes in the value of 
the contracts. Bilateral netting relates to agreements for netting across different contract 
types. Bilateral netting significantly reduces the amount of credit exposure, so that also the 
amount of collaterals needed is consequently decreased. Such decentralized market 
provides participants with a flexible way to tailor OTC derivative products to their needs, 
although a large amount of such derivatives may consist of de facto relatively standardized 
contracts. However, fully decentralized markets are not very transparent, as participants 
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tend not to disclose derivative prices (especially, market-makers that play the role of 
intermediaries and that can profit from price discrimination among their customers). The 
presence of the CCP helps reducing information asymmetry, and it provides lower 
counterpart credit risk as every participant is exposed to the credit risk of the CCP (Baker, 
2009). 
 
It should also be remarked that credit derivatives can be settled in two ways. In the physical 
settlement, the occurrence of a credit event (e.g., default of the debtor) entails that the 
protection buyer has to deliver to the protection seller the underlying reference obligation, 
in exchange for the strike price of the reference obligation. In the cash settlement, instead, 
the protection buyer does not have to delivery the underlying reference obligation, but the 
protection seller just pays the buyer the net loss that results from the credit event. In other 
words, the contract is settled by netting the positions of the parties. 
 
2.2 The Benefits of Derivatives 
Derivatives have been used in commercial activities since early recorded history. Forms of 
option contracts, for example, were already used by the Phoenicians and the Romans in 
relation to the delivery of goods transported by ship (Romano, 1996). More recently, future 
contracts were written on tulip bulbs in the Netherlands and derivatives were well 
established means of commercial activity in the Dojima rice futures markets in the 18th 
century in Japan (Acharya et al., 2009). In the modern era, the use of financial derivatives 
took off in the 1970s, especially in relation to various financial, economic, and policy 
conditions in the main industrialized countries. The time was characterized by the end of 
the Bretton Woods system, which resulted in greater uncertainty about currency 
fluctuations and increased volatility of interest rates. In order to hedge against interest rate 
risk, mortgage companies, such as GNMA (Government National Mortgage Association, a 
US corporation owned by U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, also 
known as ‘Ginnie Mae’) started making use of future and swap contracts. Since then, 
derivatives have been increasingly used by both business and financial operators, either in 
regulated markets (such as the Chicago Board of Trade, founded in 1848, the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange, founded in 1989, and the London International Financial Futures 
Exchange, founded in 1982) or through OTC ‘bespoke’ contracts (especially, Credit 
Default Swaps since the 1990s). 
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Nowadays, derivatives constitute a large part of financial markets, at least in relation to 
their nominal value. The most recent estimate of the notional amount of futures in the 
world, in June 2014, is US$ 29 trillion and of options is US$ 44 trillion1. The most recent 
estimate of the notional amount of outstanding contracts of OTC derivatives, at the end of 
June 2014, is US$ 691 trillion2. The supply side of the industry is relatively concentrated, 
especially around five main US institutions - JPMorgan, Goldman Sachs, Bank of America, 
Morgan Stanley and Citigroup - and a few European ones - Barclays, BNP Paribas, Credit 
Suisse, and Deutsche Bank. The demand side, instead, is populated by several actors, 
especially including investors, commercial banks, and business companies (as surveyed by 
such sources as, for instance, the BIS Semiannual Derivative Statistics, Fitch Ratings, and 
Standard and Poor’s; Gibson, 2007).   
 
Why do derivatives exist? We may argue that, if derivatives exist, then they must result in 
some form of advantage for the parties that enter the transaction. In an ideal world, where 
there are no trading costs, no transaction costs, no taxes and no regulations, and where 
every actors could borrow at the same risk less interest rater, derivatives would not be 
needed to perform any economic function (Minehan and Simons, 1995). They play a role in 
the economy, instead, exactly because of the presence of ‘market imperfections’ that open 
up the possibility to create value by reducing trending costs, or transaction costs, or taxes, 
or the regulatory burden. In the experienced world, derivatives play a role because they 
essentially reallocate risk. Derivative contracts enable to isolate a particular kind of risk and 
to shift it from one party to another (Awrey, 2010).  
 
Derivatives can help reallocating risks in several ways.  Some derivatives, for example, 
help reducing the risk of foreign currency fluctuations, thereby assisting the development of 
international trade (Cohen, 1994). Other derivatives help reducing the risk of interest rate 
fluctuations. Other derivative contracts - options - allow the risk protection buyer to hedge 
against particular risks (for example, a protective put strategy enables an investor to protect 
from the risk of a decline of a stock price). Swaps permit companies to hedge against 
interest rate risk (for example, by swapping a floating rate debt into a fixed rate one). Credit 
derivatives assist financial operators to reduce risk from ownership of bonds or loans, to 
take risk exposure towards another entity, and to express a credit view on other entities 
                                                1	  BIS	  web	  site,	  http://www.bis.org/statistics/r_qa1409_hanx23a.pdf,	  accessed	  21st	  November	  2014.	  2	  BIS	  web	  site,	  http://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy1411.htm,	  accessed	  21st	  November	  2014.	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(Lynch, 2011); they also allow to separate the function to originate credit (typically, to 
corporate borrowers) from the one of holding credit risks associated with the loans (Hirtle, 
2009). 
 
The use of derivatives also entails various beneficial effects to other economic actors and to 
the economic system more generally. Derivatives, for example, help the working of the 
market system by assisting the ‘price discovery’ mechanism (Hentschel and Smith, 1996; 
Minehan and Simons, 1995). Generally, markets are affected by the presence of 
information asymmetries between parties, where one party that is better informed seeks to 
gain over the other who holds inferior information (Bagehot, 1971). When there are large 
information differences, typically bid-ask spreads are higher. Derivative markets attract 
traders who possess superior information because gains can be amplified through leverage. 
Therefore, fewer traders operate in the market for the underlying assets, and this market 
becomes more efficient. The prices of the underlying asset and of the derivative are linked 
because of arbitrage opportunities, in a way that the information in the derivatives market 
affects the prices of the underlying assets (a so-called ‘migration of information’ that 
reduces the spread and increases the volume of trading; Damodaran and Subrahmanyam 
1992). Derivatives also help enhance liquidity in markets, especially because trade in the 
derivative market is relatively cheaper than in the underlying asset one.  
 
Some special considerations should be made, in particular, on the role and benefits of OTC 
derivatives. Differently from the standardized derivatives traded on exchanges, OTC 
derivatives enable customized solutions to issues of risk management (Backer, 2009). 
According to Awrey (2010), OTC derivatives contribute to the working of economic 
systems in three ways: 
 
Completing asset markets: If derivatives do not exist, then economic actors would hold the 
whole risk that is associated with any portfolio of ownership of assets, i.e., they would hold 
market risk, lender credit risk, foreign exchange risk, and so on. With OTC derivatives, 
instead, economic actors have various flexible ways to ‘unbundle’ risk related to their 
particular financial and business conditions. By using OTC derivatives, economic actors 
can restructure the risk in a tailored way that fits with their risk preferences in a way that 
would be otherwise impossible or too costly to attain without them. 
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Enhancing price discovery: If derivatives do not exist, then buyers and sellers of an asset 
(or goods) would spend some time to negotiate and explore the range of potential price 
agreements. In principle, the discovery of the equilibrium price in a market may take 
advantage of arbitrage, where economic actors exploit information asymmetries between 
preferences of buyers and sellers for their advantage. Yet, arbitrage in the market for assets 
(or goods) is relatively expensive. With OTC derivatives, instead, economic actors can 
engage in the arbitrage of assets for even relatively small price deviations because of the 
possibility to trade the OTC derivatives rather than the underlying assets.  
 
Absorbing systemic risk: If derivatives do not exist, then financial institutions that hold 
large risk towards several other counterparts may originate a concatenation of losses if the 
risk event takes place. With OTC derivatives, instead, financial institutions can shift risks to 
other parties that are more willing and capable to absorb them. As a result, if economic 
actors make use of derivatives then the market is more stable and resilient: any 
materialization of the risk event (e.g., a default), in fact, would not pose a serious risk of 
additional defaults among other economic actors. 
 
The use of OTC derivatives also results in additional benefits (Backer, 2009), that include: 
the possibility for business firms to hedge their financial and business risk; the increase of 
liquidity in underlying markets; the possibility to diversify investment portfolios; the 
improvement of accuracy of market prices (e.g., CDS spreads provide signals on specific 
credit risk); the diversification of risk in a way that is broader than the one usually attained 
with more traditional financial instruments; the increase of bank credit capacity, that results 
in additional lending; more flexibility in counterpart credit arrangement than exchange 
trading (with beneficial effects, for instance, on the management of working capital); 
finally, derivatives allow to complete financial markets by enabling trading of risk by itself 
rather than assets. 
 
To be fair, the praise for derivatives ought to be weighted against allegations that these 
financial instruments - especially, some kinds like CDS - result in enhanced rather than 
reduced risk. Indications from the 2007-08 ‘great financial crisis’, indeed, fueled the 
arguments against the use of OTC derivatives. Various authors, however, hold that the 
benefits of derivatives generally outweigh their presumed pitfalls. Acharya et al. (2009), for 
instance, argue that the use of OTC derivatives allowed the spreading of credit risk across 
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several global investors and away from capital constrained financial institutions, with the 
resulting effect of expanded credit available to individuals and firms. In addition, they hold 
that CDS and other derivatives have actually contributed to contain the consequences of the 
source of the crisis, especially by disseminating information about credit risk to regulators 
and the public. While the securities markets may have not properly assessed the value of 
stocks, bonds, and other financial instruments, the CDS market was able to provide signals 
about the quality of financial institutions’ bankruptcy prospects.  
 
The widespread use of CDS and other credit derivatives, indeed, suggests that economic 
actors may benefit from these financial instruments in several ways. Commercial banks 
tend to use credit derivatives to adjust their credit risk exposure (Gibson, 2007): they may 
use, for example, single-name CDS (i.e., CDS that are specifically tailored to hedge from 
credit risk of a particular operator) to shield themselves from the credit risk of issuers of 
securities to whom they have a large exposure. Investment banks tend to use credit 
derivatives to deal with the risk that they hold when they underwrite securities: for 
example, the investment bank assumes credit risk for the short time between when it takes 
the risk on a security (e.g., a residential mortgage backed security) and when it sells the risk 
to the market, which takes place when the investment bank can assemble a large amount of 
contracts to launch a securitization. Finally, investors tend to use credit derivatives to align 
its credit risk exposure with its desired credit risk profile: in fact, credit derivatives can be 
more flexible and less expensive than transacting in the underlying securities.  
 
The use of derivatives, therefore, also fundamentally depends on the aims of the economic 
actors. Some investors like pension funds, for example, may be interested in a ‘buy and 
hold’ strategy, that consists of earning from the return of fixed income securities. Other 
investors like hedge funds, instead, may pursue an ‘active trader’ strategy, that consists of 
earning a return by predicting short-term price movements better than other market 
participants. Whatever the investment or trading strategy of the economic actors, however, 
the use of derivatives results in a more efficient management of the financial portfolio. If 
investors do not use derivatives, then they can only rebalance their portfolios (in relation to 
changed expectations of future return and risk performance) by buying or selling securities, 
such as stocks or bonds. Some of the securities markets, however, may be illiquid, therefore 
the investors may incur high transaction costs. Even if the investors seek newly issued 
securities, the price may be influenced by particular contingencies in the market at that 
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time, which can make the adjustment of the portfolio not advantageous. If the investors can 
use derivatives, instead, then they can adjust the risk profile of their portfolios by hedging 
against the unwelcome events, e.g., by purchasing risk protection against credit defaults 
using CDS. The bid-ask spread on CDS, in fact, is generally lower than the bid-ask spread 
on underlying assets like corporate bonds. 
 
Finally, we should also notice that the apparent benefit of using derivatives has been 
documented in various empirical studies. Research works showed that the use of 
derivatives reduces total risk and systematic risk for firms, and that there may be also a 
positive (albeit weak) effect on the value of firms (Allayannis and Weston, 2001; Bartram 
et al., 2011; Graham and Rogers, 2002; Guay and Kothari, 2003; Hentschel and Kothari, 
2001; Jin and Jorion, 2006). Others highlight that the use of derivatives extends to more 
general benefits for the economy. Hirtle (2009), for example, found some evidence that the 
use of credit derivatives is associated with greater supply of bank credit for large term 
loans, in terms of longer loan maturity and lower spreads. Faubus (2010) remarked that, in 
the view of Alan Greenspan, the widespread use of CDS mitigated the potentially 
devastating repercussions of some among the largest corporate defaults in history, such as 
WorldCom and Enron) and the largest sovereign defaults in history (such as Argentina’s in 
2001).  
 
2.3 The Costs and Risks of Derivatives 
Derivatives have been often regarded as the source of various costs and risks, both to the 
performance of individual firms and of the economic system as a whole. Along this view, 
derivatives should be heavily regulated, or even banned, in order to prevent serious troubles 
to the economy. It is relevant, therefore, to review the arguments that are typically made for 
criticizing the use of derivatives in contemporary finance. Generally, these arguments 
primarily build on the view that derivatives entail moral hazard problems (Peek and 
Rosengren, 1997; Remolona et al., 1996), that is, one party of the derivative contract is 
inclined to behave irresponsibly exactly because of the protection against risk that is 
provided by the derivative contract itself. The problem is exemplified, for instance, by a 
risk protection buyer who may shrink to carefully monitor its credits after buying a credit 
derivative; or by a risk protection seller who may shift the risk to other entities (e.g., a 
subsidiary) or under-represent the risk exposure in the financial reports in order to attract 
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more credit derivative buyers. In these cases, the use of derivatives results in ‘perverse 
incentives’ for the counterparts to behave in a way that exacerbates their risk position. 
 
Moral hazard, however, is not the only kind of problems that are typically associated with 
the use of derivatives. Cohen (1994), for example, noticed that derivatives may result in 
losses for those parties who do not adequately assess the likelihood of exposure to 
unwelcome future events, as it may be the case for unsophisticated investors who do not 
really understand and anticipate the economic, financial and legal effects of derivative 
contracts. Derivative contracts are also fundamentally subjected to counterpart risk, i.e., the 
possibility that the other side of the contractual relationship does not fulfill its obligations 
because of insolvency. Also, derivatives may not be cautiously managed if parties lack 
appropriate internal control mechanisms, or they lack operational capacity to book and 
monitor transactions and update estimates on potential losses. In addition, derivatives 
contracts may be occasionally difficult to enforce, especially when dealing with foreign 
counterparts. Sometimes, derivatives may be impossible to enforce, if the market for the 
underlying asset becomes illiquid. There is also the possibility that derivatives do not 
deliver the expected risk protection because of political upheaval or natural catastrophes. 
Finally, derivatives also open up possibilities for various kinds of deliberate abuse and 
frauds, including misrepresentation of information towards counterparts and the general 
public.  
 
Among the various kinds of derivatives, OTC ones pose special issues that especially 
originate from the complexity of these financial instruments (Duffie et al., 2010). 
According to Awrey (2010), OTC derivatives expose counterparts to four types of peculiar 
risks: 
 
Risks arising from information asymmetry: OTC derivatives are designed on the basis of 
complex mathematical formulas, which build on sophisticated financial concepts, and 
which are articulated in complicated legal documentations. As such, any party of the 
derivative contract must possess highly specialized and advanced knowledge in order to 
understand the terms, conditions, and effects of the OTC derivative contracts. However, in 
practice individuals possess relatively limited information, time, and resources to cope with 
the cognitive load required to fully understand OTC derivatives. Often, the party that 
designs the OTC derivative contract (i.e., the financial institution that sells protection, or a 
	   25	  
financial intermediary) possesses a more detailed understanding of the contract than the 
counterparts (e.g., a business company or a local government), especially in complex OTC 
derivatives such as CDO.  
 
Risks arising from over-investment: OTC derivatives are typically used to shift risks away 
from one party, which can then exhibit a better financial outlook to clients and investors. 
As such, OTC derivatives result in greater capital available for investments, lower interest 
rates, minor credit spreads, and - ultimately - in the under-pricing of credit risk. The effect 
of OTC derivatives, therefore, may be the one to induce a sub-optimal excess of 
investments, as apparently was the case in the mounting up of the 2007-08 financial crises, 
when financial market conditions (that also related, however, to lax monetary policies, to 
the US-China trade imbalance, and to the growth of the so-called ‘shadow’ banking system) 
contributed to the US housing bubble that eventually resulted in widespread negative 
externalities after the adjustment of house prices. 
 
Risks arising from excess leverage: OTC derivatives may also facilitate highly leveraged 
speculation, that is, to enable parties to take significant speculation risk while employing 
relatively little capital. This conduct may be harmful for the party taking too much risk, but 
it may be also detrimental for the financial system on the whole, if the party that assumed a 
too high risk position because of the leveraged OTC derivative contracts may negatively 
affect, in case of default, the solvency of other economic actors.  
 
Risks of systemic sort: finally, OTC derivatives may be the source of systemic risks, i.e., 
the risk of a collapse of the entire financial system. This event may take place if the cost of 
OTC derivatives is not fully internalized by parties (i.e., by the risk protection sellers) but it 
spills over other economic actors, in a kind of ‘snowball’ or ‘domino’ effect. A possible 
scenario where this event can materialize is, for instance, when a small but critical mass of 
defaults result in the insolvency of additional financial institutions, which in turn throw 
other financial institutions into insolvency, and so on. Another possible scenario is related 
to conditions of illiquidity that can result in ‘runs’ that exacerbate the solvency position of 
financial institutions. In addition, additional sources of systemic risk arise from the inability 
to fully comprehend the complexity of nowadays’ financial markets, and, relatedly, from 
the inadequacy of the pricing models that are commonly used in estimating risk exposures. 
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Among OTC derivatives, credit derivatives pose some even more particular issues on their 
own. Gibson (2007) highlighted that credit derivatives provide transformation of credit risk 
in very intricate ways, that are much harder to understand than more ‘ordinary’ risk shifting 
schemes. In addition, credit derivatives are especially sensitive to counterpart credit risk, 
which calls for enhanced efforts to closely monitor and assess credit risk positions. Also, 
the assessment of credit risk is essentially done through risk estimation models that may 
contain fundamental flaws or employ controversial assumptions. In part, the issue of 
assessing credit derivatives is tackled through the service provided by rating agencies, but 
the ratings can be misunderstood and therefore induce misinformed judgments. Also, 
additional issues arise in the settlement of a credit derivative contract following a default.  
 
The issues that relate to credit derivatives in general are especially relevant in the 
management of CDS: 
 
Credit risk: as any credit derivative, CDS enable to shift credit risk from one party to 
another. In case of default, the credit risk protection seller has to carry the loss that would 
have been incurred by the credit risk protection buyer. With CDS, however, the credit risk 
may be transferred through very intricate channels. If the CDS is of the ‘single-name’ sort 
(i.e., the credit risk protection is related to the default event of a particular security, e.g., a 
corporate bond) or of an ‘index’ sort (i.e., the credit risk protection is related to a portfolio 
of securities), then tracking the credit risk transfer is relatively straightforward. If the CDS 
is of a securitized sort, such as in the case of CDO tranches, then the structure of credit risk 
transfer arrangements can be relatively difficult to understand. 
 
Counterpart risk: as any credit derivative, CDS entail the risk that the counterpart does not 
fulfill the obligations. In principle, counterpart risk may be partially tackled by acquiring 
more detailed information about the financial and risk position of the risk protection seller. 
In practice, however, it may be difficult to accurately assess exposure to future losses and 
counterpart risk is often mitigated through collaterals or margin requirements. 
 
Model risk: some CDS, like the CDS indexes, are traded in liquid and transparent 
exchanges, and therefore their value is generally reflected in market prices. Other CDS, 
instead, are not traded in exchanges, and therefore their value is typically estimated through 
appropriate financial models. The evaluation method (‘mark-to-market’), however, builds 
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on particular assumptions that may not necessarily hold as valid in actual financial market 
dynamics. If this is the case, then the models are flawed and consequently the parties may 
lack any reliable information for pricing the CDS. 
 
Rating agency risk: rating agencies play an important role in providing assessment of 
credit risk quality of derivative products. Although rating agencies may provide transparent 
details about the models that they use to assess derivatives, nevertheless they may base 
their assessment on flawed models or incomplete information. In addition, the ‘signal’ that 
the they provide to market operators (i.e., the credit rating) should be carefully pondered, 
provided that the complexity of CDS entails that the risk associated with these financial 
instruments cannot be fully conveyed by the standards credit rating scale used for more 
traditional securities (e.g., bonds).  
 
Settlement risk: finally, additional sources of risk related to CDS arise from the difficulties 
that originate from the settlement of the contract. Traditionally, credit derivatives are settled 
with the physical delivery of the referenced security in exchange for par (i.e., when the 
default event happens, the credit protection buyer transfers the references security - such as, 
for instance, a corporate bond - to the credit protection seller, who provides the agreed 
protection payment). It may happen, however, that the credit protection buyer does not hold 
the referenced security and therefore it needs to buy it from the market. On some market 
occasions, there may be scarcity of securities to settle the derivative positions. If this is the 
case, then the CDS may not be settled, or the price of CDS may be affected by the liquidity 
issue. 
 
It should be highlighted that the issues that arise with derivatives are especially confined to 
OTC ones. Standardized derivatives that are traded in exchanges are typically evaluated in 
relation to market prices, and settlement of the contracts is typically assisted by the 
presence of a clearing house. The clearing house system of exchanges seems to work fairly 
well, provided that - since the origin of derivative trading in the modern era (the Chicago 
Board of Trade in 1848) there has not been any bankruptcy of clearing corporations, despite 
occasional attempts to corner the derivatives markets (Acharya et al., 2009). OTC 
derivatives, instead, cannot benefit from the presence of a clearing house. OTC derivatives 
are typically designed to serve particular financial and economic needs, and - in addition - 
they are often kept private. Accordingly, there is no central entity - clearing house or 
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regulator - who knows how many OTC derivatives have been written, where they are 
concentrated, what is the total exposure, and the total value of these contracts. The lack of 
transparency of OTC derivatives, therefore, is at the very core of much of the issues that 
arise in relation to these contracts. 
 
It should be highlighted, moreover, that even the same phrase ‘market for OTC derivatives’ 
may be misleading, as it suggests the presence of a fairly well structured infrastructure for 
the trading of these contracts. Derivatives markets are typically distinguished into ‘primary 
market’ (that relates to the original writing of a contract between two counterparts) and 
‘secondary market’ (that relates to the trading of one side of a derivative contract, typically 
in regulated exchanges). The so-called ‘market for OTC derivatives’ consists of a fairly 
concentrated network of contractual relationships between counterparts who write original 
contracts, while relatively ‘trading’ of existing OTC contracts takes place. As Awrey 
(2010) put it, “In reality, these [OTC] markets consist of little more than a closely-knit 
network of dealers who collectively perform both an intermediary and market-making 
function. As privately negotiated contracts, the identities of OTC derivative end-users, their 
positions, pricing and other transaction details are not readily available within the 
marketplace. Within such an environment, dealers thus often represent the only source of 
derivatives-related expertise and market information available to end-users.” As the parties 
of OTC derivatives may remain typically anonymous, it is difficult to know the web of 
mutual dependencies that is created by multiple contractual relationships (Baker, 2009).  
 
These features of OTC derivatives make these contracts pose a salient threat to the stability 
of the financial system. As it will be discussed in next Chapter, the stability of the financial 
system is a common (or public) good that may be fundamentally undermined by the 
materialization of systemic risk. Lack of diffuse and reliable information about the credit 
risk position of financial institutions can be a source of systemic risk. If economic actors do 
not know ‘how much risk’ the counterpart has (already) assumed, then they are not in the 
position to fairly assess the price and likelihood that the risk protection can be effectively 
provided. If economic actors under-estimate the potential losses that arise from counterpart 
risk, then they may end up taking too much risk and find their credit protection vanished. If 
economic actors over-estimate the potential losses, instead, they may trigger a ‘run’ that 
eventually stimulates, or accelerates the default of the counterpart (i.e., a case of ‘self-
fulfilling prophecy’).  
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2.4 The Market of Derivatives 
The market of derivatives is typically populated by three kinds of economic actors, who 
respectively pursue hedging, speculation, and arbitrage (Baker, 20109; Samuel, 2009). 
Understanding the motives that drive these three kinds of economic actors is important in 
order to figure out the resulting effects of their interaction on the dynamics of the derivative 
markets. In principle, like any market also the derivative one results in the efficient 
allocation of resources if competitive prices inform the choices of rational economic actors. 
In practice, however, the derivative market is characterized by relatively few dealers on the 
supply side (e.g., credit protection sellers), relatively tight economic and social network 
connections, and information ‘overloads’ that put the limited cognitive resources of 
individuals under pressure. As a result, the efficiency of derivative markets is often put into 
question. If we also take into account that weak institutions may open up opportunities for 
moral hazard, then both market operators and policy-makers should be concerned with 
sustaining the credibility and trust towards derivative markets in order to ensure their 
continued operation. 
 
The conduct of economic actors that pursue hedging, speculation, and arbitrage is 
analytically distinguishable. Hedging is a risk management practice that enables economic 
operators to ‘shield’ themselves from unwelcome future events (e.g., a drop or surge in 
market prices) that can result in losses. Speculation is a gamble that economic actors take in 
consideration of the possibility to make a profit in exchange for the willingness to assume a 
risk of loss, depending on the materialization of a future event. Arbitrage is a profit-making 
practice that consists of exploiting differences in prices for the same asset between two 
unconnected markets, or market segments, or market participants. Needless to say, arbitrage 
plays an important role in the working of efficient markets: it is exactly because of the 
presence of smart and well-informed economic actors that one price only exists in the 
market for any asset. If arbitrage operators realize that, for example, two market 
participants are willing to trade the same asset for two different prices respectively, then the 
arbitrage operator can promptly purchase the asset from the participant who is willing to 
sell it at a low price and to sell the same asset to the participant who is willing to buy it at a 
high price, while making a ‘risk-free’ profit out of the two trades. 
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While the kind of trade activity done by speculation and arbitrage operators is occasionally 
condemned in moral arguments, they both contribute to the effective and efficient working 
of the market mechanism. As a matter of fact, the same hedging behavior may not exist if 
the market is not populated by operators that pursue speculative purposes. When an 
economic actor aims to hedge against a risk, another market participant should be able to 
take on the risk. If all market participant share the same economic interest and risk concerns 
(e.g., farmers who intend to shield from the risk of future price decrease), then they would 
not find counterparts. In order for the shift of risk to take place, then, some market 
participants must have an economic interest to take on the risk by placing a ‘bet’ that the 
unwelcome event will not take place. The presence of speculators, therefore, provides the 
counterparts to those who aim to hedge against particular risks (Romano, 1996). In 
principle, speculators may place their ‘bets’ by purchasing (or selling) the underlying assets 
or commodities before the expected increase (or decrease) of price takes place. In practice, 
instead, speculators find it more efficient to operate on derivatives market (rather than on 
the markets of underlying assets or commodities) because less money is needed to enter 
derivatives contracts than trading assets or commodities, or because the assets or 
commodities may not be available to buy (or sell) at the preferred time. 
 
As already highlighted, the complexity of contemporary derivative products results in a 
deeply interconnected patterns of relationship between market operators. The securitization 
of credit derivatives resulted in complex financial products, such as CDO, that only a 
narrow group of specialists could deeply understand. With the introduction of CDS, credit 
risk was transferred from one financial institution to another in ways that became uncharted 
by both market participants and regulatory agencies. Within such environment, it is 
sometimes difficult to discern whether an economic actor pursues a hedging strategy, rather 
than speculative or arbitrage purposes. As a matter of fact, the differences between the aims 
of economic actors may be more a matter of analysis than actual conduct: the same market 
participant, in fact, may both employ a CDS to hedge its own risk profile while, at the same 
time, enter CDS contracts to speculate on selling protection to another market operator. 
 
What is the effect of such complexity on dynamics and performance of derivative markets, 
and on the financial system more generally? Credit derivatives (especially, CDS) can serve 
the role of the proverbial ‘canary in the coal mine’: if the price for CDS reflects the best 
information available to market participants, then the widening and volatility of spreads 
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should convey market signals about the increased credit risk position of any referenced 
security and market participants can adjust their portfolio accordingly. On the other hand, 
credit derivatives can trigger abrupt portfolio adjustments: if market participants over-react 
to the widening and volatility of spreads (which may originate from real issues), then CDS 
may contribute escalating relatively minor price fluctuations into widespread widening and 
volatility of spreads (which can have price and liquidity consequences on the market for the 
underlying asset, in turn). The resulting effect of CDS (as well as other OTC derivatives), 
therefore, is apparently the one of inducing sources of instability into the derivatives 
market, as well as potentially in the overall financial system. 
 
As a way to clarify how the derivatives market work, let us briefly recall the main features 
of financial markets generally. Financial markets are organized platforms where economic 
actors engage in negotiations and trading of securities. In contemporary financial markets, 
transactions are assisted by computerized systems that compute the matching between 
buying and selling orders. In addition, the financial market organization provides public 
information about prices (traded prices, bid prices and ask prices) and other statistics (e.g., 
volume). The working of the financial market, moreover, is typically coordinated through 
some kind of price discovery mechanism, that typically consists of a ‘double auction’ 
system (Cason and Friedman, 1996). This market platform is operated by different kinds of 
participants, that differ in relation to their role in the price discovery and market matching 
process: 
 
Investors (or clients): the participants who enter the market to attain hedging, speculation, 
or arbitrage aims. 
 
Brokers: market participants who connect the buyers and the sellers for a concession or fee, 
without taking any risk on the transaction. 
 
Dealers: market participants who provide and commit to a quote if a client requests, or 
have to take the opposite side of an order if the order is executed. Dealers make use of their 
own capital to cover from losses and keep liquidity. 
 
Market-makers: market participants who are required to post both bid and ask prices for 
the securities that they are expected to trade in. If another market participant wants to buy 
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or sell at the prices provided by the market-maker, then the order must be executed. If the 
market-maker cannot find a corresponding seller or buyer, then it must execute the order in 
person.  
 
As a matter of fact, financial markets work with clients and brokers placing orders to 
dealers and market-makers who take note of the order positions and temporarily ‘hold the 
bag’ while they search for corresponding clients and brokers who can act as counterparts to 
the transactions. In exchanges nowadays, the search for matching counterparts takes place 
by stimulating competition on both the buying and selling sides (i.e., both bid and ask 
prices are surveyed and a settlement point is reached when the highest buy price meets or 
exceeds the lowest sell price). If the market is liquid (i.e., there relatively many buyers and 
sellers operating continuously and that are readily available to match an order), then dealers 
and market-makers do not need to hold any position too long (and they can profit from the 
bid/ask spread). 
 
Derivatives markets - especially, the markets of standardized derivatives - work along the 
same general principles of financial markets. With respect to the trading of underlying 
assets such as stocks or bonds, however, the trading in derivatives takes places in relatively 
more illiquid market conditions. One reason for the relative illiquidity of derivative market 
is that, for any underlying asset, there are a number of possible derivative contracts that are 
typically traded in exchanges, e.g., options that differ in terms of strike price, expiry dates, 
and terms of settlement. While liquidity in the market for the underlying asset may be high, 
the markets for the related derivatives are less populated.  Because of this, occasionally 
bid/ask spreads may tend to diverge and the market price may exhibit relatively wide 
fluctuations.  
 
The working of standardized derivative markets is facilitated by the infrastructure support 
provided by the exchange companies. In the US, for example, the Options Clearing 
Corporation (that originates from the Chicago Board Options Exchange Clearing 
Corporation established in 1973) provides central counterpart clearing and settlement 
services to 14 exchanges and to various kinds of securities, including options, financial and 
commodity futures, security futures and securities landings. In exchanges, where 
derivatives are standardized, market operations can take place on ‘undifferentiated’ or 
‘fungible’ contracts, that help liquidity of the market. Standardization of derivatives also 
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help making ‘netting’ (i.e., the settling of multiple cash flows obligations with one net cash 
transfer only) possible also on the same derivative across different exchanges. As a matter 
of fact, however, it often happens that dealers and market-makers are not able to match 
buyers and sellers on precisely the same type of derivative and at the same time. While they 
‘hold the bag’, therefore, they carry the risk that the counterpart shifted to them. As a way 
to partially offset the risk while searching for a match in the market, dealers and market-
makers constantly adjust their market portfolio with the aim of hedge themselves (so-called 
‘dynamic hedging’).  
 
The working of ‘non-standardized’ derivatives markets - that is, markets of OTC 
derivatives - work in a quite different way. The trading of OTC derivatives consists of 
complex and detailed contracts between large investors (e.g., a business company) and 
dealers (e.g., a bank). The terms of OTC derivatives contracts are typically ‘exotic’ or 
‘unusual’, in the sense that they carry unique conditions on strike price, expiry date, and so 
on. As such, any order to buy or sell OTC derivatives (including, of course, CDO and other 
credit derivatives) in a hypothetical market cannot be plausibly matched with any 
counterparts - provided that very idiosyncratic motives drive the investors and the dealers 
to write the OTC derivative. The ‘market’ of OTC derivatives, then, is actually confined to 
the contracts between investors and dealers. The dealers take on the risks from the 
investors, and then seek to hedge their risk position through a combination of other 
derivatives trading. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Financial Stability, Systemic Risk, and Derivatives 
 
3.1 What is Systemic Risk? 
Systemic risk is a fundamental concept in our understanding of the structure and dynamics 
of the financial system. In general terms, systemic risk relates to the possibility that a chain 
of consequential behavior results in negative widespread effects to the whole financial 
system. Faubus (2010) defined it as “the risk that a ‘trigger event’ such as a market or 
institutional failure will cause a chain of consequences negatively affecting both market 
participants and the larger economy”. Acharya (2009) conceived it as “the endogenously 
chosen correlation of returns on assets held by banks”. Moussa (2011) characterized it as “a 
macro-level risk which can impair the stability of the entire financial system, as opposed to 
the risk of failure of an individual entity in the system”. Systemic risk is a condition that 
related to the possibility that a ‘trigger event’ - such as an aggregate negative shock in 
economic output, unemployment, or inflation, or a large fluctuation in interest rates, foreign 
exchange rates, or drop in market prices, or a large financial distress in a particular 
institution - results in negative effects to the whole financial system.  
 
Systemic risk is understood, therefore, in relation to the concept of financial stability. 
Financial stability relates to the presence of confidence that key institutions of the financial 
system can continue to meet their financial obligations without interruption or outside 
assistance, and that the key financial markets allow participants to confidently transact in 
them at prices that relate to the fundamental forces rather than fluctuating substantially over 
short periods when there have been no changes in fundamentals (Crockett, 1997). It is part 
of the financial stability that, occasionally, some financial institutions may incur substantial 
losses and possibly default their obligations. It is part of the working of the market 
economy that financial institutions, like any other kind of business venture, may even go 
bankruptcy. However, in a financially stable system the losses, or default, or bankruptcy of 
a financial institution does not entail much harm to the rest of the economy, setting aside 
the direct negative effects on the customers (and, possibly, to the employees) of the 
financial institution itself. Indeed, the possibility to default provides a mechanism to 
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counteract the problem of moral hazard, where financial institutions may not be attentive 
enough in their investments if they are reassured that government intervention or any other 
kind of safeguard measure would prevent them from market failure anyway. 
 
The potential effects of systemic risk - that is, what happens if the strategic risk materializes 
- can be devastating. In the worst scenarios, the consequences included the failure of 
financial institutions, with effects that result in credit shortage, liquidity freeze, and the 
paralysis of several markets that rely on inter-bank payment flows. At least, the 
materialization of the systemic risk may result in large losses of particular financial 
institutions and increased volatility in financial markets. Because of its potentially tragic 
effects on the entire financial system, systemic risk has been the object of several studies 
that especially focused on better understanding the possible sources and mechanisms that 
relate to the materialization of a systemic threat. Various sources and mechanisms of 
systemic risk have been discussed, including, for instance, the role of financial innovation 
(Merton, 1992; Kyrtsou and Sornette, 2013) and external shocks to the economy. Much 
research, however, has especially focused on at least three main areas of inquiry, namely 
the role of liquidity, the process of contagion between financial institutions, and the 
structure of interconnections between financial institutions. 
 
Liquidity 
In principle, defaults of financial institutions primarily take place because of insolvency. 
Insolvency happens when the “going concern” of a financial institution does not exceed the 
expected value of its liabilities (Brunnermeier et al., 2009; Haldane and May, 2011; 
Moussa, 2011). By itself, liquidity problems - that is, conditions where a financial 
institution temporarily lacks convenient and economy means of payment of obligations - do 
not necessarily entail that a financial institutions would default. However, also temporary 
lack of liquidity may occasionally escalate to more severe problems. This is especially the 
case in scenarios of financial crises, where the price of assets is weakly related to the 
‘fundamentals’ (i.e., to the expected cash flow) and it rather reflect the value that market 
operators are immediately willing to pay for the assets (‘liquidity price’). Liquidity price 
may be significantly lower than the price based on fundamentals, for reasons that include 
the shortage of immediate buyers and buyers’ perception of the urgency to sell the asset. In 
financial crises, moreover, a financial institution with liquidity constraints may find it 
harder to access further funding sources. 
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Liquidity problems, therefore, may originate from both the financing and the market side. 
Funding liquidity is the phrase that refers to the ease or difficulty with which financial 
operators can obtain funding from other financial institutions or investors. Typically, 
financial institutions rely on various finding sources with different periods of ‘maturity’. 
When financial institutions heavily rely on relatively short-term funding sources (e.g., 
commercial papers or repo contracts), then they need to frequently renew (i.e., roll over) 
their debt. Market liquidity, instead, is the expression that refers to the ease or difficulty 
with which financial operators can raise money by selling the assets at reasonable price. 
When financial institutions raise cash by selling assets in conditions of urgency, then they 
need to accept relatively low prices. Depending on conditions of the financial system, 
therefore, liquidity problems may turn into more severe solvency issues if financial 
institutions face funding liquidity problems, or market liquidity problems, or both. 
 
Contagion 
If any ’trigger event’ - such as an external shock to the economy or a liquidity problem or a 
credit default - hits a financial institution, the effects of this event may be circumscribed to 
the financial institution only. Under certain conditions, however, the trigger event may have 
repercussions also to other financial institutions through various kinds of mechanisms of 
contagion (or propagation). Some well-researched mechanisms include the ‘domino effect’ 
and the process of adjustment to price signals. 
 
‘Domino effect’ 
The ‘domino effect’ refers to the concatenation of credit losses that one financial institution 
can stimulate to other economic operators, along a chain of credit-debt relationships. In a 
typical scenario, one bank borrowed from another bank. If the creditor bank incurs credit 
losses, then the bank can reduce its overall lending, including the landing to the debtor 
bank. If the debtor bank cannot find other funding sources, then it will reduce its own asset 
holding, including its lending to other banks (especially, if the bank cannot sell illiquid 
assets if not at immediate ‘fire sale’ prices). The debtor bank, therefore, may end up 
withdrawing funding from other banks, which - in turn - may react by reducing their own 
asset holdings and so on. The scenario, therefore, results in a ‘bank run’ where the financial 
institutions contract the overall amount of credit in the system, with potentially detrimental 
effects on the solvency of particular financial institutions and on the working of the 
economic system on the whole.  
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Brunnermeier et al. (2009) notice, however, that the ‘domino effect’ does not really pose a 
serious threat to financial stability. Setting aside the case where relatively large shocks take 
place, generally the effect of localized credit contractions does not escalate into the 
contagion of a large number of financial institutions. They argue, however, that the 
‘domino effect’ may not fully capture the behavior that financial institutions may follow 
when facing credit contractions or other kinds of shock events. Indeed, other forms of 
contagion may take place between financial institutions, depending on how financial 
operators adjust their beliefs and expectations in face of the events and in anticipation of 
the possible defaults of other financial operators. 
 
Adjustments to price signals 
Another possible source of contagion between financial institutions originates from 
reactions triggered by apparently large price fluctuations. Financial institutions typically 
mark their balance sheets to market (i.e., accounting values are adjusted to reflect market 
values of assets). A reduction of market prices may result in losses that are inscribed into 
balance sheets of financial institutions, which may not have any credit-debt relationship 
with each other. A reaction from financial institutions, then, may be the one to sell some 
assets to restore its equity cushion, with the effect of depressing market prices even further 
and triggering losses on other financial institutions. Because of diffusion of such behavior, 
the single original price fluctuation may be amplified. 
 
The spiral of losses triggered by a price fluctuation may also originate from a so-called 
‘margin or haircut spiral’. A margin is a collateral that the holder of a financial instrument 
has to deposit to cover some or all of the credit risk of the counterpart. A haircut, instead, is 
a percentage that is subtracted from the market value of an asset that is used as collateral in 
a transaction. Margins and haircuts affect the maximum amount of leverage that a financial 
institution can adopt. Generally, margins and haircuts increase when asset prices decrease, 
and therefore they induce further contraction of credit. The increase of margins and haircuts 
stimulate a reduction of leverage and therefore sale of assets, that results in more price 
decrease and further increase of margins and haircuts, and so on (Brunnermeier and 
Pedersen, 2009).  
 
The adjustment to price signals takes place especially because of three mechanisms 
(Brunnermeier et al., 2009). First, margins and haircuts are corrected in face of dropping 
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asset prices because risk measures are typically constructed on the basis of past 
performance data. The technique commonly employed - so-called Value-at-Risk (VaR) - 
are sensible to recent price falls in the past, that is incorporated into the model as a sharp 
increase in risk estimates. As in a typical ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’, the consequential fire 
sale of assets results in greater volatility of asset prices, hence providing an ex-port 
confirmation of the higher risk estimate. Second, margins and haircuts are corrected in face 
of dropping asset prices because the price drop is perceived as signaling increased 
volatility. Third, margins and haircuts are corrected in face of dropping prices because of an 
‘adverse selection’ problem, in the sense that, as losses increase, financial institutions may 
be wary to receive assets as collateral because they may suspect that only low quality 
securities are used as collateral.  
 
Structure of interconnections 
The structure of interconnections between financial institutions also plays an important role 
in the propagation of the effects of ‘trigger events’ within the financial system. The 
structure of interconnections refers to the network of credit-debt and risk relationships 
between financial institutions. Research done in this areas (Battiston et al., 2009; Gai and 
Kapadia, 2010; Halaj and Kok, 2013; Moussa, 2011; Nier et al., 2007) has shown that the 
structure of interconnections - e.g., the degrees to which the financial network is more or 
less concentrated or fragmented - plays an important role in whether ‘trigger events’ result 
in widespread damages to financial stability or not. This kind of studies have important 
implications for better understanding sources of financial instability that may be not so 
apparent from the analysis of financial institutions alone, or from the dyadic relationship 
between any couple of two financial institutions and of their credit-debt and risk 
relationships. Indeed, analysis of the structure of interconnections results in original 
insights that have repercussion on financial stability policies, including the so-called 
‘macro-prudential’ regulation that will be discussed later. 
 
An instance of research on the role of the structure of interconnections between financial 
institutions is provided by the study of Gai et al. (2011). Their network model of the 
banking system is intended to study what happens when shocks affect the availability of 
interbank loans, i.e., the consequences of a ‘funding liquidity shock’. Any single bank 
reacts to the effects of the shock by reducing its interbank loans. The overall effect of the 
shock on the financial network, however, resulted strongly dependent on properties of the 
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network structure (needless to say, nowadays’ financial systems are relatively complex, 
where securitization resulted in the lengthening of the intermediation chains). Greater 
complexity and concentration of the financial network, in particular, resulted in greater 
fragility of the financial system.  
 
Several other works resulted in explanations for the role of heterogeneity across financial 
institutions, distributions of exposures, and tiered network structures (Moussa, 2011). 
Generally, results of these studies are controversial and partially counterintuitive. Nier et al. 
(2007) found that, in well-capitalized networks, greater connectivity tends to increase 
contagion up to a certain threshold, above which further connectivity entails a reduction of 
contagion. In under-capitalized networks, instead, greater connectivity makes the financial 
system more prone to contagion in any case. Battiston et al. (2009), instead, highlighted 
that an increase in connectivity improves resistance to contagion if the initial connectivity 
is low, while further connectivity increases the risk of contagion if connectivity is already 
high. Haldane and May (2011), moreover, highlight that excessive homogeneity within a 
financial system—when all banks tend to follow the same investment criteria and tend to 
have similar exposures —can minimize risk for each individual bank, but maximize the 
probability of the entire system collapsing.  
 
Findings from these research suggest that detailed attention to the structure of 
interconnections is needed to understand how originally circumscribed events may 
‘snowball’ into larger systemic effects. A key insight, here, is that features of the network 
ties may act either as ‘shock transmitters’ or as ‘shock absorbers’ (Nier et al. 2007), 
depending - among other factors - on the level of connectivity of the whole network. If 
connectivity is low, more network ties amplify the possible channels for contagion. If 
connectivity is high, more network ties help spreading losses among a larger number of 
counterparts, so that the loss for each of them is relatively small. But also capitalization 
counts: in under-capitalized networks, even a small loss can lead to a default of the 
counterpart (Battiston et al., 2009). There may be also a role for the overall size of the 
network, where larger financial systems seem to be relatively more resilient to contagion.  
 
Within the area of study of systemic risk, special attention has been placed, in particular, to 
the role of derivatives (Hentschel and Smith, 1996). By their very nature, derivatives make 
counterparts exposed to the risk that a single shock to the economy may have large 
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repercussions across many actors. Trigger events such as a sharp fluctuation of prices, or 
interest rates, or foreign currency exchanges, or - more relevantly - a credit default, may 
result in the materialization of large obligations in several financial institutions; credit 
protection sellers may find themselves called to cover losses incurred because of the default 
of the underlying asset debtor; credit protection buyers may rush to hoard the defaulted 
securities and may not be able to find them in a liquid market, and, in the worst scenario, 
they may not be able to receive the credit protection that they expected.  
The threat posed by derivatives on the position of a financial institution, moreover, is 
heightened if its dealers do not carefully take safeguarding measures, such as careful 
monitoring of counterpart risk, diversifying risks across uncorrelated markets, maintaining 
adequate capital cushions, and possibly establishing highly rated special-purpose 
subsidiaries to conduct derivative business (Kyrtsou and Sornette, 2013).  
 
As a matter of fact, however, sometimes financial institutions that exchange derivative 
contracts hold unsecured exposures that exceed capital, even to a single counterpart. The 
risk held by these financial institutions may be relevant for financial stability, especially if 
the institution is a ‘Systemically Important Financial Intermediary’ (SIFI), that is, a 
financial operator whose default has significant repercussions on the whole financial 
system. A study conducted in 2009 by the rating agency Fitch (Marcose, 2012) identified 
that 12 SIFIs accounted for about 78% of all bilateral derivative exposures (up from 67% 
that had been reported the previous year). Even more significantly, the top five financial 
institutions accounted for 95% of total notional amount that was bought and sold. In such 
scenario, the financial system may be overtly dependent on the robustness of a few SIFIs - 
that, arguably, may result, because of the topology of network ties, in ‘too interconnected to 
fail’ (TITF) financial institutions, where any failure of a SIFI may bring down other 
financial operators in a cascading fashion.  
 
3.2 Macro-Prudential Regulation 
Because of potentially devastating effects on financial stability, systemic risk has been 
subjected to high scrutiny from the side of academics, policy-makers, central banks, and 
financial regulatory authorities. The main issue in counteracting systemic risk originates 
from the fact that, as highlighted by Faubus (2010), systemic risk bears the traits of the 
‘tragedy of the commons’. In the original formulation, the tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 
1968) refers to the lack of cooperative behavior that results in the over-exploitation of 
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natural resources. In the present context of discussion, the tragedy of the commons arises 
because financial institutions lack the incentives to cooperate in preventing threats to 
financial stability, provided that individuals reap the benefits of exploiting finite capital 
resources while they do not fully internalize the costs of their over-exploitation. On this 
basis, concerns with systemic risk generally result in advocacy for public policies intended 
to safeguard the stability of the financial systems. 
 
That financial stability should be a public policy objective is generally uncontested 
nowadays. Reasons for public authorities’ intervention to preserve financial stability 
especially include the argument that the financial system is dangerously exposed to 
instability threats, and that sources of instability can propagate to the rest of the financial 
system with potentially widespread negative effects (externalities) (Crockett, 1997). 
Instability threats originate from various conditions attached to contemporary finance, 
including the growth in the volume and volatility of financial transactions, the increased 
integration of capital markets, the rise of international capital flows, the cognitive 
challenges to understand the complex risk structures that originate from securitization and 
diversification of investments, and the adequacy of risk management models and tools to 
keep risk under control. The possibility that localized instability escalates to widespread 
effects, moreover, is related to delicate conditions about financial institutions’ vulnerability 
to ‘runs’, contagion mechanisms, and perceptions of financial institutions’ liquidity and 
solvency.  
 
The main policy approach to cope with systemic risk is commonly known as ‘prudential’ or 
‘macro-prudential’ regulation. The term, that originated within the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS) in the 1970s (Clement, 2010), refers to the containment of collective-
level risk taking into consideration both individual (financial institution-specific) risk and 
joint (or correlated) risk that financial institutions have with other ones (Acharya, 2009). 
The general goal of macro-prudential policy is to limit the risks and costs of systemic crises 
(Galati and Moessner, 2013). For Brunnermeier et al. (2009), macro-prudential policy is 
primarily intended to stabilize the financial system with respect to the tendency of reducing 
measured risk in booms and increasing measured risk in busts. Perotti and Suarez (2009) 
conceived macro-prudential policy as primarily aimed to discourage individual behavior 
that may cause systemic risk or spread negative externalities across the financial system. 
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For Hanson et al. (2011), macro-prudential policy should aim at controlling the social costs 
of a generalized reduction of assets in the financial system. 
 
Macro-prudential policy is generally designed with the intention to contain two potential 
sources of financial instability and diffusion of instabilities to the whole financial system. 
First, macro-prudential policy is concerned with containing fluctuations of risk over time, 
especially in relation to the tendency of the financial cycle to amplify the boom and bust of 
the business cycle (i.e., the ‘pro-cyclicality’ of the financial system). A typical policy 
approach, in this respect, is to require financial institutions to build up a capital cushion in 
good times, which could help covering losses in bad times. Second, macro-prudential 
policy is also concerned with containing risk that is especially concentrated in particular 
areas of the financial system that are also extremely interconnected with other financial 
institutions (i.e., SIFIs). A policy response here, which has gained an increased attention 
during the last years, is the one to tailor regulatory requirements to the systemic 
significance of individual financial institutions, i.e., their contribution to overall risk. In this 
way, particular financial institutions would be subjected to different requirements 
depending on how disruptive their default would be for the financial system. 
 
The adoption of macro-prudential regulation as a way to counteract systemic risk also 
builds on the belief that market forces, by themselves, are not able to ensure the stability of 
the financial system. In principle, if financial operators are ‘left on their own’ then they 
might exercise more care in their financial decisions with respect to the scenario where the 
intervention of public authorities makes them more inclined to take risks. In practice, 
however, sources of instability in the financial system may originate from events that are 
infrequent, or that cannot be predicted, and over which financial institutions have no 
control. Even if public authorities commit not to intervene on the financial system, 
moreover, they may find it politically or economically advantageous to step in and restore 
financial stability once the disruption to the financial system has already happened. In 
anticipation of this, therefore, the decisions of the financial institutions are not immune by 
moral hazard anyway. 
 
A traditional way for public authorities to maintain financial stability has typically been the 
use of ‘safety nets’, especially in the form of deposit insurance schemes and of the presence 
of a lander of last resort. Deposit insurance schemes have been widely adopted as tools of 
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financial stability in the world, albeit - by themselves - they induce insured depositors to 
relax their efforts to monitor the borrowing institutions. Borrowing institutions, in turn, 
may be induced to pursue risky strategies because of the expectation that public funds 
would in any case rescue the loss of capital. The lander of last resort, instead, provides that 
financial institutions would receive liquidity support if needed, in order to avoid a ‘fire 
sale’ of assets that would generate losses and possibly lead to insolvency. The lander of last 
resort results in moral hazard problems, if financial institutions are safe that the lander of 
last resort would always provide the necessary liquidity. In part, this issue is tackled by the 
‘constructive ambiguity’ (Corrigan, 1990) of central banks that may, in principle, intervene 
to provide the necessary liquidity but they do not provide assurance of this to any particular 
institution. Practically, however, it seems that public authorities can hardly restrain 
themselves from assisting financial institutions whose default has large negative 
repercussions on the rest of the financial system, especially because of their relative large 
size (i.e., ‘too big to fail’). 
 
Setting safety nets aside, public authorities rely on other forms of intervention to support 
financial stability, namely regulation to protect franchise value, regulation to support 
market forces, and capital requirements (Crockett, 1997). 
 
Regulation to protect franchise value 
One way to maintain stability of the financial system is to contain the sources of industrial 
change and innovation. Until about the 1970s, many countries used to adopt public policies 
that effectively limited entry to the financial industry, provided restrictions on interest rate 
competition, and tolerated collusion practices. Commercial and investment bank activities 
were kept segregated from each other. When a default happened, the consequences on the 
financial system were relatively modest and typically public authorities could intervene to 
salvage the defaulted company. During the last decades, however, liberalization and 
deregulation policies increased competition in the financial sector, with the effect to make 
the financial system more vulnerable to sources of instability.  
 
Regulation to support market forces 
Another way to maintain stability of the financial system is to induce financial operators to 
self-regulate their behavior. In principle, the ‘tragedy of the commons’ of financial stability 
arises exactly from the apathy of financial institutions towards externality effects of their 
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potential default. However, financial institutions share the concern of public authorities to 
monitor their exposure to risk in order to better manage their portfolios. Public authorities 
may induce, therefore, financial institutions to make use of their internal risk assessment 
models (subjected to external validation) for determining the extent to which they should be 
subjected to regulatory intervention (e.g., amount of capital requirement). This approach to 
macro-prudential policy has gained attention at the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervisions and it has been incorporated into their Capital Accord. 
 
Regulation to set risk-based capital requirements 
Lastly, another way to maintain stability of the financial system is to set risk-based capital 
requirements, that is, demanding financial institutions - especially banks - to hold a 
minimum amount of capital in relation to their risk-weighted assets. Originally introduced 
with the Basel I regulation in 1988 (and followed by 2004 Basel II and by the Basel III that 
is currently being implemented), capital requirements constitute the cornerstone of 
contemporary financial regulation (Brunnermeier et al., 2009). Basel capital requirement 
regulation have been progressively refined over time, with an increased sensitivity to 
different classes of assets in relation to their risk and to different ‘tiers’ of capital. In 
general, capital requirements are expected to reduce the likelihood that a financial 
institution defaults, and larger financial institutions that hold relatively riskier weighted 
asset portfolios are required to hold higher amounts of capital than smaller and relatively 
less risky ones.   
 
Although capital requirements have resulted in making the financial system apparently 
more stable, nevertheless they may not completely shield the financial system from the 
negative externalities associated with systemic risk. One limitation of the capital 
requirement policy to counteract systemic risk is that capital requirement rules apply to 
‘regulatory capital’ (i.e., the minimum capital required by the regulator), while financial 
decisions made by financial institutions are affected by their ‘economic capital’ (i.e., the 
capital required to cover losses within a certain confidence level) (Elizalde and Repullo, 
2007). Accordingly, some financial decisions result in increased risk to the portfolios of 
financial institutions (e.g., through the use of credit derivatives) but these decisions do not 
have any effect on capital requirements because they do not impact regulatory capital. 
Another limitation of capital requirement policy is that evidence from past financial crises 
showed that financial institutions with relatively small risk exposure (e.g., in terms of size 
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of their balance sheet) can nevertheless pose significant risk of contagion to the whole 
system. 
 
Concerns with the limitations of capital requirements and other policies for dealing with 
systemic risk are heightened by the increased role of derivatives in the contemporary 
financial system. The use of OTC derivatives, in particular, entails that financial institutions 
are exposed to risks that, on the one hand, have profound repercussions on financial 
stability while, on the other one, are not taken into consideration in the ‘standard’ macro-
prudential tools. As a matter of fact, derivative contracts made outside the exchanges have 
been largely unregulated in the past, especially at the time of the outbreak of the 2007-08 
financial crisis: for example, in the US CDS were exempt from regulation by the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) under the Commodity Futures 
Modernization Act (CFMA) of 2000, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has 
limited authority to enforce federal securities laws, and the Federal Reserve (Fed) lacked 
information about derivatives transactions that were not subjected to central clearing or 
recorded in trade repositories (Kiff et al., 2009). In all effect, at the time when the 2007-08 
financial crisis erupted, the financial system lacked information about the exposure to 
systemic risk originating from derivatives, as well as prudential tools for shielding the 
financial system from negative externalities that could originate from derivatives defaults. 
 
The 2007-08 financial crisis (also termed, nowadays, as ‘Great Financial Crisis’ or GFC) 
marked a fundamental rupture in the policy approach towards systemic risk. The kind of 
potential cascades of defaults of financial institutions that could take place in those years 
paralleled only those that had been experienced in the Great Depression, but under 
conditions of greater complexity of the financial system. The dramatic experience of the 
Great Financial Crisis stimulated widespread awareness of the need for a macro-prudential 
or systemic risk regulator, which would especially focus on protecting financial stability 
vis-à-vis sources of instability and negative externalities effects across the network of 
relationships between financial institutions (Bliner, 2010). In order to better understand the 
context where contemporary ideas about systemic risk regulation originated - and, in 
particular, about macro-prudential regulation of financial derivatives - next sections will 
briefly recall the trajectory of the Great Financial Crisis and the role that derivatives played 
in pushing the financial system on the edge of meltdown.  
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3.3 On the Edge of the Meltdown: The Great Financial Crisis 
Reviewing the events that led to the 2007-08 Great Financial Crisis is important in order to 
gain a better understanding of the conditions of the contemporary financial system and the 
role of derivatives as source of systemic risk. During the twenty years before 2007, the 
financial system enjoyed a prolonged period of relative stability and contained fluctuations, 
a phenomenon that - also in conjunction with relative growth of GDP in most countries and 
low inflation - was optimistically called ‘the great moderation’ (Kyrtsou and Sornette, 
2013). Before the Great Financial Crises came, most of pivotal actors of the international 
financial and monetary system (from the academia, the public authorities, and the financial 
professions) confidently praised the success to attain financial stability: as Frederic Mishkin 
(2007) argued, “Fortunately, the overall financial system appears to be in good health, and 
the U.S. banking system is well positioned to withstand stressful market conditions”. The 
‘good health’ suddenly vanished in a few months’ time. 
 
There is no shortage of scholarly and professional works that aimed to reconstruct, analyze, 
interpret, and explain the events that triggered the Great Financial Crisis and its unfolding 
(a review of several book is provided by Lo, 2012). No single causal factor has been clearly 
identified for the origination of the Great Financial Crisis, which can be related to a 
combination of conditions that include global capital flows, poor regulation, regulatory 
capture, inequality, high leverage, skewed economic incentives of borrowers and lenders, 
etc. (Dam, 2010; Kallestrup, 2012; Stout, 2011). The Reports of the US Financial Crisis 
Inquiry Commission (Angelides and Thomas, 2011) and of the EU Liikanen Commission 
(Liikanen, 2012) offer some detailed and enlightening insights into the ‘trigger events’ of 
the Great Financial Crisis, how sources of financial instability extended across the network 
of financial institutions, and how the meltdown of the financial system was prevented - 
albeit, at the cost of massive spending of taxpayers’ money to restore liquidity, solvency 
and credibility of financial institutions.  
 
The Great Financial Crisis unfolded along a process that can be divided into different stages 
(Helleiner, 2011; Roubini and Mihm 2010). The Liikanen Report identified five ‘waves’. 
 
Wave one: “The subprime crisis phase” (mid-2007 to September 2008) 
During the decade before the outbreak of the Great Financial Crisis, various conditions 
related to global capital inflow, low interest rates, and deregulation of financial services 
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resulted in escalating prices of houses in the US (Crotty, 2008). The frenzy in the US house 
market especially originated from advantageous borrowing conditions for American 
households, especially in the form of sub-prime mortgages (i.e., mortgages accorded to 
individuals who historically have difficulty to maintain repayment schedule). Brokers of 
mortgage companies progressively intensified the relaxation of credit check conditions to 
the issue of loans (Jickling, 2009), that were eventually provided even to so-called ‘NINJA’ 
borrowers (i.e., No Income, No Job or Assets). The generous concession of loans resulted 
in a remarkable over-leverage of the US financial system: by the mid-2000s, the ration of 
household debt to GDP had raised above 100% (the last time the level of debt was more 
than 100% of GDP was in 1929, at the beginning of the Great Depression; Reavis, 2009). 
 
The growth of sub-prime mortgages was part of a more general financial scheme that has 
been described as the ‘originate to distribute’ (OTD) strategy (Wilmarth, 2009). The OTD 
strategy included the provision (origination) of consumer and corporate loans (including the 
sub-prime mortgages), the packaging of loans into asset-backed securities (ABS) and 
collateralized debt obligations (CDO), the creation of OTC derivatives based on the 
underlying ABS and CDO securities, and the distribution of these securities to investors. 
The OTD strategy enables financial institutions to increase income from commission fees, 
to transfer to investors the risks associated with the securitized loans, and to expand the 
amount of credit given. During the 2000s, the OTD strategy resulted especially profitable 
and viable, also in relation to the growing demand for high yield products from the side of 
investors (Crotty, 2008). As an indicator of the growth of the OTD strategy, the amount of 
global CDO issuance increase from $ 150 billion in 2004 to $ 2 trillion in 2007 according 
to the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (Sornette and Wooddard, 
2009). 
 
Already in 2005, some sub-prime mortgage holders started defaulting their payments. The 
losses that two sub-prime hedge funds incurred resulted in the temporary closure of the 
market for asset-backed commercial papers and in July a German financial institution 
(Deutsche Industriebank IKB) was not able to roll over its short term funding. Losses from 
the repayment of subprime mortgages intensified in 2007, when financial institutions 
started liquidating their residential mortgage-backed securities. The sale of these assets 
resulted in a sharp decrease in prices of sub-prime securities (up to −80% by December 
2007), but also in other (more quality) tranches. The widespread sale entailed that the 
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market for mortgage-backed securities became illiquid, and that holders of these troubled 
assets could hardly find any seller of credit protection. 
 
The lack of liquidity in the mortgage-backed securities market - and, relatedly, in other 
parts of the inter-bank markets more generally - triggered liquidity problems in some 
financial institutions. In September 2007, Northern Rock applied for emergency liquidity 
aid from the Bank of England (eventually, the financial institution was nationalized In 
February 2008). Public authorities reacted to the signs of financial distress by supplying 
liquidity to the inter-bank market (the ECB, for instance, intervened in August 2007 with 
€95 billion and in December 2007 with € 300 billion).  
 
Wave two: “The systemic crisis phase" (as of September 2008) 
In September 2008, Lehman Brothers collapsed and the financial crisis suddenly escaped to 
the systemic level. Liquidity issues became apparent in other main financial institutions, 
especially American International Group (AIG). Perceptions that financial institutions were 
not financially solid, and that the government would not necessarily step in to salvage them, 
triggered panicked sales of assets. Prices of several financial assets (including bank stocks) 
fell sharply, volatility in global capital markets peaked, and credit spreads intensified. 
Liquidity in the financial markets dried up, with the effect to make it more difficult and 
expensive for financial institutions to short term refund (Schwarcz, 2009). The 
development of global finance in the previous years, in addition, had resulted in complex 
international relationships between financial institutions, with the effect that defaults of 
financial institutions in a country could potentially threaten financial stability in other 
countries.  
 
Extreme measures were taken by governments in the world to sustain liquidity in the 
financial system. Public authorities eventually decided to rescue largest financial 
institutions, on the basis of the argument that their bankruptcy would be detrimental for 
financial stability because of their size (i.e., the ‘too big to fail’ doctrine) and their ties with 
the rest of the financial network (i.e., the ‘too interconnected to fail’). In the US, for 
instance, a massive governmental intervention was required to salvage AIG, Merrill Lynch, 
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Washington Mutual, and Wachovia (Helleiner, 2011), although 
these actions did not prevent hundreds of smaller banks in the US to fail in the period 2008-
2010 (Blinder, 2010). The threat of the financial meltdown, moreover, extended far beyond 
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the US. The governments of the UK and the Netherlands, for example, had to provide 
guarantees to protect the funds that their depositors had put in Icelandic banks, that were 
rapidly hit by the financial storm. 
 
Wave three: “The economic crisis phase" (as of 2009) 
While the negative externalities of the financial crisis were contained by government 
interventions, public authorities turned their attention towards restoring financial stability 
and reinvigorating the distressed real economy. The Financial Stability Board (FSB), 
established in April 2009, started working closely with the Basel Committee on Banking 
and Supervision on the creation of new rules for capital, liquidity and trading requirements, 
that eventually resulted in the formulation of Basel III principles in September 2010. A 
period of relative stability of market prices helped financial institutions to recover their 
financial solidity and improve profitability. However, it became apparent in 2009 that the 
real economy had been severely hit by the financial crisis and that exceptional measures 
were needed to help the recovery of business enterprises and consumption spending. These 
measures, however, came at the cost of increased sovereign debt. 
 
Wave four: "Sovereign crisis phase" (as of 2010) 
The last stage of the Great Financial Crisis is the exacerbation of public finances, especially 
in industrialized countries. The level of public debt in relation to GDP grew most notably in 
peripheral EU countries, such as Portugal, Spain, Italy, Ireland, and Greece. The Greek 
public finance conditions were especially troubled, and widespread concerns with the 
possible default of Greek debt triggered the special intervention from the EU and the IMF, 
that provided a € 110 billion rescue package to the country in May 2010 (also, a € 750 
billion emergency fund was created to support other weak EU economies). After some 
indication that Greece could not be able to meet budgetary targets anyway (and the 
downgrade of Greece’s sovereign debt to CCC in June 2011), an additional support 
package of € 190 billion was provided in July 2011. Later on, it became apparent that 
Greece could not meet even the terms of the second rescue package, and, after lengthy 
negotiations, eventually private holders of Greek debt accepted a 78% net present value 
haircut on their positions in March 2012. 
 
Growing concern with the difficulty that EU banks experienced in accessing the capital 
market induced the European Central Bank (ECB) to offer a special scheme called “Long-
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Term Refinancing Operations” (LTRO) that provided banks with the possibility to take up 
loans to be repaid within three years at a 1% interest rate. In total, 523 banks participated 
for an aggregate amount of € 489 billion in December 2011 and about 800 banks took part 
for an overall amount of € 529 billion in February 2012. The LTRO operations assisted 
restoring financial solidity into the EU system, although they also elicited concerns that the 
EU banks could have used the liquidity to invest in government bonds - therefore possibly 
increasing their exposure to the troubled central banks of EU peripheral countries. It was 
uncertain, moreover, whether the LTRO operations eventually resulted in more credit 
access to small-medium enterprises, households, and other borrowers. 
 
Wave five: “The crisis of confidence in Europe” 
The possibility that EU governments might default their sovereign debt put pressure on 
European banks, that investors suspected to hold large shares of government bonds. Access 
to capital markets deteriorated for European banks, whose stock prices started exhibiting 
signs of greater volatility. Concerned with the stability of the European financial system, 
the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) and, later, the European Banking 
Authority (EBA; established on 1st January 2011), in cooperation with the European 
Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) started conducting ‘stress test’ exercises to assess the 
resilience of financial institutions to adverse market developments (stress tests were 
conducted in 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2014). The stress tests highlighted the levels of 
exposure of the European banking system to sources of risks to financial stability and 
informed subsequent measures, especially in terms of targeted requirements on individual 
institutions. 
 
Explaining the origin and unfolding of the Great Financial Crisis is beyond the aims of the 
present work. For the sake of better understanding how the outbreak of the Great Financial 
Crisis relates to the materialization of systemic risk that threatened the financial stability of 
the US, the EU, and of other financial centers in the world, however, it may be relevant to 
highlight the importance of features of the institutional and regulatory environment where 
the Great Financial Crisis took place. While various factors may have played a role in 
triggering the crisis in 2007, in fact, attention should be also placed on the ‘rules of the 
games’ of the financial system that operated at that time, if we are to argue for why the 
crisis took place at that particular time in history. In this respect, indeed, some scholars 
argue that changes of financial regulations that took place in the between the 1980s and the 
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2000s contributed generating an environment that was favorable at least, if not conducive 
to, the ‘trigger events’ of the Great Financial Crisis (Stout, 2011; Samuel, 2009; Wilmarth, 
2009). 
 
For most of the twentieth century, the financial system was regulated through a relatively 
prudent arrangement, which originated from reactions to the speculative excesses of the late 
1920s (which, in turn, are generally related to the failure of thousands of banks in 1930s 
and to the origins of the Great Depression). Concerned with preventing individual financial 
institutions to take on too much risk, in 1933 US policy-makers enacted the Glass-Steagall 
regulatory system, which included the separation of commercial banking, investment 
banking and insurance activities, that was intended to prevent the use of bank deposits for 
speculative purposes. 
 
In the 1970s and 1980s, various economic and political conditions coalesced to undermine 
the Glass-Steagall regulatory system (Samuel, 2009). On the one hand, rising inflation, 
increased global trade, and the Savings and Loan crisis induced reconsideration of the 
adequacy of the regulatory system to help financial institutions cope with a changed 
financial environment and preserve them from misbehaving. On the other one, liberalism 
ideology - in the form embraced by Thatcher and Reagan - resulted in favorable 
circumstances for re-regulating the operation of financial services. London Stock 
Exchange’s ‘Big Bang’ on 27th October 1986 (when several new regulations of the city’s 
exchange came into force) provided a relevant instance of the changed policy orientation 
towards the de-regulation of financial services and the opening of venues for innovative 
products in the financial market. In the same year, the Federal Reserve in the US 
reinterpreted the Glass-Steagall regulatory system in the sense that a bank could derive up 
to five per cent of revenues from investment banking activities.  
 
The progression towards greater de-regulation of financial services intensified. In the US, 
in 1996 the Federal Reserve further adjusted the reinterpretation of Glass-Steagall allowing 
banks to earn up to 25% revenues from investment banking activities. In 1998, US 
regulators allowed Citicorp to merge with Travelers, resulting in the world’s largest 
financial services company that included commercial banking, investment banking and 
insurance business areas. In 1999, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (also known as the 
Financial Services Modernization Act) repealed part of Glass-Steagall Act that provided 
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separation between banking activities. In 2000, the Commodity Futures Modernization Act 
prevented the Commodity Futures Trading Commission from regulating most OTC 
derivatives (including CDS). By the years 2000s, then, the institutional and regulatory 
conditions in the main world financial markets had come to largely tolerate innovative 
forms of financial services and products. 
 
The changed regulatory system provided a fertile ground for enhanced financial activity. 
The US credit market debt was 168% of GDP in 1981 and it totaled 350% in 2007; 
financial assets were about five times larger than GDP in 1980 but they become ten times 
larger in 2007; the notional value of all derivative contracts amounted to about three times 
global GDP in 1999 but they became more than eleven times in 2007; the notional value of 
CDS derivatives was about $ 6 trillion in 2004 but they become $ 62 trillion in 2007 
(Crotty, 2009). These development were largely led by the main financial services firms - 
especially, companies like Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs and Lehman 
Brothers that, by 2006, had gained the status of ‘universal banks’ (Wilmarth, 2009). 
 
3.4 The Role of Derivatives in the Great Financial Crisis 
Several scholars and analysts agree that, while derivatives did not trigger the Great 
Financial Crisis, nevertheless they largely contributed to creating the conditions for the 
fragility of the financial system and to escalating early defaults to larger threats to financial 
stability. Among derivatives, a primary role in the financial crisis was played by Credit 
Default Swaps (CDS), which were largely concentrated in a relatively small number of 
financial institutions. While CDS primarily serve the objective to transfer risk of default in 
an underlying credit asset, during the 2000s massive amounts of CDS were traded for 
speculative purposes. Financial institutions build up large amounts of CDS in their 
portfolios, which - because of the limits of accounting standards and disclosure 
requirements - were not generally properly tracked and communicated to the public. The 
lack of information on the CDS held by financial institutions, together with their increased 
leverage, resulted in the increase of systemic risk: once the value of US houses plummeted, 
mortgage holders started defaulting their payments, and liquidity dried up, CDS could 
potentially bring down a number of financial institutions, had public authorities not stepped 
in to salvage the financial system of most industrialized countries. 
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At least four features of credit derivatives made them play such a significant role in the 
Great Financial Crisis, namely the lack of information about CDS exposure, the complexity 
of CDS products, hidden leverage, and concentration of risk.  
 
Lack of information: First, credit derivatives (like all OTC derivatives more generally) 
were not typically disclosed with adequate detail. Despite several calls in the past for more 
transparency from public and supervisory authorities, such as BIS and IMF, generally 
financial institutions did not provide detailed information about credit derivatives that they 
held in their portfolios. Setting aside some disclosure of notional amounts and market 
values, financial institutions did not provide information about counterparts and risks 
involved with their CDS contracts (Acharya et al., 2009). As an effect, other financial 
operators could not assess how risky the position of financial institutions was because of 
the CDS contracts already in place. In addition, no public or supervisory authority could 
access centralized information about CDS contracts present in the financial system, with 
the result that no assessment could be made of the overall risk that derivatives posed to 
financial stability (especially, an assessment of whether different CDS contracts were 
correlated with each other).  
 
Complexity of financial products: Second, credit derivatives consisted of highly complex 
financial products, whose complete understanding largely surpassed the cognitive abilities 
of the typical trader. Differently from exchanged derivatives, which are standardized, OTC 
derivatives are custom contract that are bilaterally negotiated between parties. As such, 
OTC contracts are typically illiquid and difficult to price. The value of these contracts, 
therefore, could be only assessed on the basis of complex mathematical models. Further 
complications arose, however, because of the subjectivity involved in determining when a 
‘credit event’ occurs and because of the difficulty to assess the creditworthiness of 
counterparts if they had extensive and complicated exposures to derivatives in their 
portfolios. As a matter of fact, the assessment of the value of credit derivatives depended on  
systems that appeared ‘cryptic’ to the same financial institutions’ users - the result of 
mathematical models implemented through specialized algorithmic coding in computerized 
systems. 
 
Leverage: Third, credit derivatives enabled financial institutions to significantly increase 
their leverage (i.e., debt/equity ratio) in a hidden way. Credit derivatives like CDS started to 
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be used in conjunction with other credit derivatives, especially Collateralized Debt 
Obligations (CDOs) (D’Souza et al., 2009). CDOs consisted of asset-backed securities that 
derived their value from portfolios of underlying assets, such as mortgages, corporate 
bonds, and credit card debts. These debts were converted into different ‘packages’ and sold 
as securities, with the underlying assets serving as collateral. These securities were often 
sold in ‘tranches’, where the first (equity) tranche bore most of the risk (and return) and 
other tranches held less risk (and return). The CDOs were typically held by banks as off-
balance-sheet assets. Because of the lack of information about credit derivatives, the 
leverage of financial institutions was hidden to the eyes of other financial operators. Credit 
derivatives, therefore, were used as a ‘secret lien’ (Simkovic, 2009) that made financial 
institutions appear more creditworthy than they actually were. By hiding the amount of risk 
exposure, financial institutions were able to increase their leverage at disproportionate 
levels: Goldman Sachs, for example, possessed about $40 billion of equity in front of $1.1 
trillion of assets, and Merrill Lynch had about $30 billion of equity for $1 trillion of assets 
(Crotty, 2009).  
 
Concentration of risk: Fourth, credit derivatives resulted in massive concentration of risk 
in financial institutions that served as ‘hubs’ of several counterparts. Credit derivatives 
enables financial operators to transfer risks to other market actors that were willing, upon 
receipt of a fee, to take on the risk. Over time, some financial institutions accumulated 
immense risk positions, that eventually exposed them to large losses when the counterparts 
claimed to receive the credit risk protection. The concentration of risk, moreover, was 
typically related to the adoption of the ‘originate to distribute’ model, that induced financial 
institutions to create credit risks first through the concession of sub-prime loans, then to 
securitize them, and then to sell packaged credit securities through the capital market. 
Credit derivatives served the purpose to shift risk away from the financial institutions that 
created credit risks through the concessions of sub-prime loans on the one hand, and to gain 
commission fees for taking on concentrated risks (typically, through subsidiaries of main 
bank groups) from other financial operators.  
 
The combined effect of these features of credit derivatives resulted in an increase of 
systemic risk. When US mortgage holders started to default and the crisis hit the market, 
the price of collateralized credit securities, such as CDOs, plummeted. Rating agencies 
responded by downgrading these products, that lost additional market value therefore. The 
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presence of credit derivatives (especially CDS) resulted in losses for the financial 
institutions that were expected to provide credit protection. Losses triggered margin calls, 
that financial operators could only provide by fire-selling safer assets (the only ones that 
had market). The market price of assets and derivatives went down, because of both the 
massive sale and the lack of reliable information about their value. The capital of banks 
evaporated as they valued securities according to their estimated current value. As a 
consequence, banks reduced credit, both to non-bank operators and then also to other banks 
in the inter-bank market.  
 
How could credit derivatives come to exercise such an influential role? In part, the answer 
can be found in the features of the regulatory environment - namely, in the progressive 
formulation of legislation that favored the explosion of credit derivatives while lacking the 
means for keeping the use of such derivatives under control. In the modern era, derivatives 
were originally regarded for their function to protect business from accidental events (e.g., 
a farmer that protected his business from the risk of price fluctuation of crops). The 
speculative use of derivatives, instead, was highly criticized - and legally restrained - 
because of its lack of social benefits. During the last decades, however, various legislative 
interventions in the US progressively removed barriers to the use of derivatives, or even 
introduced advantageous consequences from the use of derivatives. In the opinion of some 
scholars (Crotty, 2009; Simkovic, 2009; Stout, 2011), we should exactly look at the 
changes of legislation and regulation of derivatives over the last decades in order to identify 
the conditions that made derivatives play an influential role in the mounting of the crisis. 
 
The way changed legislation opened up possibilities for the speculative use of derivatives is 
highlighted by Stout (2011), who argued that the Commodities Futures Modernization Act 
(CFMA) of 2000 dramatically changed the way finance operated. The author highlighted 
that, since the nineteenth century, the common law had developed the so-called ‘rule 
against difference contracts’ doctrine, that considered derivative contracts (also called 
‘difference contracts’ in the past) as unenforceable gambles if they did not serve hedging 
purposes. For example, in a case (Irwin v. Williar) discussed in 1884, the US Supreme 
Court explained:  
 
“The generally accepted doctrine in this country is . . . that a contract for 
the sale of goods to be delivered in the future is valid, even though the 
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seller has not the goods, nor any means of getting them than to go into the 
market and buy them; but such a contract is only valid when the parties 
really intend and agree that the goods are to be delivered by the seller and 
the price to be paid by the buyer; and, if under guise of such a contract, 
the real intent be merely to speculate in the rise or fall of prices, and the 
goods are not to be delivered, but one party is to pay to the other the 
difference between the contract price and the market price of the goods at 
the date fixed for executing the contract, then the whole transaction 
constitutes nothing more than a wager, and it is null and void.” 
 
The lack of juridical protection of speculative derivatives resulted in the creation of 
privately organized exchanges, where clearinghouses provided the private enforcement of 
these contracts. In 1936, the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) confirmed that speculative 
derivatives trading was confined to the organized exchanges. These institutional 
arrangements, however, were progressively dismantled since the 1980s. In 2000, the 
CFMA effectively legalized, for the first time in US history, the speculative trading of OTC 
derivatives. After the CFMA, the aggregate volume and value of derivatives (especially, 
OTC credit derivatives) skyrocketed, and the stage for the financial crisis had been 
prepared.  
 
Another feature of the US legislation that contributed to make derivatives play an important 
role in the Great Financial Crisis was the exceptional status of derivatives in bankruptcy 
procedures (Crotty, 2009). Since the 1970s, the US Bankruptcy Code gives creditors in 
derivatives transactions special rights and immunities in the bankruptcy process, including 
unlimited enforcement rights against the debtors (the so-called ‘safe harbor’ attribute). 
These special provisions for derivatives grew over time under the lobbying pressure of the 
financial industry on the US Congress, on the basis of arguments that the financial system 
(especially, the commodities futures market) would be otherwise too fragile. The special 
protection of derivatives, however, later expanded to include any kind of derivative 
contracts, especially including swaps. Given that the safe harbor for derivatives enables the 
derivative creditor to terminate the contract and to take possession of the collateral of the 
derivative debtor in case of bankruptcy, the special protection of derivatives results in the 
downplaying of the counterpart risk. As a consequence, the preferential treatment of 
derivatives accorded by the Bankruptcy code also helps explaining the growth of 
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derivatives before the crisis, as well as the amount of risk exposure that financial 
institutions were willing to take on. 
 
Both features of derivatives and special conditions included in the US legislation, therefore, 
help explaining the role that derivatives contracts played in the Great Financial Crisis. 
According to the Report of the US Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011), derivatives 
contributed to the Great Financial Crisis in three ways: 
 
“First, one type of derivative—credit default swaps (CDS)—fueled the 
mortgage securitization pipeline. CDS were sold to investors to protect 
against the default or decline in value of mortgage-related securities 
backed by risky loans. Companies sold protection—to the tune of $79 
billion, in AIG’s case—to investors in these newfangled mortgage 
securities, helping to launch and expand the market and, in turn, to further 
fuel the housing bubble. 
 
Second, CDS were essential to the creation of synthetic CDOs. These 
synthetic CDOs were merely bets on the performance of real mortgage-
related securities. They amplified the losses from the collapse of the 
housing bubble by allowing multiple bets on the same securities and 
helped spread them throughout the financial system. Goldman Sachs 
alone packaged and sold $73 billion in synthetic CDOs from July 1, 2004, 
to May 31, 2007. Synthetic CDOs created by Goldman referenced more 
than 3,400 mortgage securities, and 610 of them were referenced at least 
twice. This is apart from how many times these securities may have been 
referenced in synthetic CDOs created by other firms. 
 
Finally, when the housing bubble popped and crisis followed, derivatives 
were in the center of the storm. The insurance company American 
International Group (AIG), which had not been required to put aside 
capital re- serves as a cushion for the protection it was selling, was bailed 
out when it could not meet its obligations. The government ultimately 
committed more than $180 billion because of concerns that AIG’s 
collapse would trigger cascading losses throughout the global financial 
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system. In addition, the existence of millions of derivatives con- tracts of 
all types between systemically important financial institutions—unseen 
and unknown in this unregulated market—added to uncertainty and 
escalated panic, helping to precipitate government assistance to those 
institutions.” 
 
The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission also commented that the regulators had the power 
to protect the financial system from the diffusion of the crisis. In their view, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) could have required more capital and stopped risky 
practices of the big investment banks. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York could have 
prevented excessive leverage of major financial institutions, such as Citigroup. Also, 
policy-makers and regulators could have stopped the widespread practice of mortgage 
securitization. Instead, regulators authorities did not act, for reasons that may be related to a 
lack of political will and to cognitive and social barriers to criticize the way the financial 
system operated, especially in an age when finance seemed (to the eyes of many, including 
those in public and supervisory authority positions) to support growth and profitability. 
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Chapter 4 
 
The Regulation of OTC Derivatives 
 
4.1 Financial Regulation: An Overview 
The regulation of the financial system consist of activities that are carried out by public and 
supervisory authorities on the conduct of financial institutions in order to maintain the 
integrity of the financial system. Financial regulation is concerned with the solidity of 
individual financial operators, the protection of financial customers, the maintenance of 
confidence in the financial markets, and the stability of the financial system as a whole. 
These aims are attained through various means, which include the provision of guidelines 
and standards of conduct (i.e., a ‘soft regulation’) and the enforcement of requirements and 
restrictions on the behavior of financial operators. These activities are carried out by several 
supervisory and regulatory authorities (with some variations across countries), which 
generally focus on the supervision of stock markets, of derivatives markets, of listed 
companies, and of banks and other financial operators (e.g., dealers, brokers, and market-
makers). In the US, for example, regulatory institutions include the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), the 
Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFCT), the Federal Reserve, and other public 
and supervisory agencies. In the UK, regulatory functions are performed by the Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA) and the Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA). In Italy, 
financial regulatory functions are carried out by the Commissione Nazionale per le Società 
e la Borsa (CONSOB) and the Bank of Italy.  
 
A large component part of financial regulation is the regulation of banks, which obviously 
play a fundamental role as financial intermediaries that borrow funds, lend funds, and 
operate in the financial markets. Bank regulation is intended to attain various objectives, 
including preserving the financial solidity of individual banks, reducing systemic risk, 
avoiding misuse of funds and fraudulent behavior. Regulation of banks is carried out 
through various means, that generally include supervisory activities (e.g., the issue of a 
bank license before the financial institution can operate), minimum requirements (e.g., 
setting conditions, such as minimum capital ratios, that banks have to comply with), and 
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market discipline (e.g., stock market’s reaction to public information provided by banks 
when complying with mandatory disclosure requirements). In part, these regulatory 
approaches - called the ‘three pillars’ under Basel II - are implemented through various 
tools, such as, for example, reserve requirements, credit rating requirements, corporate 
governance regulations, financial reporting and mandatory disclosure requirements, and 
various kinds of restrictions (such as, for instance, mandatory separation of commercial and 
investment banking activities, that was provided in the US by the Glass-Steagall Act in 
1933).  
 
Among the tools of banking regulation, capital requirement is especially relevant in the 
context of the present discussion on derivatives regulation. In general terms, capital 
requirement relates to the amount of capital that a financial institutions must hold as 
required by the financial regulator, generally expressed as a percentage of risk-weighted 
assets. Since the late 1980s, capital requirement has been determined on the basis of the 
Basel Accord, namely by Basel I in 1988, Basel II in 2004, and recently, Basel III in 2010-
11. Basel I, which was eventually adopted in over 100 countries, provided a classification 
of assets into five categories depending on credit risk and required banks to hold capital 
equal to 8% of risk-weighted assets. Basel II defined capital requirement in relation to three 
kinds of risk, namely credit risk, operational risk, and market risk, and provided specific 
methodologies for calculating each of them (although also Basel II provided that banks 
could progressively develop their own risk measurement system in place of standardized 
approaches). Basel II defined two types of capital, namely ‘tier 1’ largely formed of 
shareholders’ equity and disclosed reserves and ‘tier 2’ (or supplementary capital) formed 
of undisclosed reserves, revaluation reserves, general provisions, hybrid instruments and 
subordinated term debt, and required banks to comply with set ratios of tier 1 and tier 1+2 
capital with respect to risk-adjusted assets.  
 
Basel III, which was negotiated in the aftermath of the Great Financial Crisis in 2010-11, 
developed within the context of the policy reactions to deficiencies in financial regulation. 
In general terms, Basel III strengthens the capital requirements principles already set by 
Basel II, while it also introduces additional forms of safeguard to financial stability. Basel 
III provides that minimum common equity would be raised to 4.5% of risk-weighted assets 
after deductions; that contractual terms of capital instruments would include a clause that 
allows – at the discretion of the relevant authority – write-off or conversion to common 
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shares if the bank is judged to be non-viable; that that banks should hold a capital 
conservation buffer that includes common equity equal to at least 2.5% of risk-weighted 
assets (bringing the total common equity standard to 7%); and that banks should set up a 
countercyclical buffer within a range of 0-2.5% comprising common equity, when 
authorities judge credit growth is resulting in an unacceptable build up of systematic risk. 
 
Basel III also contains measures intended to provide risk coverage and contain leverage. 
Measures include the strengthening of capital treatment for certain complex securitization 
and the requirement that banks conduct more rigorous credit analyses of externally rated 
securitization exposures; the requirement that banks holds significantly higher capital for 
trading derivatives, as well as complex securitization held in the trading book; the 
introduction of a stressed value-at-risk framework to help mitigate pro-cyclicality; the 
introduction of a capital charge for incremental risk that estimates the default and migration 
risks of un-securitized credit products and takes liquidity into account; the strengthening of 
the counterpart credit risk framework with more stringent requirements for measuring 
exposure, incentives for banks to use central counterparts for derivatives, and higher capital 
for inter-financial sector exposures. Basel III also provides that trade exposures to a 
qualifying CCP will receive a 2% risk weight and default fund exposures to a qualifying 
CCP will be capitalized according to a risk-based method that estimates risk arising from 
such default fund. Finally, Basel III also provides a non-risk-based leverage ratio that 
includes off-balance sheet exposures and that serves as a backstop to the risk-based capital 
requirement. 
 
Within the Basel III capital requirements, special attention has been devoted to the 
regulation of systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). Basel III provides that 
SIFIs must have higher loss absorbency capacity to reflect the greater risks that they pose to 
the financial system. By using a methodology that includes 12 indicators of both 
quantitative and qualitative sort to identify systemically important banks, the requirement 
provides that banks increase their loss absorbency requirements with a progressive 
Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital requirement ranging from 1% to 2.5% depending on 
the bank’s systemic importance. Additional loss absorbency plays the role of disincentive 
to increase a bank’s global systemic importance. Notably, after the initial release of the 
higher loss absorbency capacity requirement by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision in November 2011, a revised document - titled “Global systemically important 
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banks: updated assessment methodology and the higher loss absorbency requirement” - was 
issued in July 2013.  
 
Basel III also contains additional provisions that refer to leverage ratio and to liquidity 
requirements. The leverage ratio is specifically intended to counteract the effects of too 
high leverage in financial institutions. During the Great Financial Crisis, market pressures 
induced highly leveraged financial institutions to de-leverage, with the effect of pushing 
asset prices down even further. This de-leveraging amplified the feedback loop between 
losses, reduction of bank capital, and reduction of credit availability. Basel III introduced, 
therefore, a non-risk based leverage ratio (computed as the ratio between capital measure - 
or Tier 1 capital - and exposure measure - largely based on accounting data but also taking 
into account of off-balance-sheet items) as an additional cautionary measure to the risk-
based capital requirement. The introduction of leverage ratio is still in progress, and it is 
expected to be fully implemented by 2018.  
 
Finally, the liquidity requirements of Basel III are intended to provide additional sources of 
resilience of the financial system. The liquidity requirements take the form of the Liquidity 
Coverage Ratio (LCR) and the Net Stable Funding Ratio. The Liquidity Coverage Ratio 
aims to make a bank retain enough high-quality liquid assets to cover its total net cash 
outflow over 30 days in stress scenario, while the Net Stable Funding Ratio aims to make 
the available amount of stable funding to exceed the required amount of stable funding over 
a one-year period of extended stress. It is the LCR that is especially keyed to ensure the 
liquidity in face of potential stress in the short term and to avoid potential spillovers from 
the financial to the real sectors of the economy (BIS, 2013). In essence, the LCR provides 
that banks retain an adequate amount of high quality liquid assets. The requirements of the 
LCR will be introduced at reduced intensity (60% by 1st January 2015) and they will 
progressively increase over time until full implementation by 2019. 
 
It should be highlighted that the flow of regulatory interventions - from Basel I to Basel III 
- follows an evolutionary trajectory. Basel I regulations primarily addressed credit risk, 
while other kinds of risks were left to the national regulators. Also, Basel I primarily 
targeted globally active banks, and it was intended to reduce global competitive inequality 
among banks and to strengthen the international banking system (Balthazar, 2006). Basel II 
regulations were intended to address some shortcomings of Basel I, especially in face of 
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emerging securitization activity of banks and of the development of internal models for risk 
assessment in large banks (that had become more complex and sophisticated than the one 
provided in Basel I). Basel III regulations emerged as a prompt response to the Great 
Financial Crisis and were aimed to increase the safety of the banking system, with special 
attention to liquidity management.  
 
Some, however, contend that the regulation of the financial and banking system followed 
an evolutionary approach.  Cunningham and Zaring (2009), for example, highlighted that a 
noticeable feature of the present financial regulatory system that emerged from the response 
to the Great Financial Crisis is that the reform of the financial and banking system followed 
a ‘developed-on-the-fly’ approach, i.e., that regulations consisted of scattered and reactive 
measures taken to counteract urgent problems rather than of a well designed and 
comprehensive program of interventions. This characterization of the present regulatory 
system would be especially apparent in the US, where the initiatives of Secretary of 
Treasury Henry Paulson and Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke in 2008 converted a 
previously disaggregated domestic financial and banking regulatory regime into a more 
centralized one. The resulting US regulatory system granted more relevance to the central 
bank, created a de facto hierarchy of financial regulators, marginalized the role of 
investment banks, and federalized or nationalized other firms. Incidentally, Cunningham 
(2009) also argued that the present US regulatory system, devised along Paulson’s 
intentions, is one where consolidation serves the purpose of enhancing the global 
competitiveness of the US financial system, in contrast to a more internationally 
collaborative approach as could have developed under Paul Volcker’s orientation.  
 
 
4.2 Weaknesses and Limitations of the Present Financial Regulatory System 
Several studies have tried to assess the strengths and weaknesses of financial regulations. A 
review of some among the main works done in this area is important in order to articulate 
the rationales and objectives of financial regulation. In addition, a review of these works 
also serves the purpose of explaining the arguments for the identification of the ‘open 
issues’ in the regulation of the financial system at the present time. The construction of a 
safe and sound regulatory system - especially, one that takes into account the apparent need 
for greater macro-prudential regulation - is still an unfinished work, and - as we will argue 
below - additional research is needed to enhance the resilience and solidity of the financial 
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system worldwide. Generally speaking, works done on the assessment of the strengths and 
weaknesses of financial regulation can be divided in two camps, namely those that advocate 
for the need of a better designed regulatory system and those that argue that regulations 
have negative or counter productive effects and that they should be reduced or minimized 
(that Basel III financial regulation would result in negative effects, moreover, was also 
argued by bankers and top executives, who claimed that that the increased capital ratios 
would make banks to able to function and would reduce banks’ return on equity with 
detrimental effects to their shareholders). 
 
Brunnermeier et al. (2009) are among those who argued that additional attention should be 
paid to designing better financial regulation. After noticing that financial and banking crises 
are not too rare phenomena (e.g., they counted more than 100 such crises before the 2007-
08 one), they highlighted the main rationales for regulation of financial activity, that relate 
to the presence of five kinds of negative externalities: 
 
1) Information contagion: the failure of a financial institution generates beliefs that also 
other (similar) financial institutions may default, with the effect that lenders of other 
financial institutions lose confidence and withdraw their funds, causing a sudden liquidity 
problem for the other financial institutions and resulting (in a self-fulfilling prophecy) in a 
more likely default. 
 
2) Information loss: the failure of a financial institution results in the difficulty for the 
customers to access funding from other financial institutions, which do not possess the 
detailed information that the defaulted financial institution possessed about the customers. 
 
3) Loss contagion: in nowadays economy financial institutions are deeply dependent upon 
reciprocal lending and risk-shifting schemes, therefore the failure of a financial institution 
is likely to have repercussions in terms of losses of other financial institutions. 
 
4) Liquidity spirals: liquidity difficulty in one financial institution may trigger forced sell 
of assets (fire sales), that result in the fall of market prices of the same assets held on other 
financial institutions’ books, with the effect of worsening the solvency and liquidity of 
these other financial institutions (that, in turn, may trigger further forced sell of assets). 
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5) De-leveraging: liquidity difficulty in one financial institution may also trigger the 
restriction of credit extension to borrowers, with the effect of lowering output and prices in 
the economy, therefore increasing the likelihood of defaults of borrowers (that, in turn, may 
trigger further restriction of credit extensions). 
 
Brunnermeier et al. (2009) argued that in the past financial regulation was overtly focused 
on the conduct of individual banks (i.e., it was too much micro-prudential) and that it has 
therefore overlooked the problem of negative externalities spreading from one financial 
institution to another (i.e., regulation should be more macro-prudential). The authors 
suggest, however, that it is the self-amplifying dynamic (e.g., contagion or repercussions of 
one financial institution’s default or liquidity problems onto other financial institutions) that 
lies at the core of financial crises. In fact, while the maturity mismatch between assets and 
liabilities at any particular financial institution may be relatively contained, at the systemic 
level the concatenation of lending relationships between financial institutions may result in 
an overall serious mismatch that may capitulate into sudden liquidity problems. 
 
In the past, financial regulators had largely assumed that if financial institutions had 
adequate capital ratio then they could avoid illiquidity problems because of the possibility 
to raise extra funds in the market. Evidence from the Great Financial Crisis showed that this 
in not always the case. Illiquidity problems may arise anyway, especially in relation to the 
aggregate (‘herding’) behavior of financial institutions. If something the Great Financial 
Crisis made clear, therefore, it is that micro-prudential regulation (one that has been 
historically linked especially to capital adequacy) should be complemented by macro-
prudential one for safeguarding the financial system as a whole. The macro-prudential 
approach should be based on measures to counteract the cyclicality of the economy and to 
penalize dangerous funding mismatches.  
 
Several academic works have called for the design of better financial regulation. Laeven 
and Levine (2008) noticed that capital requirements may induce increasing risk taking, as 
the owners of the financial institutions tend to compensate for the loss of utility from more 
stringent capital requirements by selecting a riskier investment portfolio (Koehn and 
Santomero, 1980). Kashyap et al (2010) highlighted that increased capital requirements 
result in the migration of credit creation to the shadow banking system, that can enhance 
the fragility of the financial system, and that therefore financial regulation is incomplete if 
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the shadow banking system is not included in regulatory supervision. Vallascas and Kaesey 
(2012) highlighted that, whole capital adequacy and liquidity requirements may improve 
the resilience of a bank to systemic events, a cap on bank absolute size appears the most 
effective tool to reduce the default risk of a bank given systemic events, and that smaller 
economies would require smaller banks. 
 
Acharya (2009) argued that we should take a ‘collective’ approach towards financial 
regulation, where regulators should be concerned with the joint failure risk of banks as well 
as their individual failure risk. In effect, every bank makes investment choices that have 
externalities on the payoffs of other banks and others’ investment choices. Regulators, 
therefore, should take into account how banks behave taking into consideration the 
incentives that arise from financial regulation and the consequences of the conduct of other 
financial operators. The design of regulatory policies that takes into account only individual 
bank risks is suboptimal in a multiple bank context. Capital adequacy requirements, in 
particular, should be increasing in the correlation of risks across banks as well as individual 
risks. Moreover, banks should be penalized for holding portfolios with high correlation of 
returns, therefore the author proposed a ‘correlation-based’ capital adequacy requirement.  
 
Brunnermeier et al. (2009) noticed that, although small financial operators may not pose 
any systemic risk, they may exhibit ‘herding behavior’, i.e., they may conduct investment 
choices in a similar way so that their aggregate effect is the one to take considerable 
amount of overall risk. If this is the case, then not only do regulatory authorities need to 
monitor the conduct of financial operators (i.e., to require transparency), but they also need 
tools to affect the behavior of financial operators in order to prevent, or to correct, the 
excessive concentration of risk in the financial system (Blinder, 2010). It seems 
appropriate, then, that the regulatory system provides that higher capital requirements are 
placed on systemically important institutions, whose potential impact on the rest of the 
financial system relates to their size and structure of network relationships (moreover, the 
additional capital charge would be justified by their ‘too big to fail’ substantive status, that 
entails the likelihood that public authorities would step in to rescue them from default). 
Additionally, we could consider whether also any other financial operator should be 
required to hold additional capital depending on how much they contribute to systemic risk 
in the financial system. 
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Blinder (2010) highlighted that the proposal to require financial institutions to hold 
additional capital in relation to their particular relationship to systemic risk builds on the 
notion of ‘contingent capital’, akin to the function of ‘reverse convertible debentures’ 
(Flannery, 2005). The proposal entails that regulators would have the power, by declaring a 
systemic crisis, to force holders of special convertibles to convert bonds to equity against 
their will. In this way, financial institutions would be given more equity capital and less 
debt when they need it. These special convertible bonds would call for higher interest rate 
(because of the diminished value of being subjected to compulsory conversion; else, the 
conversion rate could be priced below market). A limitation of the proposal, however, is 
that it is hard to anticipate how much the market would price these special convertible 
bonds and how costly they would be, as source of capital, to financial institutions. This 
proposal has been also made by the Liikanen Report (2012), which exactly called for 
greater use of ‘bail-inable debt’. 
 
De Lisa et al. (2011) focused on deposit insurance schemes and proposed a new approach 
of estimating the loss distribution based on Basel II framework. By considering two major 
sources of systemic risk, namely the correlation between banks’ assets and interbank 
lending contagion, they showed that the introduction of bank contagion via the interbank 
lending market could lead to the collapse of the entire banking system of a country (they 
especially focused on the empirical basis of Italian banks). They argued, therefore, that 
policy-makers should reconsider capital requirements in relation to deposit insurance 
schemes.  
 
Acharya et al. (2011) reviewed the contrasting tendencies that operate on the debt-to-equity 
structure of financial institutions. They proposed that banks should hold a two-tier capital 
framework, that includes first tier of regular core capital requirement that is intended to 
deter excessive risk-taking, and a second tier of special capital account that limits risk 
taking but preserves creditors’ monitoring incentives. The second tier of special capital 
account consists of capital that must be invested in Treasuries or equivalent, which would 
belong to the shareholders as long as the bank is solvent, and to the regulators if the bank 
defaults. In this way, it is possible to reduce the risk-appetite of banks and to monitor bank 
manger (which would also care about the share of debt that could be converted to equity). 
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Hanson et al. (2011) reviewed the mechanisms of macro prudential policy, and 
recommended that financial regulatory regimes should include additional tools to ensure 
the stability of the financial system, namely: time-varying capital requirements (where 
banks are asked to maintain higher ratios of capital to assets in good times than in bad times 
in order to rely on a buffer when adverse shocks hit and have less capital requirement 
pressure when a crisis erupts); higher quality capital (where banks should be rapidly 
recapitalized in a crisis, and therefore regulators should require most capital requirement to 
be satisfied with common equity rather than preferred stock); corrective actions taken as 
dollars of capital, not capital rations (where banks would be required to raise additional 
capital until they repair their capital ratios); contingent capital (where banks would be 
required to hold instruments of automatic recapitalization when some conditions - related to 
crisis events - are triggered, like automatically convertible bonds); regulation of debt 
maturity (where banks would be required to hold more longer term debt); and regulation of 
shadow banking (where regulators should also focus on non-bank financial operators, 
which do not finance themselves with insured deposit but which are nevertheless subject to 
wholesale financial runs). 
 
Levine (2012) argued that financial regulation may not be so relevant to prevent or contain 
financial crises if these are fundamentally triggered by bad policies. In the author’s opinion, 
the seeds of the Great Financial Crisis lay in the deliberate and ill-fated policies that policy-
makers - notably, the US Congress and the Federal Reserve - pursued and that resulted in 
encouraging financial markets and financial institutions to take excessive risk (Levine, 
2010). In Levine’s (2012) view, then, financial regulation is ‘missing the point’ when it 
focuses on tools of micro-prudential and macro-prudential regulation, as the crises may be 
rather fueled by defects in systemic financial governance. In other words, regulatory 
requirements are not able, by themselves, to counteract the negative effects of bad policy 
decisions made by policy-makers and regulators, who should be, because of their expertise 
and position, able to anticipate the consequences of their choices. Levine (2012), therefore, 
argued that the financial regulatory system is missing the mechanism through which the 
public and its elected representatives can obtain an informed, expert, and independent 
assessment of financial regulation. That the reform of the financial system did not place 
adequate attention to governance was also noticed by Avgouleas et al. (2013), who 
highlighted the lack of formal governance structure dealing with cross-border supervision 
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of global financial institutions and with cross-border crises and resolution of global 
institutions.  
 
Other academic works, instead, can be placed in the camp of those who argued that 
regulations have negative or counter productive effects and that they should be reduced or 
minimized - rather than enhanced. Van Hoose (2007), for example, held that the intellectual 
foundations for the capital regulation regime is not too strong: according to reviewed 
literature, the effects of capital regulation on asset risk and overall safety and soundness of 
the banking system may be not so clear, as increased capital requirements may enhance 
bank stability but they may also make banks riskier institutions. He also noticed that., 
drawing from the implementation of Basel I, past experience suggests that financial 
operators can learn how to ‘game the system’ and substantially bypass unwelcome 
regulation. Also, greater capital requirements result in a reduction in total lending, increases 
in market loan rates, and substitution from landing to holding alternative assets. In sum, van 
Hoose (2007) presented some skeptical arguments for the effectiveness of capital 
requirements, provided that, although they may result in greater capital cushion from 
losses, they may also induce banks to adjust their behavior in ways that result in 
counterproductive effects.  
 
Another work in this camp is the one of Thakor (2012), who especially criticized the so-
called ‘Volcker rule’, i.e., a ban on proprietary trading (investment banking) by commercial 
banks included in the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act. Thakor (2012) argued that the Volcker rule 
has negative effects on market making and liquidity provisions for many securities, making 
financial institutions focus on smaller and risker securities where large and unexpected 
supply-demand shocks are more likely. Also, the Volcker rule would reduce the network 
benefits of market making for financial institutions and businesses, it would result in higher 
cost of capital for businesses and lower capital investment by borrowers, and it would make 
bank risk management less efficient, harming the ability of businesses to raise capital. 
 
Among the works that criticize the present financial regulatory system, Scott (2010) 
highlighted that the capital requirements for containing systemic risk should be determined 
by market forces rather than by regulators. The author noticed that the Basel process had 
attained a rather poor record to prevent or contain financial crises, for reasons that he 
imputes to the methodological and political difficulties in the group of regulators. Rather 
	   72	  
than determining capital requirement on administrative basis, then, he proposed that 
financial institutions should be required to disclose their risks and that they should not be 
provided any bailout (in order to reduce moral hazard): accordingly, creditors and 
counterparts should become more vigilant in assessing the riskiness of financial institutions 
for both the particular transactions and for the threat that they would pose to the financial 
system. 
 
The argument that market forces are able to provide discipline to financial institutions in 
particular and to the financial system as a whole in general was also put forward by other 
scholars, including Dowd (1996). If there is no lender of last resort or government 
guarantees, depositors and investors would be aware of the risks, and therefore would be 
attentive to screen less risky banks, monitor bank behavior, and withdraw their funds at the 
earliest sign of misconduct. In order to avoid funds withdrawal, financial institutions would 
be inclined to pursue conservative lending and investment policies and to enhance their 
transparency to reassure depositors and investors. Among the measures that financial 
institutions would take to signal their quality, they would self-select levels of capitalization 
that better satisfy the market demand from depositors and investors.  
 
Of course, such argument for market-based regulation of the financial system is criticized 
on various grounds. Dowd (1996) argued that market-based regulation of the financial 
system would be extremely pro-cyclical and that the central bank would intervene in any 
case. Santos (2001) highlighted that financial institutions play such an important role in 
financial intermediation as providing liquidity, monitoring and information services that 
any systemic crisis would entail intolerable social costs. Moreover, market-based regulation 
would not completely remove the moral hazard problem, provided that the managers of 
financial institutions would not necessarily behave in a way that is consistent with the 
interests of the owners (and of the depositors and investors alike). In addition, screening 
and monitoring is too costly for any single depositor or investor, especially smaller ones.  If 
any depositors or investors engage in screening and monitoring, then others would free ride 
taking advantage of others’ efforts to extract relevant information and simply mimic their 
behavior.  
 
Arguments that criticize the present financial regulation may also relate to either 
ideological or partisan perspectives. As a matter of pragmatism, the present financial 
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regulation is largely intended to address the fundamental issue of commercial and financial 
relationships, namely hidden leverage (Simkovic, 2009). Hidden leverage refers to the 
problem where debtors have the interest to hide their debts in the eyes of creditors: higher 
leverage, in fact, entails that debtors are perceived more risky and therefore would be 
changed higher interest rates for additional debt. In principle, it would be beneficial for all 
(potential and actual) creditors to share information about transparent (potential and actual) 
debtors, so that they are equally well informed of the creditworthiness of the debtors. In 
practice, debtors and creditors may collude to hide the borrowing already made to other 
potential lenders and to grant a preferential treatment to loans already in place: in this way, 
existing senior creditors would be privileged with respect to novel junior ones in case of 
default, and the debtor would not have to pay higher interest rates to the novel junior 
creditors.  
 
In the past, commercial and financial law generally developed the doctrine of so-called 
‘secret lien’. A lien - that is, a claim of a creditor on the debtor’s property that is superior to 
claims of other creditors - is secret if it is not properly disclosed to other potential creditors. 
The doctrine of ‘secret lien’ states that secret lien holders do not have any preferential 
treatment in case of debtor’s default, and that their claims are rather subordinated to those 
of other creditors. The doctrine of secret liens, therefore, deprived hidden leverage of a 
source of legal protection and therefore stimulated transparency. Over the last century, 
however, the doctrine of secret lien has been progressively eroded by various policy 
measures, that gradually introduced various forms of exceptions to bankruptcy codes and 
exemptions from the rule. A very relevant policy change, in this respect, was the 
introduction of an exception to the secret lien doctrine granted to asset securitization and 
derivatives, i.e., the granting of preferential treatment to the holders of asset-backed 
securities and derivatives even if these financial contracts did not comply with transparency 
requirements (i.e., de fact, they allowed the formation of hidden leverage that could not be 
monitored and assessed to the eyes of other creditors). Simkovic (2009) argued, in fact, that 
it was exactly the preferential treatment granted to asset-backed securities and derivatives 
(i.e., the presence of liens attached to these financial instruments in case of default of the 
debtor) that account for their diffusion and growth in the financial system, especially in the 
last few decades (Faubus, 2010). 
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One central feature of Basel III and of national legislations passed in the aftermath of the 
Great Financial Crisis, like in the US, is precisely the one to acknowledge that more 
transparency is needed in order to enable financial operators and regulators to better 
understand the leverage and the exposure to risk of financial institutions. This and other 
financial regulations, such as greater capital requirements and limitations of universal 
banking, will result in profound changes to the business models and the strategies pursued 
by financial institutions (Weingher, 2012). According to Weingher (2012), it is likely that 
low-margin businesses will be reduced, capital will be increased in both US and EU 
financial institutions, and profitability will decrease, making the financial industry less 
attractive for investors (and also inducing banks to pursue cost cutting policies). Probably 
banks will have to reduce the size of their balance sheets to meet the required capital ratios, 
at least in the short run. Also, managers may be especially concerned to meet short term 
regulatory requirements rather than caring about the long term strategic development of the 
financial business. Finally, the new liquidity requirements may lead to a ‘race for deposits’ 
where banks will start and target sources of liquidity funding (e.g., pension funds, insurers 
and mutual funds) in competition between each other and other financial operators.  
 
Finally, it should be highlighted that additional proposals to address some limitations of the 
emerging financial regulatory system have been put forward, within the EU, by the so-
called Liikanen Report (2012). The Report especially recommended five measures to 
complement the regulations already in place: first, that proprietary trading and other 
significant trading activities should be assigned to a separate legal entity if they amount to a 
significant share of a bank’s business (i.e., a principle similar to ‘Volcker’s rule’ in the US); 
second, that banks should draw up effective and realistic recovery and resolution plans; 
third, banks should start making use of ‘bail-inable debt’, i.e., obligations (bonds) that are 
converted into equity against the will of the holders in case of trouble (e.g., presence of a 
systemic crisis); fourth, that more robust risk weights should be used in the determination 
of minimum capital requirements; lastly, that corporate governance of financial institutions 
should be improved, including measures for strengthening boards and management, 
enhancing risk management, limiting compensation for bank management and staff, 
improving risk disclosure, and strengthening sanctioning powers. 
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4.3 The Regulation of OTC Derivatives 
Regulation of derivatives has been long debated within academic circles. Cohen (1994) 
observed that at least three frameworks for derivatives regulation existed. The first one 
consisted of a system of voluntary compliance by dealers (a preferred non-interventionist 
method followed in the US in the 1980s and 1990s). The second one provided the inclusion 
of derivatives regulation within the general framework of securities regulation, although the 
legal nature of derivatives differs from the one of shares, bonds, and other securities. The 
third one was to admit that derivatives regulation required special legislation on its own. 
Over time, concerns that derivative trading was booming but that it fundamentally 
remained without any well designed regulatory framework led scholars to argue for 
regulatory interventions (Romano, 1996). Still in the 1990s, regulation of derivatives could 
be summarized in two basic requirements (Hentschel and Smith, 1996): 
 
1) Capital adequacy rule: general capital requirements set for banking activity were 
applied also to derivative trading, although originally they had not been designed 
specifically for the purpose of regulating the trade of derivatives. Following a model 
developed by BIS, capital was required in proportion to the credit-equivalent of the 
exposure to derivatives. The requirement, however, did not take into consideration whether 
the counterpart was hedging or exacerbating their exposure, nor the leverage in the 
transaction, nor the diversification or concentration of risks related to derivatives positions. 
 
2) Disclosure requirements: generally, financial operators that traded in derivatives only 
applied general accounting rules, that did not provide adequate disclosure for the purpose of 
monitoring and assessing counterpart risk, nor for the one of supervising systemic risk.  
 
As financial innovation progressed and the volume of the derivative market grew, it became 
apparent in the 1990s that the system of regulation of derivatives was inadequate. In 1998, 
the CFTC, led by Ms Brooklyn Born, issued the “Over-the-Counter Derivatives Concept 
Release”, that aimed to call a wide class of derivatives under the regulatory influence of the 
agency. The Release was unwelcome by the financial industry and part of the US 
government system, which counteracted by impressing a dramatic turn towards the 
liberalization of the derivative market with the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 
2000 (CFMA) (Lynch, 2011; Baker, 2009). The CFMA confirmed that certain OTC 
derivative trades were outside the jurisdiction of the Commodity Futures Trading 
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Commission (CFTC) and, de fact, provided that all financial derivatives are legally 
enforceable (Stout, 2011). This provided legal certainty to OTC derivative transitions and 
shielded them from regulatory interference (D’Souza et al., 2009). Following the CFMA, 
the volume of transaction in OTC derivatives that had been placed outside CFTC regulatory 
increased rapidly, together with faster pace of financial product innovations. It may be 
worthy noticing that, despite strict regulatory requirements, at that time public authorities 
seemed to believe that the derivative market was under adequate supervision. As a report of 
the US Government Accountability Office stated: 
 
“Because OTC credit derivatives transactions [or any OTC derivative transaction, for 
that matter] occur between private parties and are not traded on regulated exchanges, 
they are not subject to regulation in the United States, provided that the parties and 
other aspects of the transaction satisfy requirements of the Commodity Exchange . . . 
. Although the OTC credit derivatives products themselves are not regulated, certain 
market participants are. If the dealer is a U.S. bank federally chartered as a national 
bank, it is supervised by the OCC [Office of the Comptroller of the Currency]. If a 
bank is owned by a bank holding company, its holding company is regulated by the 
Federal Reserve. These bank regulators oversee these entities to ensure the safety and 
soundness of the banking system and the stability of the financial markets. If the 
credit derivatives dealer is a securities broker-dealer, it is overseen by SEC. 
According to U.S. regulators, some of the U.S. banks and securities broker-dealers 
also conduct credit derivatives trades in foreign affiliates subject to foreign 
regulation. Similarly, other participants in the credit derivatives market include 
foreign banks that are supervised by foreign regulators and, in some cases, also by 
U.S. regulators if operating in the United States.” 
 
Within the new regulative framework that emerged in the aftermath of the Great Financial 
Crisis, a special place is taken by the regulation of OTC derivatives (Pagliari, 2012, 2013; 
Duff and Zaring, 2013). Following the 2009 G20 meetings, initiatives to reform the 
regulation OTC derivatives took off at both the national and super-national level. At the 
international level, a review of OTC derivatives regulation and proposals for reform were 
conducted by the OTC Derivatives Coordination Group, formed by the chairs of the 
Financial Stability Board (FSB), the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), the 
Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS), the International Organization of 
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Securities Commissions (IOSCO) and the Committee on Payments and Market 
Infrastructures (CPMI). At the super-national level, specifically in the EU, OTC derivatives 
came to be regulated by so-called European market infrastructure regulation (EMIR), i.e., 
Regulation (EU) 648/2012, that came into force on 16th August 2012. In the US, the 2010 
Dodd-Frank Act provides, in Title VII, a comprehensive framework for the regulation of 
OTC derivatives (swaps).  
 
The contemporary regulation of derivatives is set to address three primary issues (Acharya 
et al., 2009): 
a) uncertain counterpart credit risk exposure, which can generate illiquidity and can cause 
markets to break down; 
b) capital erosion, which can cause the financial system to break down if the erosion is 
large and it is concentrated in financial institutions that provide liquidity to part of the 
financial system;  
c) prices that may be away from fundamentals due to illiquidity of the market, as it may 
originate from fire sales, and which can cause distortion in capital allocation decisions.  
 
Generally, greater transparency is a requirement that can help coping with these issues, 
especially counterpart credit risk, but it can also generally serve the purpose of monitoring 
the building up of risk exposures that can be systemically relevant. Before the regulations 
set in the aftermath of the Great Financial Crises, regulators did not have tools for 
monitoring the build up of exposure risk at their disposal. Accordingly, works like the one 
of Acharya et al. (2009) proposed that issues of derivatives regulation could be effectively 
dealt with by using a central clearing house or exchange structure for monitoring 
counterpart risk externalities (but also with appropriate collateral and margin requirements) 
or at least centralized registries for tracking transactions; by letting regulators, clearing 
houses, exchange market structures and registries access all relevant information about 
derivative trading and risk positions in a timely manner (also, some transparency for the 
public of trade-level information on volume and prices in real time, albeit without revealing 
identities of the traders); and by introducing information requirements and oversight on 
derivatives in a way similar to other stocks and securities (i.e., differently from the 
unregulated regime for many OTC derivatives that took place in the last decades). 
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Several other scholarly works highlighted the importance of the kind of regulatory tools 
indicated in Acharya et al. (2009) (Duquerroy et al., 2009; Barnier, 2010; Garicano and 
Lastra, 2010; Hull, 2010; Barr, 2011; Singh, 2011; Flood et al., 2012; Duff and Zaring, 
2013). Ngo (2007) argued that the system of CCP could be helpful to reduce the complexity 
of the network of derivative contracts, by establishing a kind of ‘hub-and-spoke’ 
configuration. Of course, the CCP should be adequately robust, in order to prevent it 
becoming a source of financial loss or liquidity shortage contagion by itself. The CCP can 
also help reducing the volume of derivative positions (and, relatedly, of margins and 
guarantees) by assisting the ‘netting’ of derivative contracts, i.e., clearing reciprocal and 
equal (albeit of opposite sign) obligations between counterparts rather than having 
counterparts mutually exchanging equal amounts of cash flows (in principle, moreover, 
netting can also take place between more than just two mutually trading counterparts, if 
sophisticated multi-lateral netting algorithms are employed on the basis of the information 
on multiple derivative contracts collected by the CCP).  
 
Also Cecchetti et al. (2009) argued that a CCP for OTC derivatives can improve market 
resilience by lowering counterpart risk and increasing transparency. The transfer (or 
‘novation’) of the derivative contract between two parties to the CCP (in practice, the 
replacement of the derivative contract with two contracts written between each of the 
counterparts and the CCP) entails that the CCP can net multilaterally and therefore reduce 
both counterpart and operational risk, increase the efficiency of collateral management, and 
ensure consistent mark-to-market evaluations of exposures. CCP should be provided with 
adequate capital (typically in the form of fees from members) and keep liquidity position. 
CCP would improve transparency by allowing collection of high-frequency market-wide 
information on market activity, transaction prices and counterpart risk exposures for market 
participants. The effect of CCP on pro-cyclicality of derivatives (i.e., the requirement to 
post additional collateral as risk increases and the effect on liquidity) in uncertain: in 
principle, CCP can reduce pro-cyclicality by lowering counterpart risk but, on the other 
hand, centralized margin calls could aggravate pro-cyclicality.  
 
Also Kiff et al. (2009) argued about the benefits of CCP. They highlighted that a CCP can 
act as intermediary for exchange-traded derivatives by catching the trade information  
automatically in real time from the trading platform and becoming the direct counterpart 
after trade execution. For OTC derivatives, however, the CCP should be informed of the 
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conditions attached to the negotiated derivative contracts. In addition, the authors also 
highlighted the importance of the structure of the CCP industry, especially that, while 
competition between different CCPs may be beneficial, the efficiency of counterpart risk 
mitigation produced by CCP decreases as the number of CCPs clearing the same product 
type increases (Duffie and Zhu, 2009). Also, the CCP industry builds on network 
externalities, so that net benefits from the use of CCPs is evident when a relatively high 
number of members join the scheme, and scale economies, so that average cost per 
transaction declines with an increase of the number of transactions (especially because of 
the high fixed costs of the derivatives clearing IT infrastructure). It is possible, therefore, 
that the structure of the CCP industry is relatively consolidated, with the effect that CCP 
firms would be subjected to regulation (as any public utility). Public authorities, therefore, 
will play an important role in the conduct of the CCP business, especially because failure of 
a CCP would seriously affect the functioning of the entire financial market.  
 
Baker (2009) argued that, in addition to increase prudential supervision and regulation, the 
regulation of OTC derivative markets requires domestic and international systems for 
regulatory cooperation, i.e., within the US, there should be cooperation between SEC and 
CFTC (a ‘regulatory joint venture’), and, internationally, there should be a system of 
public-private partnership to coordinate regulation in the global marketplace. The author 
questioned the effectiveness of regulatory systems that divided the competences between 
regulatory agencies (as this could leave room for unregulated kinds of derivatives), of the 
conventional division between standardized and non-standardized derivative contracts (as 
this has been difficult to implement in the past, because of the flow of innovative derivative 
products that did not plainly fit any classification), and of the lack of attention for 
international aspects of regulation of derivatives, that are nowadays often traded in global 
markets. Baker (2009) argued that disclosure of OTC contracts is pivotal to facilitate the 
monitoring of the systemic risk entailed by derivative positions, but regulators lack both 
current and past data. 
 
As highlighted by Cherny and Craig (2010), a CCP or clearinghouse would help regulating 
derivatives by making it possible to absorb the default of a financial institution, rather than 
letting the consequence of the default propagate to other financial institutions in a 
potentially escalating effect. The clearinghouse would work through two main tools, 
namely contract standardization, that would make valuation easier by removing 
	   80	  
heterogeneous terms and increasing trading volume, and margin enforcement, that would 
protect the clearinghouse from counterpart default (the margin would be used to 
compensate the counterpart while protecting the clearinghouse from losses). The authors 
also highlighted that an exchange would also provide pricing services by soliciting bid and 
ask quotes from participants for standardized contracts. 
 
Blinder (2010) highlighted the relative benefits of an exchange for derivatives, rather than a 
CCP or clearinghouse. Both kind of institutions provide mechanisms of central clearing, 
multilateral netting, greater transparency, and the imposition of a third counterpart between 
buyers and sellers that would help reducing counterpart risk. With respect to 
clearinghouses, however, an exchange would also provide regular public information about 
price and volume of traded contracts (although exchanges are typically opposed by dealers 
because they reduce their profits on spreads). In any case, Blinder (2010) also argued that 
any sort of regulation of the derivative market that enables monitoring counterpart and 
systemic risk would mark a significant improvement over the baseline of the pre-crisis, 
when derivatives regulation was substantially absent. The effectiveness of the Dodd-Frank 
Act, in this respect, was regarded as doubtful because of the many exceptions that it allows. 
 
Duffie et al. (2010) observed that the working of the CCP or clearinghouse requires the 
charge of adequate margins on the members. The CCP should collect two types of margin: 
an initial margin, that is paid when the trade is cleared, and a variation margin, which is 
exchanged between the CCP and the member of the clearinghouse on a daily basis. The 
variation margin payment is the estimated change in the market value of the derivatives 
position from the previous day. In addition, members of the clearinghouse should provide 
the CCP with guaranteed fund, that is, an additional defense apart from initial marring to 
cover losses that originate from the failure of a member to perform on a cleared derivative.  
 
Noyer (2010) highlighted that appropriate incentives should be designed to induce market 
participants to clear on CCPs. In this respect, regulators should find a balance so that 
collateral requirements are set not too tight (in order to make CCP clearing attractive) and 
not too low (in order to mitigate risk). The author noticed that not all derivatives can be 
cleared through clearinghouses or exchanges anyway (as many of them would remain un-
standardized in any case), but efforts should be taken to move as many derivatives as 
possible into the CCP system. For those derivative contracts that are not placed in the CCP 
	   81	  
system, regulators should ask market operators to implement appropriate risk management 
practices and higher capital requirements. This, of course, would also place some regulatory 
burden on market operators, which may lack - at present - the operational capabilities to 
deal with the new regulatory requirements. 
 
It is worthy noticing that these arguments for the regulation of derivatives amount to a 
sharp difference from other positions, that rather believe that derivative markets possess 
self-regulating features. Long before the Great Financial Crisis, for example, Hentschel and 
Smith (1996) argued that counterparts of derivative contracts take great care of leaving little 
uncertainty about the nature and enforceability of the contractual obligations as they deem 
cost-effective, and that, in this sense, they should be able to design effective contract by 
themselves without the need for any regulatory intervention. In their view, deposit or 
margin requirements induce counterparts to take even more risk (i.e., more moral hazard 
problems) and evidence - until their time, of course - did not support the claim that 
derivative-related defaults, such as the one of Barings Bank in 1995, could escalate to 
systemic effects. Arguments about the futility, or even perversity, or regulating derivative 
markets have been reformulated along different lines, e.g., the inability of market operators 
and regulators to ‘digest’ and make sense the amount of information about derivative 
contracts even if they are subjected to mandatory disclosure (Bartlett, 2010; Best, 2010), 
the negative effects of tight regulation on financial innovation and the limitations of CCPs 
to manage default risk better than market participants (Gubler, 2011), and the stimulation 
that CCPs provide to take greater risks (Levitin, 2013). Others argue that there is no serious 
danger of a derivatives-induced financial collapse (Miller, 2011). 
 
For the rest of the present discussion, we will especially focus on the EU regulation of OTC 
derivatives (there is a large amount of agreement between the EU and the US regulation of 
OTC derivatives; a detailed inquiry into the differences between the two regulatory 
frameworks, however, lays beyond the scope of the present work). The EU regulation of 
OTC derivatives (EMIR) builds on five main lines of interventions (Lannoo, 2011): 
 
1) Reporting: EMIR requires all counterparts with outstanding derivative contracts to 
report details of these contracts to an authorized trade repository (TR). A TR (also called a 
Swap Data Repository) is an organization that collects and maintains records of OTC 
derivatives. This activity is carried out through an electronic platform that keeps records of 
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relevant contractual and economic information about OTC derivatives trades. At present, 
there are six TR registered (in 2013) by the European Securities and Markets Authority 
(ESMA), a EU financial regulator and supervisory institution that started operating on 1st 
January 2011. 
 
2) Clearing: ESMA can impose mandatory clearing obligations for OTC derivative 
contracts once a central counterpart (CCP) has been authorized under EMIR for the type of 
contract. Clearing refers to the operations that are required in order to execute the derivative 
contract until the transaction is settled. A CCP is an organization that stands between two 
clearing firms with the purpose of reducing the risk of one or more clearing firms to fail 
fulfilling its contractual obligations, especially by requiring collateral (or margin) deposits, 
providing independent valuation of trades and collaterals, monitoring credit worthiness of 
the counterparts, and also providing guarantee that losses in excess of a defaulting firm’s 
collateral are covered. In March 2014, Nasdaq Clearing became the first clearing house 
recognized under EMIR. 
 
3) Non-cleared transactions: for those derivative contracts that are not cleared, all 
counterparts are required to comply with operational risk management requirements for the 
timely, accurate, and appropriately segregated exchange collaterals in order to reduce 
counterpart risk (a required generally called ‘margining’). This requirement is applied to 
derivative deals with financial counterparts (i.e., banks, insurers, investment firms and fund 
managers, called FC) and with non-financial counterparts whose exposure in derivatives 
trading exceeds a certain threshold (called ’NFC+’) (thresholds are set at different levels for 
credit, equity, interest, foreign exchange, and other derivative contracts). It is expected that 
the requirement will enter into force (with all detailed technical specifications) by the end 
of 2015. 
 
4) Collateral: for those derivative contracts of financial counterparts, that are not cleared 
through a CCP, there will be the requirement that contracts are subjected to a bilateral 
collateral. The requirement is intended to reduce system risk (by reducing contagion and 
spillover effects) and to promote central clearing. The requirement, incidentally, also 
reinforced the need for international coordination and harmonization of derivatives 
regulation, provided that counterparts may be tempted to ‘shop around’ the most 
economically advantageous regulatory regime (and, relatedly, some country jurisdictions 
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may be tempted to engage in a ‘race to the bottom’ towards lighter regulatory requirements 
for attracting derivative deals).  
 
It should be highlighted, that non-financial counterparts are subjected to derivatives 
regulations if their OTC derivatives positions exceed the thresholds set by EMIR (called 
‘NFC-‘).  
 
In the past, derivatives in the EU had been regulated under Capital Requirement Directives 
(CRD) I, II, and III (issued in 2008, 2009 and 2010). CRD II and III, in particular, had 
provided incremental risk capital charges to reflect the risk of large but less frequent losses 
and the potential for large long-term cumulative price movements, and the requirement of 
calculate capital adequacy based on scenarios of longer periods of market losses. Later, 
CRD IV issued in 2013 (in force from 1st January 2014; also called Capital Requirement 
Regulation Directive or CRR) provided an additional capital charge for possible losses 
associated with the deterioration in the creditworthiness of a counterpart of a derivative 
(derivatives counterpart credit risk) (Liikanen, 2012). Further consideration, moreover, has 
been granted to the possibility to modify risk measures (from ‘value-at-risk’ to ‘expected 
financial shortfall’) to better capture ‘tail risk’ and to include elements of market illiquidity 
in the risk models (Liikanen, 2012). 
 
Among the measures provided by EMIR and CRR, it is especially relevant the provision to 
collateralize and standardize OTC derivatives transactions by CCPs and to establish TR to 
collect information on non-standardized derivatives in order to increase transparency for 
regulators. Additional requirements, however, will be placed by the Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive (MiFID) II, voted in 2014 and to come into force in 2017 (and to 
repeal MiFID I of 2004): MiFID II will provide that standardized derivative trades will 
have to be executed on exchanges and that the EMIR clearing obligation will be extended 
to exchange traded derivatives, although there will be still relevant exemptions for those 
entities that do not exclusively deal in derivatives on own account; there will be some 
regulation of limits on derivatives positions; and there will be stricter management and 
reporting requirements. 
 
The going into force of EMIR derivatives regulation entails that financial operators need to 
assess their readiness to comply with the regulatory requirements. Among the issues that 
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they should consider, we highlight: identification of the TR where derivatives contracts 
should be registered; definition of the operational procedure for notifying derivative 
contracts registration requests; identification of the CCP that can clear the derivative 
contracts; definition of the relationship with the CCP, i.e., whether the counterpart can act 
as ‘clearing member’ or whether it needs to be a client of a clearing member; review, 
design and implement the operational procedures for fulfilling operational risk management 
requirements; assessment and provision of adequate guarantees (collateral) for non-cleared 
OTC derivative contracts. 
 
Latest update on the status of the implementation of the new derivatives regulation was 
provided by the Financial Stability Board report “OTC Derivatives Market Reform: Eight 
Progress on Implementation”, issued on 7th November 2014. The report acknowledged that 
reform implementation was not completed yet, but progress was continuously made across 
jurisdictions as legislations were almost completely passed. Higher capital requirements for 
non-centrally cleared derivatives and trade reporting requirements were adopted in about 
three quarters of FSB member jurisdictions. Measures to promote trading on exchanges, 
however, seemed to be taking longer time than other reform initiatives. 
 
4.4 Central Counterparts (CCPs) and their Role in the Regulation of Derivatives 
Central Counterparts (CCPs) constitute an important component part of the emergent 
architecture of regulation of derivatives. These institutions provide a means for centralizing 
risk management (through processes of multilateral netting, collateralization, and loss 
mutualization) and data processing operations (through trade registration and reporting) 
(Steigerwald, 2013). CCPs bring some clarity to the network of financial derivatives 
contracts that would be otherwise rather ‘opaque’, in the sense that the multiplicity of 
connections (derivative contracts) between financial operators would be otherwise difficult 
to discern and understand. Without CCPs, no industry operator can have a complete 
overview of the relationships between risk protection buyers and seller. The presence of 
one (of more) CCPs, instead, “allows the numerous bilateral exposures of a market 
participant to be substituted for a single net exposure to a financially and operationally 
robust” counterpart (Reserve Bank of Australia, 2011: 12). A way to express this argument 
in a graphical form is conveyed by Figure 1, which shows how a complex network of 
bilateral clearing (without any CCP) can be simplified with the introduction of a CCP. 
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Figure 1. Financial derivatives contract networks without and with the presence of a CCP 
(source: Reserve Bank of Australia, 2011) 
 
The role that CCPs can play in providing new sources of stability of the financial 
derivatives industry, however, has not been fully clarified so far. A number of additional 
studies and policy papers have identified ‘open issues’ that the present regulatory system, 
which includes a pivotal role for CCPs, may not be fully equipped to tackle in an efficient 
and effective way.  
 
Kiff et al. (2009) provide an overview of some of the problems that the present derivatives 
regulatory system hosts. First, they argue that coordination between national regulators is 
needed in order to prevent conflicts that may arise when a CCP, which is based in a 
particular country jurisdiction, nets positions of derivatives that are written according to the 
terms provided in other country jurisdictions. Second, they held that more efforts could be 
exerted to improve the quality of information disclosed by financial institutions, including 
	   86	  
financial reporting. Finally, they contemplated the possibility that CCPs may default and 
spread financial turmoil throughout the financial system, if regulatory and public authorities 
do not take adequate risk mitigation and risk management tools to protect the integrity of 
financial stability.  
 
About the need for international regulatory coordination, Kiff et al. (2009) highlighted that, 
most likely, future regulatory scenario for derivatives is that there will be different CCPs 
located in different country jurisdictions, rather than any international CCPs that would be 
able to operate in more than one country. This would call for intensive cross-border 
coordination and supervision, especially in order to avoid regulatory arbitrage, help 
mitigating systemic risk, and avoiding hampering multiple-currency or cross-border 
transactions. In this context, the European Central Bank supported the creation of EU-based 
CCPs rather than having EU-based financial operators relying on CCPs based abroad 
(especially in the US). Also, a relevant initiative was the establishment, in 2009, of the 
OTC Derivatives Regulators’ Forum, with the aim of adopting, promoting, and 
implementing consistent standards in setting oversight and supervisory expectations.  
 
About the need for more quality of information disclosed by financial operators, Kiff et al. 
(2009) commented on the merits of the introduction of novel accounting standards (IFRS 7 
and FAS 157, plus additional guidance documents) on the disclosure requirements for 
financial reporting. Part of the efforts to provide better quality of information have been 
directed to the application of fair value to financial products, although issues persist when 
markets are no longer functioning properly as it may be the case in a fire sale scenario, 
where liquidity of assets dries up and market prices diverge from fundamentals. Another 
part of the efforts have been directed to enhance the monitoring of trading activity in 
derivatives, although issues persist whenever trading in OTC derivative products is not 
communicated to TR because of exemptions and when communication is made to TR 
abroad but the derivative contract is relevant for a particular country’s financial operator. 
 
The scenario where a CCP defaults is another kind of issue in the regulation of derivatives 
that has attracted considerable amount of attention. Duffie et al. (2010) highlighted that, if a 
CCP is successful in clearing a large quantity of derivative trading, then the CCP becomes a 
systemically important financial institution. The default of the CCP, then, would expose a 
large number of financial operators to losses. This point is also discussed by Scott et al. 
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(2010), who argued that, by pooling risk, CCPs may exacerbate, rather than contain, 
systemic risk. Once created, therefore, the CCPs need to be carefully regulated because 
they pose issues akin to those of large financial institutions that are induced to take on too 
much risk in anticipation that, because of their ‘too big to fail’ status, public authorities 
would eventually rescue them from default. 
 
In order to prevent the CCP to became a source of financial instability itself, Duffie et al. 
(2010) call for tight operational and financial controls, including especially risk 
management instruments, tools for quick recapitalization, and tools for reversing the 
position in derivatives with minimal impact on counterparts and markets. Regulators should 
ensure that CCPs are robust enough to sustain various sources of risk, including the defaults 
of multiple counterparts, sudden fire sales of financial assets and rapid reduction of market 
liquidity. Particular attention should be placed to anticipate issues that arise from ‘extreme 
but plausible’ loss scenarios (i.e., relatively rare events, also often characterized as ‘black 
swans’; Taleb, 2001), such as, for instance, large albeit rather unusual price movements.  
 
Scott et al. (2010) argued that, in order to prevent acting as a source of financial instability, 
CCPs need to take measures to reduce their own risk, including membership and capital 
requirements and a backup clearing fund. CCPs, moreover, should be subjected to close 
regulatory scrutiny to ensure that measure are adequate and enforced. The authors also 
proposed that CCPs should apply margining requirements for out-of-the-money participants 
in a day-by-day basis, i.e., the CCP should assess the participants’ derivative contracts to 
market prices and, for those contracts that have declined in value, the CCP should ask the 
participants to provide additional collateral.  
 
A related issued discussed by Scott et al. (2010) is about the number of CCPs. On the one 
hand, having a few CCPs (even just one, at the extreme) would result in more efficient 
netting and margining as the CCP would be in the position to possess information about a 
large number of derivative transactions. On the other hand, having a large number of CCPs, 
possibly organized by asset class as this relates to different risk management techniques, 
would prevent having a massive concentration of risk into ‘too big to fail’ financial 
institutions and would instill competition between CCPs, with potentially beneficial effects 
on prices of intermediation services and innovation. Scott et al. (2010) also considered 
possible, however, that market pressure would naturally lead the industrial structure of 
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CCPs, with the possibility that CCPs would eventually consolidate in a relatively small 
number. 
 
A condition that may affect the industrial structure of CCPs, as well as the function of 
CCPs to contribute to systemic risk reduction, originated from the interoperability of CCPs, 
i.e., the possibility for CCPs to exchange information on derivative trading in a timely way 
and to conduct netting and margining requirements in a coordinated way. In principle, 
interoperability would result in both the benefit from having multiple CCPs (e.g., in terms 
of competitive pressures and innovation) and the one from having a coordinated approach 
to risk, especially in terms of netting positions of counterparts of different CCPs. In 
practice, however, issues arise with respect to the costs of administering interoperability 
and to the establishment of consistent regulatory standards across CCPs. Moreover, the 
establishment of linkages between CCPs would entail additional risks that relate to the 
operational, legal, liquidity and settlement implications of having two or more CCPs relate 
to each other through the same derivative trading. As a matter of fact, indeed, there has 
been relatively little empirical experience of CCP inter-linkages so far. 
 
These and other issues call for a focused attention and research effort to place on better 
understanding whether CCPs can improve the stability of the financial system. In principle, 
CCPs clearly offer the possibility to ‘absorb’ or ‘cushion’ losses that originate from 
derivative contracts (e.g., swaps) because of the monitoring, supervision, and ‘guarantor’ 
role that they can play in the financial derivatives industry. Questions arise, however, as to 
whether CCPs are able to effectively perform this role when facing some of the actual 
conditions under which financial market operate, e.g., the high level of connectivity 
between financial institutions (that engage in multiple derivative contracts to hedge their 
positions and for speculative purposes), the presence of both systemic and institution-
specific shocks, and the possibility that relatively large defaults impair the stability of the 
whole financial system. It is necessary, therefore, to explore the effects of CCPs under 
different conditions of the financial system, which also include how sources of financial 
instability can or cannot be effectively countered by this novel regulatory instrument. 
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Chapter 5 
 
The Simulation Method: Implementing Agent-Based Models 
 
5.1 The Simulation Method: An Overview 
The aim of this study is to address the general issue of how derivatives markets can be 
effectively regulated. By effectively regulated we mean that derivatives markets should 
exhibit the property of a satisfactory resilience towards sources of systemic crises that can 
undermine financial stability. By satisfactory resilience we mean that derivatives markets 
should be able to absorb relatively high losses related to credit or other events (depending 
on the kind of underlying assets) without compromising the stability of the financial 
system. The term ‘satisfactory’ cautiously relates to the assumption that complete solidity 
of the financial system with respect to any source of systemic risk may be unattainable, if 
not at relatively high costs and/or constraints imposed on financial activity (e.g., the 
prohibition to trade in derivatives). As such, any assessment of the amount of confidence 
placed on the resilience of the financial system, and therefore of the adequacy of the 
regulatory system, is related to the subjectivity of the policy-makers or the regulators. The 
contribution of this study, in this respect, is the one to assist key decision-makers to 
formulate a better-informed judgment, based on theoretical and empirical work. 
 
Within the present temporal context, the question as to how derivatives market can be 
effectively regulated necessarily relates to the experience drawn from the recent Great 
Financial Crisis and the policy response to it. Accordingly, the question calls into play the 
regulatory tools that have been devised in the last a few years: How effective are the 
measures taken for regulating derivatives markets as formulated in the concerted policy 
initiatives undertaken within G20 (and other) countries, i.e., those included in the Dodd-
Frank Act in the US and in the EMIR, CRR, and MiFID II in the EU? To what extent do 
these measures entail that the financial system is satisfactorily resilient to sources of 
systemic risk in the future? Answers to these questions are important in order to anticipate 
whether the financial system is able to contain the insurgence and spreading of financial 
crises and, if sources of weaknesses are still present in the regulation of financial activity, 
where they are located and what measures can be taken to counteract them. 
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Taking into account the general features of the present regulatory system of derivatives 
markets, some of the main issues that relate to the effectiveness of derivatives regulation 
are: 
 
1) Does the requirement to report derivatives trading to TR improve financial stability? 
The immediate effect of reporting derivatives trading to TR is the one to reduce asymmetric 
information between the regulatory on the one hand, and the conduct of financial operators 
on the other one. By collecting information about derivatives trading in a centralized 
repository, the regulator can monitor concentration of risk in any financial operator and, if 
appropriate, take appropriate measures. In order to assess whether the reporting of 
derivatives trading to TR improves financial stability, we need to consider whether (a) 
trading information enables a regulatory authority to identify concentration of risks that 
may be detrimental to financial stability, (b) whether the regulatory author possess the tools 
for correcting the conduct of financial operators that results in such concentration of risks, 
and (c) whether, in consideration of the possible actions taken by the regulatory authority, 
financial operators may conveniently adjust their conduct.  
 
2) Does the requirement to trade through CCPs improve financial stability? The immediate 
effect of trading through CCPs is the one to interpose a CCP in between the counterparts of 
derivatives trading. The CCP is expected to sustain the losses that may arise if any 
counterpart defaults, i.e., it is not able to fulfill the obligations that arise from the derivative 
contracts, either at all or at cost of losses that arise when trying to keep liquidity positions. 
In order to assess whether CCPs help attaining greater financial stability, we need to 
consider under which conditions CCPs are able to absorb losses: Could the default of a 
single, relatively large, financial operator on derivative contracts bring down the ‘cushion’ 
provided by the CCP? Or could the CCP be severely hit by the concurrent default of 
several, relatively small, financial operators on derivative contracts rather than of single, 
relatively large, one? Could the default of a single, relatively large, financial operator 
impact on the CCP through a ‘side route’, if, for instance, losses are propagated from the 
large financial operators to smaller ones and eventually to the CCP? How should we expect 
financial operators to adjust their conduct because of the requirement to trade through 
CCPs? 
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3) Do non-cleared derivatives transactions pose any threat to financial stability? The 
immediate effect of having some derivative trading not cleared through CCPs is the one 
that counterparts of the non-cleared derivatives trading carry the risk without the ‘cushion’ 
provided by CCPs. In terms of financial stability, this entails that defaults on the derivatives 
contract would impact the counterpart and, potentially, losses may propagate to other 
financial operators as well. In order to assess whether the presence of non-cleared 
derivatives transactions poses any threat to financial stability, we need to consider whether, 
in a context where other derivatives contracts are cleared through CCPs, losses that may 
arise from the non-cleared transactions may be contained by the presence of other measures 
taken to regulate cleared derivatives, i.e., whether the CCPs and the other regulatory tools 
may provide mechanisms of containment of the losses to the counterparts, or to a limited 
number of other financial operators only, rather than permitting the contagion to other parts 
of the financial system. 
 
4) How much collateral is needed to safeguard financial stability? The immediate effect of 
collateral requirements is the one to increase the capacity to absorb losses in counterparts of 
derivatives transactions. As such, collaterals should be keyed to the amount and likelihood 
of losses related to particular derivatives contracts. In order to assess whether collateral 
requirement helps attaining greater financial stability, we need to consider whether the 
collateral measures take into account the additional risk that particular derivatives trading 
pose to the financial system. That is to say, the effects of any derivative contract are not 
circumscribed to the counterparts only, if the default of any counterpart entails the 
possibility of loss repercussions to other parts of the financial system. In such conditions, 
should collateral requirements include a charge related to the negative externality that the 
additional derivatives contract pose to the whole risk-shifting structure provided by the 
aggregate amount of derivatives transactions? How much collateral should financial 
operators provide in order to contribute to the resilience of CCPs in face of the additional 
systemic risk that their derivatives transactions pose? 
 
Answers to these questions seem important in order to better equip the system of 
derivatives regulation to cope with possible future sources of systemic risk. While the 
present regulatory system includes various measures that are expected to limit the excesses 
of derivatives trading experienced in the pre-Great Financial Crisis period, there are good 
reasons to expect that derivatives will be part of the strategy of financial institutions and 
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business alike in the future. Derivatives play a fundamental role in the de-coupling of risk 
and return profiles attached to real and financial investments: they enable, through various 
forms of financial engineering and securitization, the shift of risk to financial operators who 
are most willing to take on additional risks for a commensurable market price and the 
design of less risky assets for investors who are willing to accept relatively lower returns.  
 
This work focuses, in particular, on the research question whether the requirement to trade 
through CCPs improve financial stability. In principle, the introduction of one or more 
CCPs can provide a source of resistance to shocks to the financial system, because the CCP 
would ‘absorb’ or ‘cushion’ losses that hit financial institutions – apart from enabling better 
monitoring and surveillance of the financial system. The CCPs, however, would operate 
within a complex environment, where the high level of interconnectivity between financial 
institutions would result in the possibility that losses propagate across the financial system 
and result in the destabilization of large and/or numerous financial operators. The 
complexity of the networked structure of the financial system – especially, the part that 
related to the financial derivatives industry – makes it analytically difficult to derive 
solutions about the impact of CCPs. An alternative approach, that is followed here, is to 
adopt simulation techniques – namely, agent-based models – for drawing computational 
inferences about the effects of the presence of CCP as tools for regulating the financial 
derivatives industry. 
 
5.2 General Features of Agent-Based Models 
Simulation is often regarded as a methodological ‘third way’ to conduct scientific enquiry 
but the canonical ‘inductive’ and ‘deductive’ approaches (Axelrod and Tesfatsion, 2006; 
Wallace, 2009). Simulations do not consist, as ‘inductive’ kind of research does, in the 
hypothesis-generation or hypothesis-testing activities based on the analysis of empirical 
evidence. Also, simulations do not consist, as ‘deductive’ kind of research does, in the 
formulation of logically-derived hypotheses or conclusions from axiomatic premises. 
Consequently, simulations also differ from any kind of mixed ‘deductive-inductive’ kind of 
research that provides the analysis of empirical evidence for testing theoretically-derived 
hypotheses. Rather, simulations have been considered a method for ‘generative’ research 
(Epstein, 1999) that primarily aims to formulate explanations of the emergence of features 
of behavior of an entity at an aggregated level on the basis of features of the conduct of 
entities, and of their interaction, at a disaggregated level. Simulations, for instance, seek to 
	   93	  
explain the emergence of market price patterns of a commodity (i.e., a market-level feature) 
on the basis of the conduct of, and of the interactions between, buyers and sellers (i.e., a 
market participant-level feature).  
 
Simulations are generally built around some key assumptions of the entities at both the 
aggregated and disaggregated levels (Young, 2006; Epstein, 2006): 
 
1) Heterogeneity:  simulations typically assume that, at the disaggregated level, the entity 
is made of heterogeneous component parts. For example, a simulation of the emergence of 
market price patterns of a commodity builds on the assumption that market participants are 
not alike, i.e., that each buyer and seller is unique in some respect, possibly because of their 
endowments, preferences, expectations, etc. This assumption characterizes simulations as 
typically different from most of theoretically-driven deductive research, that generally 
builds on the simplifying assumptions of homogeneity of representative agents.  
 
2) Local interactions: simulations typically assume that, at the disaggregated level, the 
entity is made of heterogeneous component parts that interact with a limited number of 
other parts. For example, buyers and sellers may interact, in the form of exchanging 
information about bid and ask prices, with a limited number of other market participants, 
with whom they are connected through particular channels, e.g., network ties or other kinds 
of n-dimensional lattice. Also this assumption characterized simulations as typically 
different from most of theoretically-driven deductive research, that generally builds on the 
simplifying assumptions that the networked pattern of interaction between agents is not 
analytically relevant to explain aggregated outcomes. Rather, simulations are generally very 
sensitive to the way in which agents are connected, and features of the topology of 
networked patterns typically play an important role in the process dynamics and outcome of 
the system at the aggregated level. 
 
3) Bounded rationality: simulations typically assume that, at the disaggregated level, the 
entity is made of heterogeneous component parts that interact with a limited number of 
other parts according to decision criteria characterized by a limited capacity to process a 
limited amount of information. Simulations, however, differ in the extent to which they 
assume agents possess fixed or changeable computational capabilities, i.e., whether they 
follow pre-determined and immutable decision rules or they are provided the possibility to 
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adjust (or to evolve) their computational capabilities especially on the basis of performance 
of past decisions and of other agents’ conduct (e.g., imitation of others’ behavior) (Secchi, 
2010). When agents are provided the possibility to adjust their computational capabilities, 
then simulations may incorporate procedures (e.g., algorithms) that originate from the field 
of artificial intelligence. By making decision rules dependent on adjustments based on other 
agents’ conduct, moreover, simulations are typically able to reproduce certain properties of 
social phenomena, such as, for instance, so-called ‘herding’ behavior when groups of 
agents exhibit certain consistency of behavior at the group aggregated level.  
 
Generally, simulations do not pose any particular requirement or presupposed constraint 
about the conduct of the entity at the aggregated level: rather, they consist of computational 
experiments that allow the emergence of behavioral patterns at the aggregated level - 
possibly, of regularities - on the basis of the assumptions formulated at the disaggregated 
level only. In other terms, simulations are intended to produce explanations in the form of 
reconstructions, through computational systems, of the properties of entities at the 
aggregated level in a ‘bottom-up’ fashion (De Grauwe, 2010). As an epistemological 
program, therefore, simulations exhibit both reductionist and holistic components: on the 
one hand, explanations of phenomena at a certain level of analysis build on the aggregated 
effect of behavior exhibited at a lower level of analysis (along the generative social science 
motto that ‘if you do not grow it, you don’t explain its emergence’; Epstein, 1999); on the 
other hand, the conduct of entities at the disaggregated level of analysis does not amount, 
by itself, to an explanation of the phenomena at the level of analysis of interest, if not 
taking into account the effect of the interactions between behavior at the disaggregated 
level (Epstein and Axtell, 1996; Axelrod, 1997). 
 
Simulations exhibit many properties of how it is generally understood that social systems 
work (Batten, 2000). Simulations include heterogeneous agents, that make choices in 
discrete - rather than continuous - steps. Simulations include the possibility that the 
interaction between agents and their choices are affected by various kinds of frictions, e.g., 
limited information or information processing capabilities. Simulations tend to exhibit path-
dependency, in the sense that the dynamics of the system is affected by the past trajectory 
of the same system. Simulations may exhibit relative stability (steady states) or chaotic 
behavior, or periods of relative stability may be interrupted by sudden alterations of the 
apparently stable conditions. Simulations may also result in the evolution of an apparently 
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chaotic system into one that exhibits some form of self-organization, in ways that are not 
necessarily dictated by any central coordination agency but rather emerge, in an unintended 
way, from the decentralized interaction between agents. Simulations also allow to explore 
how minimal perturbations of the system may escalate into system-scale effects, especially 
in terms of disturbances of the apparent organization, or in self-regulation properties of the 
system as a whole.  
 
The view that societies and economies display the properties of self-organizing systems is 
intellectually rooted in the tradition of Adam Smith, Frederick Hayek, and Joseph 
Schumpeter, and it is contrasted with other approaches, such as neoclassical economics, 
that build on different assumptions. Theoretical approaches informed by neoclassical 
though, such as in the Walrasian equilibrium, typically assume that agents are 
homogeneous, that they typically make choices according to canons of ‘hyper-rationality’, 
and that they have no cognitive limitations (Pyka and Fagiolo, 2005; Tesfatsion, 2006). The 
intellectual approach followed within simulation studies, instead, allows the idea of the 
emergence of regularities in the social and economic behavior at the aggregated level on the 
basis of a restricted number of assumption on the conduct of agents at the disaggregated 
(Schelling, 1978; Axelrod, 1984; Arthur, 1994). As highlighted by Tesfatsion (2002), 
agent-based simulations also build on the concept of a two-way feedback between micro-
structure and macro-structure: on the one hand, the interaction between agents at the 
disaggregated level results in the emergence of properties at the aggregated level; on the 
other one, properties at the aggregated level affect disaggregated interactions as agents take 
into account or are constrained by the state of the system.  
 
One main implication of simulation-based method to research of social and economic 
system is the acknowledgement that, most of the times, such systems are in an inherent out-
of-equilibrium condition (Arthur, 2006; Epstein, 2006). Neoclassical economics is 
intellectually oriented to identify the conditions that lead to equilibrium of market forces, 
for example. In contrast, the simulation-based method results in explanations of system 
dynamics and outcomes that rarely provide the possibility to reach steady state conditions 
as neoclassical economic (and other) approaches typically do (e.g., duopoly models, Nash 
equilibrium, etc.). More often, explanations result in the identification of the conditions for 
the emerge of patterns that may never ‘settle’ to assume relatively stable properties. With 
respect to other intellectual approach keyed to the specification of equilibrium conditions, 
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simulation-based methods are rather concerned with explain whether and how equilibrium 
conditions are reached, or why they are not reached at all along the process dynamics of a 
system. 
 
Proponents of the simulation-based method highlight that this method can result in 
significant advancement within social sciences, and in the fields of economics and finance 
in particular (Farmer and Foley, 2009). Colander et al. (2009) argued that, indeed, evidence 
provided by the inability of the economic profession to forecast the coming of the Great 
Financial Crisis suggests that alternative approaches - that especially do not take for 
granted the presumed self-regulatory capacity of markets to reach equilibrium conditions - 
should be granted more consideration. Simulation-based methods - with their attention paid 
to the emergence of complex dynamics that originate from the disaggregated interaction of 
heterogeneous agents - can provide the intellectual framework, methodological guidelines, 
and operational tools for addressing questions about what happens to social and economic 
systems when they change over time and when the possibility of reaching a stationary 
equilibrium is not given (indeed, when the same properties of the disaggregated mode of 
interaction do not necessarily provide the possibility that any equilibrium can be reached). 
 
During the last about two decades, agent-based models have emerged as a relatively 
popular simulation technique in social science (Axelrod, 2006). Agent-based models 
(ABMs) precisely consist of simulation techniques that enable to generate patterns at an 
aggregated level of analysis on the basis of computations of interactions that take place 
between a number of heterogeneous agents at the disaggregated level. Within the field of 
economics, ABM have been largely applied in the area of so-called agent-based 
computational economics (ACE). Tesfatsion (2000) defined ACE as “the computational 
study of economies modeled as evolving systems of autonomous interacting agents”. The 
central concern of ACE is to understand why certain global regularities have been observed 
to evolve and persist in decentralized market economies even if there is no top-down 
planning and control. The aim is to demonstrate how system-level regularities arise from 
the bottom-up, through the repeated interaction of autonomous agents acting in their own 
perceived self-interest. 
 
ABM are typically implemented through computer simulations that generate simulated data 
about properties of the process dynamics and outcome of a system under consideration 
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(Axelrod and Tesfatsion, 2006). There are different ways to construct ABM simulations 
depending on the sophistication of the assumptions regarding the conduct of agents at the 
disaggregated level. Design choices of the simulation include, in particular: 
 
1) What are the criteria that inform the choices made by agents: agents may make 
decisions on the basis of pre-determined information processing rules (e.g., self-interest 
seeking agents), or on rules that are progressively adjusted in relation to new information 
(e.g., performance feedback), or on rules that are progressively adjusted in relation to the 
apparent behavior of other agents (e.g., internalized social norms); 
 
2) How much information processing capacity agents have: agents may be able to process a 
very limited amount of information (e.g., information about properties of the present state 
of the system, or of a part only of the system), or they may be able to acquire, store and 
process a larger amount of information (e.g., information about properties of both the 
present and the past state of the system, or of a part only of the system), or they may be able 
to infer additional information on their own (e.g., information about expected future 
properties of the state of the system, or of a part only of the system); 
 
3) Whether agents are able to adjust their information processing capacity over time, 
especially along a process of learning (Brenner, 2006) that results in the improvement of 
the selection and use of information for making choices: agents may not be able to learn 
anything new, and therefore their choice criteria and information basis tend to be relatively 
stable over time, or they may be able to learn, drawing on performance feedback, 
observation of other agents’ conduct, or other mechanisms for modifying the kind and 
amount of information that they select and the procedures (algorithms) they use for taking 
choices. 
 
4) How many agents any agent is able to interact with, and how they are selected: agents 
may be able to interact with all other agents at any moment in time, or they may be able to 
interact with a limited number of other agents, who are selected depending on the topology 
of the interaction structure (e.g., on the basis of physical proximity in an n-dimensional 
lattice or on the basis of structured network ties). 
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5) How fast are adjustments to the newly acquired information: if agents react too slowly to 
information (e.g., information about changed conditions of the environment or about the 
conduct of other agents or about any dimension of desired performance) then the dynamics 
of the system may result in dissatisfactory outcomes that agents are not able to correct any 
more; if, on the other hand, agents are too fast to react to new information (i.e., they ‘over-
react’) then the adjustment of their conduct can throw additional sources of instability into 
the system. 
 
ABMs enable the researcher to investigate various kind of issues, that include the 
identification of conditions that increase the likelihood of cooperative solutions, that result 
in the over-exploitation of common-pool resources, that affect consequences of decisions 
taken in scenarios with high uncertainty, and that affect consequences of decisions because 
of the features of the topology of interactions among actors (Janssen and Ostrom, 2006). 
While these issues are not alien to the general concern of social science disciplines, what 
distinguishes ABMs is the possibility to investigate them under what are generally 
considered more realistic assumptions than most theoretical approaches, i.e., that agents 
face structural uncertainty, that they are heterogeneous, and that they interact in modes that 
are determined by idiosyncratic circumstances. ABMs, in this respect, help showing that, if 
these more realistic assumption are included, then we can explain a wider range of features 
of process dynamics and outcome of social and economic systems, and we can design 
better interventions to prevent unwelcome system-level behavior to happen. 
 
Following ABMs offers two main advantages (Pyka and Fagiolo, 2005). First, ABMs 
enable the researcher to identify sources and conditions that determine certain properties of 
the process dynamics and outcome of systems at aggregated level. In this way, the 
researcher can potentially identify whether any particular agent plays a pivotal role in the 
emergence of properties at the aggregated level, or whether certain conditions or features of 
the interaction drive the evolution of the system. In principle, ABMs also allow to identify 
the circumstances associated with dramatic adjustments in the behavior of the system at the 
aggregated level, such as, for instance, the disruption of order and the emergence of chaos.  
Second, ABMs also enable the researcher to explore alternative conditions, including 
possible interventions, to the system, with the possibility to anticipate ‘in vitro’ their effects 
on the process dynamics and outcome of the system. In this respect, ABMs play the role of 
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‘virtual laboratories’ where alternative institutional and organizational arrangements can be 
explored. 
 
Simulation-based methods, and ABMs in particular, also have some limitations (Tesfatsion, 
2005). The main source of criticism on simulation research is that results of the simulations 
may have little relevance of they do not fit empirical facts. In this respect, an issue arise 
about how simulation models can be ‘calibrated’ so that the results of the simulation (i.e., 
data about properties of the process dynamics and outcome of the simulated system) match 
those of empirical phenomena. Some authors argue that simulation-based research should 
not be concerned with empirical validation, as the insights that are provided when 
understanding how the aggregated behavior of decentralized agents results in system-level 
properties are primarily of qualitative sort (Pyka and Fagiolo, 2005). As a matter of fact, 
ABMs are used in a rather flexible way, sometimes with the intended effect of replicating 
‘in vitro’ some properties of empirical phenomena, sometimes with the aim of exploring the 
behavior of a system under different configurations of the parameters of the model.  
 
5.3 Applications of ABMs in Economics and Finance  
Simulation, especially in the form of agent-based models, have been used in a number of 
areas within social science research. Among the various instances of application of ABMs, 
the Santa Fe Artificial Stock Market deserved particular attention. Created by the Santa Fe 
Institute in 1989 (LeBaron, 2002), the model has been subjected to various development 
with the intention to better understand the dynamics of stock markets under different 
conditions. Works that resulted from the Santa Fe simulation include, for instance, Arthur 
et al.’s (1996) work on asset pricing, that included the role of expectations of other agents’ 
behavior in the formulation of actors’ conduct, including a role for market psychology, 
positive feedbacks, and bandwagoning effects. When these features are incorporated into 
the mode, the simulation of stock markets exhibits some properties that are typical of 
empirical evidence financial market time series, such as bubbles, crashes, and erratic 
behavior of prices rather than the identification of market clearing prices along the lines of 
rational economic agents. The results of the simulation, in particular, highlight the role 
played by the pace of adaptation of agents’ conduct rules: slow adaptation to new 
information results in market convergence in a rational expectations fashion, while faster 
adaptation results in more chaotic price patterns.  
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The work of the Santa Fe Institute on ABMs has been carried forward in various other 
works, including LeBaron et al.’s (1999) study of the introduction of artificial intelligence 
properties of the agents. The simulation resulted in the replication of various features of 
market behavior, including the emergence of condition where the market prices ‘stabilizes’ 
around equilibria as they would be defined by agents who behave according to canons of 
rational expectations. The results that the simulation delivered were eminently qualitative, 
i.e., the parameters and the results of the simulation were not calibrated to fit any empirical 
evidence. Yet, future developments of the model include adjusting parameters to fit actual 
financial time series, apart from introducing risk aversion preferences, coordinating social 
behavior between agents, and implementing more advanced artificial intelligence systems 
(LeBaron, 2002). 
 
Along the lines of the Santa Fe model, several other works have also used ABMs to the 
study of financial markets (Tesfatsion, 2002), especially because of the apparent promise of 
ABMs to help solving some among the main issues that analytic approaches have not been 
fully able to tackle yet, e.g., fat-tailed asset return distributions, high trading volumes, 
persistence and clustering in asset return volatility, and cross correlations between asset 
returns, trading volumes and volatility (LeBaron, 2006). Various research directions have 
been pursued, including the introduction of alternative assumption about agents’ decision 
making rules, different way of using information and storing past data, and different 
learning mechanisms. Lux and Marchesi (2000), for instance, used an agent-based model 
for examining the volatility of financial markets. The work of Soramaki and Galbiati (2008) 
employed an ABM for exploring banks’ allocation of liquidity to manage the settlement 
process, especially in relation to the issues that arise from an exogenous and random stream 
of payment orders. The one of Thurner (2011) employed an ABM for understand the 
leverage cycle and financial market crashes on national scale and their consequences. Also 
Bookstaber (2012) used an ABM to analyze threats to financial stability. Using the ABM 
simulator ‘Eurace’, which was built with the intention to provide a simulator of the whole 
European economy, Cincotti et al. (2012) examined the role of borrowing and debt load and 
their impact on the real economy, in ways that include the stimulation of economic activity 
by credit expansion and the depressive effects of credit crunch. 
 
Another important area of application of ABM models is the one of understanding the 
origins of financial crises and the policies that could be employed to prevent or contain 
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them. Buchanan (2009), for example, discussed how ABMs help exploring how regulation 
can deal with out-of-equilibrium situations. He noticed that ABMs can assist regulators to 
anticipate the effects of regulatory measures by simulating the likely consequences of the 
adjustments of behavior of the regulated to changed regulatory conditions. In addition, 
Buchanan (2009) highlighted that ABMs can also incorporate the anticipation of regulatory 
measures from the side of agents, as well as the strategies that agents can follow for 
avoiding the unwelcome aspects of the regulatory burden. Simulation approaches, 
therefore, can provide a way to model and understand the kind of ‘arms race’ that the 
regulators and the regulated undertake when adjusting their policies, in a co-evolutionary 
fashion, to the conduct of other players.  
 
Markose (2012), in particular, explored the use of ABMs (as well as of network modeling) 
for understanding the role of CDS in the origin and proportion of the Great Financial Crisis. 
He highlighted that the use of CDS introduce so-called ‘reflexivity’ properties into the 
financial system, in the sense that risk protection sellers suffer from an increase of CDS 
spread when the value of the underlying asset that they protect deteriorates. The 
consequence of the decrease of value of the underlying asset, in fact, can be the default of 
both the risk protection seller and the holder of the devalued asset, with the resulting effect 
that, rather than making the financial system more resilient, the use of CDS may result in 
exacerbating the consequences of a drop of price of underlying assets. According to 
Markose (2012), CDS markets typically exhibit more fragility than it is usually assumed, 
also because financial operators are willing to take on much more risk than the risk 
protection sellers are actually capable to support. Pivotal risk protection sellers (or ‘super-
spreaders’ as they are called by Haldane, 2009) should be made more robust, especially by 
increasing the requirement to hold buffers against potential losses. 
 
In another work, Markose et al. (2012) developed an ABM that included attention to bank 
balance sheet and off-balance sheet activity in response to changes in regulatory policy and 
under competitive co-evolutionary pressures to grow market share. Their model especially 
focused on the role of CDS in the origin of the Great Financial Crisis, and was intended to 
show how the dense interconnection in the network of financial relationships played an 
important role as a source of systemic risk. They concluded that structural weakness in 
modern risk sharing institutions arises from too much concentration of market share among 
a few broker-dealers. 
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5.4 An ABM of the Derivatives Market 
The operationalization of the simulation method entails the making of various design 
choices in the building of an ABM. Design choices include the definition of the features of 
the system to simulate, especially in terms of the entities at the disaggregated level, the 
topological boundaries and properties of the system, the modality of interaction between 
agents, and the computational properties upon which the choices of the agents rest (Gilbert 
and Terna, 1999). These choices relate, in particular, to the variety of types of agents, to 
their properties, and to the initial distribution of their properties; to the kind of connectivity 
between agents and the possibility for agents to interact with others; to the type of resources 
or information that agents can exchange with each other; and to the type of information that 
the agents can perceive from the environment, how much information they can store in 
memory, how they make use of the information for computing which kind of choices, and 
whether and how they can adjust how computations for choice are made. 
 
At the core of the conduct of any agent is the so-called ‘production system’ (Gilbert and 
Terna, 1999). The production system is composed of a set of rules, a working memory and 
a rule interpreter. Rules are formed of two parts, namely a condition that specifies when the 
rule is executed and an action part that specifies what is the consequence of the activation 
of the rule (i.e., an ‘if… then…’ structure). Some rules, however, may also modify other 
rules, as if agents possess computational capabilities to repair some rules depending on 
specified conditions. In this way, it is possible to provide agents an elementary cognitive 
capacity. Alternatively, agents may be provided with some algorithms that assist in the 
refinement of rules in an adaptive fashion, e.g., neural networks or genetic algorithms that 
result in the progressive adjustment of agents’ computational structures depending on 
various kinds of performance feedback mechanisms (Tesfatsion, 2002). The working 
memory assists the computation by storing data that can be recalled for either the present or 
for future computations. Finally, the rule interpreter provides the identification of which 
rule should be applied given the particular circumstances where an agent operates. 
 
The connectivity between agents can be modeled in different ways. Some ABMs place 
agents in a n-dimensional lattice, where agents may occupy either fixed or variable 
positions. Within the n-dimensional lattice, agents are typically allowed to interact with a 
limited number of other proximate agents, e.g., in a typical flat matrix structure, any agent 
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that occupies one ‘cell’ of the matrix can interact with the nine cells in the immediate 
surroundings in the matrix. Other AMBs, instead, provide agents with the possibility to 
interact with any other (albeit, typically, with a limited number of other agents) through the 
establishment of network connections. The choice of the connectivity model depends on the 
features of the social and economic system to reproduce, where in some cases it is relevant 
to constraint the interactions on the basis of physical proximity while in other instances 
distance is not relevant to limit interaction. 
 
The interaction between agents can also be modeled in different ways. Typically agents 
exchange information with each other, possibly about their status or properties or about 
features of the environment. Agents, however, can also exchange various kinds of 
resources, such as, for instance, financial or real assets, commodities, and money. 
Depending on the kind of interaction, agents should be equipped with a registry of their 
status or properties, such as, for instance, the record of assets or other resources that they 
control. The interaction, moreover, is governed by rules, which should specify under which 
condition the exchange of information or resources takes place. For instance, rules can 
specify under which conditions one agent transfers some information or resources to 
another one, and whether the other agents should reciprocate. The rule interpreter, in this 
instance, should specify which features of the status or properties of the agents, and 
possibly of the environment, determine the activation of the exchange rule. 
 
As agents interact through their connections over time, they may adjust their production 
systems along a learning process. There are several kinds of learning mechanisms that 
agents can follow (Brenner, 2006). In Bayesian learning, agents adjust their production 
system on the basis of evidence provided by performance feedback that impact upon the 
pre-existing (hypothesized) rules that the agent followed. In genetic programming, agents 
possess the capacity to select, reproduce, cross-over and mutate parts of the rules depending 
on feedback about the performance of existing rules. In neural networks, agents possess 
computational cognitive structures arranged in a networked connectionist fashion and the 
capacity to adjust network features (i.e., weights on the interconnections between artificial 
neurons) depending on feedback about the performance of the present network. As agents 
adjust their production systems, they develop adaptive responses to changing 
environmental conditions in ways that typically it is not possible to figure out in advance on 
the basis of a pre-specified set of equations (Markose et al., 2012). In other words, 
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openness to learning paths results in emergent properties of the complex adaptive system 
(CAS) at the aggregated level that are not analytically tractable with econometric tools and 
time series data. 
 
These design features result in a greater or lesser extent to which the structure of 
interactions between agents changes over time. If agents behave according to static rules 
and along stable connections, then their interaction may result in relatively ordered patterns 
or stable outcomes. If, instead, agents behave according to changeable rules and along 
connections that are redefined depending on past performance feedback and contingent 
conditions, then their interaction may exhibit traits of chaotic behavior (Pyka and Fagiolo, 
2005). The emergence of chaos and the possibility to investigate under which conditions 
chaos emerges are, indeed, among the peculiar features of ABMs.  
 
ABMs can be implemented through different software instruments. At the simplest form, 
ABMs can be implemented though low-level programming languages, such as plan C or 
DOS. Alternatively, it is possible to use computational tools (such as Excel or R), high-
level object-oriented programming languages (such as C++), or ABM software (such as 
Swarm or Netlogo). The selection of the software instrument depends on the complexity of 
the model, as well as on the desired output and reporting features of the simulation 
exercise. In principle, it may be possible that the agent interaction can be modeled in 
analytical form (i.e., through systems of equations) and that the resulting interaction can be 
analytically solved, but generally the complexity of the model - understood in terms of 
heterogeneity of agents, number and kind of connections, and changeability of the 
interaction rules - entails that the model eludes analytical treatment. In addition, of course, 
the computational approach also allows to observe the very trajectory of the behavior of the 
system at the aggregated level, that is typically one of the aims of the simulation-based 
method. 
 
These considerations about the design of ABMs are relevant for the purpose of the present 
work. Policy measures taken by policy-makers for regulating the derivatives market entail 
some fundamental changes in the connectivity structure of the financial system and on the 
inducement and constraints placed on financial operators (Zigrand, 2010). Issues arise, 
then, about how new structural and procedural rules are going to impact the conduct of 
individual financial operators and what kind of repercussions they may have on the 
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behavior of the financial system - or, at least, in the part of the financial system that relates 
to the trading of derivatives - as a whole. The establishment of CCPs, for example, brings 
about the reconfiguration of the network of relationships between financial operators: the 
consequences of the centralization of derivatives trading through CCPs are not fully 
evident, e.g., whether CCPs provide a buffer from market shocks or whether they could, by 
themselves, introduce additional source of instability under particular, albeit extremely rare, 
market circumstances. The simulation approach, therefore, can help providing answers to 
questions about the resilience and effectiveness of CCPs. 
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Chapter 6 
 
The Design of a Model of Financial Derivatives Industry 
 
6.1 The Design of the Model 
The design of the model of financial derivatives industry that is developed for the present 
study consists of a few component parts, namely: (a) the definition of the agents that 
populate the model, (b) the definition of the routines that drive the behavior of the agents, 
and (c) the definition of input-output interface that enables the researcher to run alternative 
simulations (depending on the parameters set for the model) and to see the results of the 
simulation (especially at the aggregated level). The design of the model includes two 
variant – Model A and Model B – in order to enable the investigation of alternative effects 
of regulating the derivatives industry with or without central counterparts.  
Like any model, also the present one is designed on the basis of relatively 
simplifying assumptions. First, agents are characterized by a limited umber of features, 
which especially include two stock variables and two flow variables. The two stock 
variables relate to assets (credits in the case of banks and investment assets in the case of 
credit protection sellers and central counterparts) and equity (reserves), while the two flow 
variables relate to losses that are passed to other financial institutions and losses that are 
received from other financial institutions on the basis of credit protection contracts (i.e., 
swaps). Second, the behavior of the agents is driven by algorithmic rules, which include 
absorbing losses on credits or on assets if agents cannot pass losses to other financial 
institutions on the basis of credit protection contracts or passing losses to other financial 
institutions if there are credit protection contracts and the counterparts can fulfill their 
obligations. Third, bank agents are affected by random credit default events that depend on 
both general exposure to default risk (i.e., all bank agents can be hit by default of part of 
their clients) and idiosyncratic exposure to default risk (i.e., every bank can be hit by 
default of part of their clients in relation to bank-specific risk conditions).  
 The model is also characterized by some features that are intended to replicate the 
networked structure of the financial derivatives industry. In Model A, each bank agent is 
connected to one or more credit protection sellers and, if a bank is left without any 
connection to any credit protection seller (e.g., if a credit protection seller goes bankrupt) 
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then the bank seeks for at least one new credit protection contract with any financial 
institution. Credit protection sellers, moreover, are connected to one or more other credit 
protection sellers and, if a credit protection seller is left without any connection to other 
credit protection sellers then it seeks for at least one new credit protection contract with any 
financial institution. In Model B, every credit protection seller is not allowed to connect to 
another credit protection seller directly; rather, all credit protection sellers are connected to 
a central counterpart, which serves as an intermediary to the linkages between any two 
credit protection sellers. The extent to which agents (banks, credit protection sellers and 
central counterparts) are connected to others is controlled by the degree of connectivity of 
the network – parameters that can be set by the researchers. 
 The researcher can manipulate the setting of the models in various respects. Inputs 
to the model include the number of banks, of credit protection sellers, and (in Model B) of 
central counterparts; the degree of connectivity of the agents with other agents; the 
exposure of banks to general credit default risk conditions and to random credit default 
events that are bank-specific; and the magnitude of credit losses when banks are hit by 
default events. The researcher can also observe the behavior of the model by looking at 
aggregated indicators, such as total number of agents of each category, total number of 
linkages between agents, total credit and other assets, and total reserves. The trajectory of 
these aggregated indicators provides the evidence that is relevant to draw inferences on the 
role of model conditions (inputs to the models and, when comparing Model A with model 
B, the presence or absence of central counterparts). 
The model is implemented in the Netlogo language. Netlogo 
(https://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/) is a programming environment that has been widely 
used for implementing agent-based models. The first version of Netlogo, developed by Dr 
Uri Wilensky, director of the Center for Connected Learning & Computer-based Modeling 
of Northwestern University (USA), appeared in 1999. It is a free open-source software 
under a GPL licence.  
 Next sections of this chapter illustrate the construction of the model in detail. The 
full code of the model is reported in the Appendix of the present work. Next chapter, 
instead, will report and discuss the results of the model simulation. 
 
6.2 The Setup of the Model 
The model contains, in both Model A and Model B variants, two types of agents, namely 
banks and credit protection sellers. Model B also contains a third type of agent, namely the 
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central counterparts. The construction of the model takes place in Netlogo by generating 
these types of agents first. This is done in Model A with the instructions: 
 
breed [banks bank] 
breed [cpss cps]  
 
and in Model B also with the instruction:  
 
breed [ccps ccp]  
 
Next step is to create the networks between actors. Model A includes two types of 
networks: one that connects banks with credit protection sellers (i.e., swap contracts 
between banks and credit protection sellers) and another that connects credit protection 
sellers with each other (i.e., swap contracts between credit protection sellers, provided that 
a credit protection seller that negotiates a swap with a bank client can enter other swap 
contracts with other credit protection sellers to have credit protection on the same swaps 
with banks). These networks are implemented with the following code: 
 
undirected-link-breed [bank_cpss bank_cps] 
undirected-link-breed [cps_cpss cps_cps]   
 
Model B, instead, the second network relates to the connections that credit protection 
sellers have with central counterparts, provided that – in Model B scenario – credit 
protection sellers do not enter credit protection contract with each other but through the 
intermediary role played by central counterparts. The network between credit protection 
sellers and central counterparts is implemented with the following code: 
 
undirected-link-breed [cps_ccps cps_ccp]   
 
Next step is the initialization of the variables to define what are the features that 
characterize any type of agent. The bank agents are characterized by five variables. One 
variable relates to the amount of credits that the bank has (i.e., loans with clients), and that 
can be exposed to the risk of credit default. Another variable relates to the amount of 
reserves (as part of equity) that the bank has, which can be eroded by losses on credits. 
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Another variable relates to the probability that the bank suffers from default on its credits 
(this probability is bank-specific, while the model also includes a general probability that a 
credit default hits any bank). Another variable relates to the amount of loss on credits that 
the bank may suffer at any period of time (and that the bank may pass to credit protection 
sellers, if the bank has any connections with them, or carry in the income loss of the period, 
if the bank has no connections with any credit protection seller or if the connected credit 
protection sellers have no means to refund the bank for the loss). Finally, another variable 
relates to the amount of loss on credits that the bank can pass to credit protection sellers. 
This is implemented with the following code: 
 
banks-own [ 
  bank-credits 
  bank-reserves 
  credit-default-prob 
  bank-credit-loss 
  bank-loss-to-pass] 
 
The credit protection seller agents are characterized by four variables. One variable relates 
to the amount of assets that the credit protection seller has (i.e., shares, bonds and other 
assets), and that the credit protection seller can sell in case of need, e.g., to refund a client 
bank or another credit protection seller for their losses. Another variable relates to the 
amount of reserves (as part of equity) that the credit protection seller has, which can be 
eroded by losses on assets. Another variable relates to the amount of loss on assets that the 
credit protection seller may suffer at any period of time (and that the credit protection seller 
may pass to other credit protection sellers, if the credit protection seller has any connections 
with them, or carry in the income loss of the period, if the credit protection seller has no 
connections with any other credit protection sellers or if the other credit protection sellers 
have no means to refund the credit protection seller for the loss). Finally, another variable 
relates to the amount of loss on assets that the credit protection seller can pass to other 
credit protection sellers. This is implemented with the following code: 
 
cpss-own [ 
  cps-assets  
  cps-reserves  
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  cps-assets-loss 
  cps-loss-to-pass] 
 
Model B also includes the central counterparts type of agents. Also the central counterparts 
agents are characterized by four variables. One variable relates to the amount of assets that 
the central counterparts has (i.e., shares, bonds and other assets), and that the central 
counterparts can sell in case of need, e.g., to refund a client credit protection seller for their 
losses if the other credit protection seller of the credit protection contract does not fulfill the 
obligation). Another variable relates to the amount of reserves (as part of equity) that the 
central counterparts has, which can be eroded by losses on assets. Another variable relates 
to the amount of loss on assets that the central counterparts should pass to the other credit 
protection seller of a credit protection contract, if the credit protection seller counterpart has 
assets, but which could affect the income of the period of the central counterpart if the other 
credit protection seller of a credit protection contract has no means to fulfill its obligation. 
Finally, another variable relates to the amount of loss on assets that the central counterparts 
can pass to the other credit protection seller of a credit protection contract. This is 
implemented with the following code: 
 
ccps-own [ 
  ccp-assets  
  ccp-reserves  
  ccp-assets-loss  
  ccp-loss-to-pass] 
 
The final step of the setup of the model consists of the creation of the agents and the 
attribution of initial values to the variables. The creation of the bank type of agents and the 
attribution of initial values to their variables is implemented with the following code: 
 
create-banks bank-count [ 
    set shape "circle"  
    set color red  
    set bank-credits 30 + random 70 
    set bank-reserves 10 + random 20 
    set bank-credit-loss 0 
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    set bank-loss-to-pass 0 
    ifelse prob-default-loan = 0 [set credit-default-prob 0] [set credit-default-prob ((prob-
default-loan - 1) * 10 + random 10)] 
    move-to one-of patches] 
 
The code creates the number of bank agents that is defined by the researcher in the input 
panel of the model (the variable named bank-count). Each bank agent is represented as a 
red circle that is placed in a two-dimensional space. The amount of initial credits of each 
bank is set between 30 and 100 (the random function returns a random integer where each 
number has the same likelihood). The amount of initial reserves of each bank is set between 
10 and 30. The maximum value of credits and reserves is arbitrary, and is merely intended 
to replicate the assumed tendency of banks to hold credits for a larger amount than reserves. 
Each bank, moreover, is exposed to bank-specific credit default risk, that is calculated with 
a formula that depends on an indicator of exposure to credit default risk, that is defined by 
the researchers in the input panel of the model (the variable named prob-default-loan). The 
formula converts the indicator (whose value range between 0 and 10) to the probability 
scale (i.e., values between 0% and 100%). 
The creation of the credit protection seller type of agents and the attribution of 
initial values to their variables is implemented with the following code: 
 
  create-cpss cps-count [ 
    set shape "circle"  
    set color blue  
    set cps-assets 30 + random 70 
    set cps-reserves 10 + random 20 
    set cps-assets-loss 0 
    set cps-loss-to-pass 0 
    move-to one-of patches] 
 
The code creates the number of credit protection seller agents that is defined by the 
researcher in the input panel of the model (the variable named cps-count). Each credit 
protection seller agent is represented as a blue circle that is placed in the same two-
dimensional space. The amount of initial credits of each credit protection seller is set 
between 30 and 100 and the amount of initial reserves of each credit protection seller is set 
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between 10 and 30. Again, the maximum value of assets and reserves is arbitrary, and is 
merely intended to replicate the assumed tendency of credit protection seller to hold assets 
for a larger amount than reserves.  
Finally, the creation of the central counterpart type of agents and the attribution of 
initial values to their variables is implemented with the following code: 
 
create-ccps ccp-count [ 
    set shape "circle" 
    set color green 
    set ccp-assets 60 + random 140 
    set ccp-reserves 20 + random 40 
    set ccp-assets-loss 0 
    set ccp-loss-to-pass 0 
    move-to one-of patches] 
 
The code creates the number of central counterpart agents that is defined by the researcher 
in the input panel of the model (the variable named ccp-count). Each central counterpart 
agent is represented as a green circle that is placed in the same two-dimensional space. The 
amount of initial assets of each central counterpart is set between 60 and 200 and the 
amount of initial reserves of each central counterpart is set between 20 and 60. The 
maximum values of assets and reserves of the central counterparts are again arbitrary, and 
their amount relates to the assumed tendency of central counterparts to act as sources of 
guarantee and stability to the network of credit protection contracts and therefore to hold 
relatively larger amount of assets and reserves than other financial institutions. 
 The creation of the networks between the agents is implemented with code that 
makes actors establish connections with others. The model includes additional inputs that 
the researcher can set about the connectivity of the banks with credit protection sellers and 
of credit protection sellers with each other (in Model B, the connection between credit 
protection sellers takes place through the intermediary role of the central counterpart, 
however). The network of banks with credit protection sellers is implemented with the 
following code: 
 
ask banks [create-bank_cps-with one-of cpss] 
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  repeat bank-connectivity [ask banks [if random 100 < bank-credits [create-bank_cps-with 
one-of cpss]]]  
 
Each bank is required to establish a connection with one credit protection seller. In 
addition, depending on the value of the input variable of the connectivity of banks (the 
variable named bank-connectivity, that ranges between 0 and 10), each bank is required to 
establish additional connections with other credit protection sellers. Also, the code makes 
banks more likely to establish additional connections the higher the amount of credits that 
the bank has, because of the assumed tendency of banks to seek more credit protection 
contracts the more credits they have towards clients. 
In Model A, the network of credit protection sellers is implemented with the 
following code: 
 
  ask cpss [create-cps_cds-with one-of other cpss] 
  repeat cps-connectivity [ask cpss [if random 100 > cps-assets [create-cps_cds-with one-of 
other cpss]]] 
 
Each credit protection seller is required to establish a connection with another credit 
protection seller. In addition, depending on the value of the input variable of the 
connectivity of credit protection sellers (the variable named cps-connectivity, that ranges 
between 0 and 10), each credit protection seller is required to establish additional 
connections with other credit protection sellers. Also, the code makes credit protection 
sellers more likely to establish additional connections the lower the amount of assets that 
the credit protection seller has, because of the assumed tendency of credit protection seller 
to seek more credit protection contracts if they have relatively less assets at disposal to 
fulfill their obligations. 
In Model B, instead, the network of credit protection sellers is implemented with the 
following code: 
 
ask cpss [create-cps_ccp-with one-of ccps] 
    repeat cps-connectivity [ask cpss [if random 100 > cps-assets [create-cps_ccp-with one-
of ccps]]]  
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In this scenario, each credit protection seller is required to establish a connection 
with a central counterpart. In addition, depending on the value of the input variable of the 
connectivity of credit protection sellers (the variable named cps-connectivity, that ranges 
between 0 and 10), each credit protection seller is required to establish additional 
connections with other central counterparts. Again, the code makes credit protection sellers 
more likely to establish additional connections the lower the amount of assets that the credit 
protection seller has, because of the assumed tendency of credit protection seller to seek 
more credit protection contracts if they have relatively less assets at disposal to fulfill their 
obligations. 
 
6.3 The Routines of the Model 
The model includes a limited number of routines that are intended to make agents carry out 
some behavior according to rules and conditions that are checked for each and single agent. 
Routines include those to check whether agents should exit the industry because of 
bankruptcy, to make agents seek connections when they have run out of connections, to 
check whether any credit default event affects banks, credit protection sellers, and (in 
Model B) central counterparts, to compute the reduction of reserves because of loss on 
income of the period, and to let agents carry out their business with related increase of 
credits and assets over time. Each of these routines is described in turn. 
Exit from the industry 
The routines to check whether an agent should exit the industry because of bankruptcy 
consists of the elimination of agents when their bank reserves are nil or negative. The 
reduction of reserves of a bank to zero or to a negative value may take place when a bank 
incurs some losses on the income of the period because of a credit default that the bank 
cannot pass to any of the connected credit protection sellers because they do not have assets 
to liquidate to refund the bank for the losses. In Model A, the reduction of reserves of a 
credit protection seller to zero or to a negative value may take place when a credit 
protection seller incurs some losses on the income of the period because of the requirement 
to refund a bank or another credit protection seller, on the basis of a credit protection 
contract, but the credit protection seller cannot pass the loss to another credit protection 
seller (because of lack of other swap contract or because other counterparts of swap 
contracts do not have enough assets). In Model B, also the reserves of a central counterpart 
can be reduced to zero or to a negative value, when the central counterpart cannot pass the 
loss on a credit protection contract from one credit protection seller to the counterpart of the 
	   116	  
swap and therefore the central counterpart is required to refund the loss (i.e., acting as a 
guarantor of the credit protection contracts) but has no enough assets to sell. These routines 
are implemented with the following code: 
 
ask banks [if bank-reserves <= 0 [die]]  
ask cpss [if cps-reserves <= 0 [die]]  
ask ccps [if ccp-reserves <= 0 [die]] 
 
Establishment of connections 
The routines to establish connections (i.e., credit protection contracts) are intended to check 
whether any agent has lost all of the connections with other agents and, in the case, to 
recreate some of them. The loss of all connections may take place if all other counterparts 
of an agent have exited the industry. If an agent is left without connections, then at least 
new connection is created (e.g., a bank seeks a connection with a credit protection seller 
and, in Model A, a credit protection seller seeks a connection with another credit protection 
seller; in Model B, a credit protection seller seeks connection with another credit protection 
seller through a central counterpart). Additional connections are created, moreover, 
depending on input variables related to the connectivity of the bank and credit protection 
seller networks. These routines are implemented with the following code: 
 
For the network of banks: 
if count my-bank_cpss = 0 [  
      if count cpss > 0 [   
        if bank-credits > 0 [   
          create-bank_cps-with one-of cpss   
          repeat bank-connectivity [if random 100 < bank-credits [create-bank_cps-with one-of 
cpss]]  
    ]]] 
 
For the network of credit protection sellers in Model A: 
 
if count my-cps_ccps = 0 [  
    if count cpss > 1 [   
      if cps-assets > 0 [   
	   117	  
        ask one-of ccps [create-cps_ccp-with myself create-cps_ccp-with one-of other cpss]   
        if count cpss > cps-connectivity + 2 [  
          repeat cps-connectivity [if random 100 > cps-assets [ask one-of ccps [create-cps_ccp-
with myself create-cps_ccp-with one-of other cpss]]]  
    ]]]] 
 
For the network of credit protection sellers and central counterparts in Model B: 
 
  if count my-cps_ccps = 0 [  
    if count cpss > 1 [   
      if cps-assets > 0 [   
        ask one-of ccps [create-cps_ccp-with myself create-cps_ccp-with one-of other cpss]   
        if count cpss > cps-connectivity + 2 [ 
          repeat cps-connectivity [if random 100 > cps-assets [ask one-of ccps [create-cps_ccp-
with myself create-cps_ccp-with one-of other cpss]]] 
    ]]]] 
 
Checking credit default events 
The routines for checking credit default events consist of the occurrence of random credit 
defaults that determine losses on banks or on credit protection sellers. The occurrence of a 
credit default event is determined in relation to the probability that a default may happen. 
The probability is determined, in turn, by two input variables set by the researcher, that 
relate to a general likelihood of credit defaults events (that may hit all banks at the same 
time) and of bank-specific credit default events. If a credit default event takes place, then 
any bank incurs a loss on credits that is dependent on the incidence of the loss, which is set 
as another input variable by the researcher (the presence of these input variables is relevant 
to run simulations under different scenario conditions).  
 When a loss on credits takes place, if a bank has connections (i.e., credit protection 
contracts) with credit protection sellers then, if a credit protection seller has any assets, then 
the bank can pass the loss on credits to the credit protection seller – else, it is the bank that 
incurs the loss on the income of the period. In Model A, the credit protection seller, in turn, 
checks whether any of the other credit protections sellers that it is connected to has any 
assets and, in the case, the credit protection seller can pass the loss to the other credit 
protection seller – else, it is the credit protection seller that incurs the loss on the income of 
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the period. In Model B, instead, the credit protection seller checks whether any of the other 
credit protection sellers that it is connected to through any central counterparts has any 
assets and, in the case, the credit protection seller can pass the loss to the other credit 
protection seller – else, if the central counterpart has any assets, than it is the central 
counterpart that refunds (as guarantor) the credit protection seller. If, however, also the 
central counterpart has no assets then the credit protection seller has to incur the credit loss 
on the income of the period. These routines are implemented with the following code: 
 
For checking credit default events with banks: 
 
  if bank-credits > 0 
    [if random 100 < (credit-default-prob / 2 + (general-default-risk * 10) / 2)  
      [set bank-credit-loss (bank-credits * default-incidence / 100) 
        ifelse count my-links > 0  
        [set bank-loss-to-pass bank-credit-loss  
          ifelse not any? bank_cps-neighbors with [cps-assets > 0]  
          [set bank-credits (bank-credits - bank-credit-loss)]   
          [ask one-of bank_cps-neighbors with [cps-assets > 0] 
           [set cps-assets-loss [bank-loss-to-pass] of myself]]] 
      [set bank-credits (bank-credits - bank-credit-loss)]  
      set bank-credits 0  ;; set credits of the bank to zero]] 
  set bank-credit-loss 0 
  set bank-loss-to-pass 0 
 
For checking losses on assets with the credit protection sellers in Model A: 
 
  if cps-assets > 0 
    [if cps-assets-loss > 0 
      [ifelse count my-links > 0 
        [set cps-loss-to-pass cps-assets-loss 
         ifelse not any? cps_cds-neighbors with [cps-assets > 0] 
          [set cps-assets (cps-assets - cps-assets-loss)]   
          [ask one-of cps_cds-neighbors with [cps-assets > 0] 
           [set cps-assets cps-assets - [cps-loss-to-pass] of myself]]] 
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        [set cps-assets (cps-assets - cps-assets-loss)]]] 
  set cps-assets-loss 0 
  set cps-loss-to-pass 0 
 
For checking losses on assets with the credit protection sellers and the central counterparts 
in Model B: 
 
  if cps-assets > 0 
    [if cps-assets-loss > 0 
      [ifelse count my-links >  
        [set cps-loss-to-pass cps-assets- 
         ifelse not any? cps_ccp-neighbors with [ccp-assets > 0]  
          [set cps-assets (cps-assets - cps-assets-loss)]  
          [ask one-of cps_ccp-neighbors with [ccp-assets > 0]  
           [set ccp-assets-loss [cps-loss-to-pass] of myself  
             check-ccp-losses]]] 
        [set cps-assets (cps-assets - cps-assets-loss)]]] 
  set cps-assets-loss 0  
  set cps-loss-to-pass 0 
 
Where ‘check-ccp-losses’ is the following sub-routine: 
 
ifelse any? cps_ccp-neighbors with [cps-assets > 0]   
  [set ccp-loss-to-pass ccp-assets-loss 
    ask one-of cps_ccp-neighbors with [cps-assets > 0]  
     [set cps-assets (cps-assets - [ccp-loss-to-pass] of myself)]]  
  [set ccp-assets (ccp-assets - ccp-assets-loss)]  
  set ccp-assets-loss 0   
  set ccp-loss-to-pass 0  
 
Computing losses of the income of the period on the reserves 
The routines for computing losses of the income of the period on the reserves consist of 
reducing reserves of agents to take into account the loss of credits or assets because of 
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losses related to credit default events (or to losses incurred by banks that credit protection 
sellers should refund). These routines are implemented with the following code: 
 
if bank-credits < 0   
    [set bank-reserves (bank-reserves + bank-credits)  
      set bank-credits 0]  
 
if cps-assets < 0  
    [set cps-reserves (cps-reserves + cps-assets) 
      set cps-assets 0]  
 
if ccp-assets < 0 
  [set ccp-reserves (ccp-reserves + ccp-assets)  
    set ccp-assets 0]   
 
Regaining some credits and assets over time 
Finally, these routines consist of the steady increase of credits of banks and of assets of 
credit protection sellers and central counterparts over time, up to a limit arbitrary set at 
three times the amount of reserves that agents have. These routines relate to the assumed 
tendency of financial institutions to grow their investment portfolio. In the simulation of the 
model, these routines enable agents that have lost all or part of their credits or assets to 
slowly regain a higher volume of credits or assets.  These routines are implemented with 
the following code: 
 
For the banks: 
 
if bank-credits < (bank-reserves * 3) [ 
    set bank-credits (bank-credits + 10)] 
 
For the credit protection sellers: 
 
if cps-assets < (cps-reserves * 3) [  
    set cps-assets (cps-assets + 10)] 
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And, in Model B, for the central counterparts: 
 
if ccp-assets < (ccp-reserves + 3) [   
    set ccp-assets (ccp-assets + 10)] 
 
6.4 The Input and Output Interface of the Model 
The model also incudes an input and output interface, that enable the researcher to set 
alternative values for input variables of the model (therefore, to simulate the model under 
different conditions of the scenario) and to observe the aggregated results of the simulation. 
The input interface consists of devices (‘sliders’) that enable the researcher to alter input 
variables in a convenient way. Sliders include control of the following input variables:  
 
Number of banks (“bank-count”): this input variable ranges between 1 and 50 
 
Number of credit protection sellers (“cps-count”): this input variable ranges between 1 and 
20 
 
Connectivity of banks (“bank-connectivity”): this input variable affects the number of 
connections that banks establish with credit protection sellers (it is an indicator that ranges 
between 0 and 10) 
 
Connectivity of credit protection sellers (cps-connectivity”): this input variable affects the 
number of connections that credit protection sellers establish with other credit protection 
sellers (it is an indicator that ranges between 0 and 10) 
 
General exposure to credit default risk (“general-default-risk): this input variable affects the 
likelihood that all bank experience credit default events (it is an indicator that ranges 
between 0 and 10) 
 
Bank-specific exposure to credit default risk (“prob-default-loan”): this input variable 
affects the specific likelihood that any bank experiences credit default event (it is an 
indicator that ranges between 0 and 10) 
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Incidence of the default event (“default-incidence”): this input variable affects the extent of 
losses of credit defaults events, i.e., the percentage of credits that is lost if a default event 
happens (it is an indicator that ranges between 0 and 100). 
 
In Model B, sliders also include the following input variable: 
 
Number of central counterparts (“ccp-count”): this input variable ranges between 1 and 5. 
 
Figure 1 shows how the set of sliders look like in Model B. 
 
 
Figure 1. The set of sliders in the input interface of the model (Model B) 
 
The output interface includes value indicators, plots, and the graph of the networks between 
banks and credit protection sellers (and, in Model B, also central counterparts). Value 
indicators show relevant aggregated indicator such as: 
Total number of banks 
Total number of credit protection sellers 
Total number of connections between banks and credit protection sellers 
Total number of connections between credit protection sellers 
Total value of credits of banks 
Total value of reserves of banks 
Total value of assets of credit protection sellers 
Total value of reserves of credit protection sellers. 
Figure 2 shows how the set of value indicators looks like: 
 
	   123	  
 
Figure 2. The set of value indicators in the output interface of the model 
 
Plots exhibit how relevant value indicators change over time. Plots are helpful to trace the 
trajectory of the aggregated behavior of the simulated system. For example, plots can show 
whether the dynamics of the financial derivatives industry results in a stable configuration 
(i.e., relatively constant number of banks, credit protection sellers, and total credits, assets, 
and reserves) or in a change of aggregated values over time. An instance of the plots 
produced by the simulation of the model is shown in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3. The plots of the model (instance) 
 
Finally, the output interface includes the graph of the network between the agents of the 
model. The graph includes banks represented as red circles, credit protection sellers 
represented as blue circles and, in Model B, also central counterparts represented as green 
circles. Connections take place between banks and credit protection sellers and between 
credit protection sellers and other credit protections sellers in Model A; and between banks 
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and credit protection sellers and between credit protection sellers and central counterpart 
(but not between a credit protection seller and another credit protection seller) in Model B. 
Moreover, the number of connections between agents depend on the input variables related 
to the connectivity of the networks. An instance of an initial configuration of the network in 
Model A is presented in Figure 4, and an instance of an initial configuration of the network 
in Model B is presented in Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 4. Initial configuration of the network graph in Model A (instance). Banks are 
represented by red circles and credit protection sellers by blue circles. 
 
 
Figure 5. Initial configuration of the network graph in Model B (instance). Banks are 
represented by red circles, credit protection sellers by blue circles, and central 
counterparts by green circles. 
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Chapter 7 
 
The Simulation of the Financial Derivatives Industry 
 
7.1 The Aim of the Simulation 
The simulation of the financial derivatives industry aims to enable researchers to gain a 
qualitative understanding of the dynamics of the industry in relation to alternative features 
of scenarios, such as a different number of actors in the industry, a different degree of 
connectivity of the network between these actors, a different exposure to the risk of credit 
default events, and the presence or absence of central counterparts. It is relevant to 
highlight that the effects on the aggregated industrial behavior and structure of alternative 
features of scenarios are not so self-evident, on the basis of how the model has been 
constructed. The number and kind of relationships between agents of the model is such that 
it is generally difficult for an analyst to draw deductive inferences of how the simulated 
system behaves, on the basis of the formulas and commands implemented in the code only. 
In addition, random components of the model make it harder to figure out how precisely 
how the system behaves, especially taking into consideration that the networked nature of 
the simulated industry makes the behavior of agents highly dependent on the patterns of the 
connections that they have with other agents. It is necessary, therefore, to resort to the 
computational simulation of the model to collect some evidence of the behavior of the 
simulated financial derivatives industry. 
 The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. First, we will report the results of the 
simulations run on Model A while exploring the behavior of the model when input 
variables are changes (especially, when they are set at the minimum and maximum values). 
Then, we will report the results of the simulations run on Model B – that is, when the 
financial derivatives network includes central counterparts. Finally, we will contrast and 
compare the results obtained from simulations of Model A and Model B. 
 
7.2 The Simulation of Model A (without Central Counterparts) 
The analysis of the behavior of the model of financial derivatives industry starts with the 
simulation of the model while all input variables are set at intermediate levels of the 
arbitrary scales that have been set. Under these conditions (number of banks = 25; number 
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of credit protection sellers = 10; connectivity of banks = 5; connectivity of credit protection 
sellers = 5; indicator of probability of general credit default = 5; indicator of probability of 
bank-specific credit default = 5; and incidence of the default = 5), the results of the 
simulation exhibits some of the typical features of complex systems: in some simulations 
the system is relatively stable, while in other cases the system is suddenly disrupted by 
changes that result in the reconfiguration of the simulated financial derivatives industry 
and, relatedly, to the exit of some players (banks and/or credit protection sellers) from the 
industry and the reduction of credit activity, or assets, or reserves (or more than one of 
these features of the agents). An instance of a relatively stable behavior of the system is 
provided in Figure 1, where an example of a disrupted system is provided in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 1. Relatively stable aggregated behavior of the system, with average values of input 
variables of the model (instance). The system is stable after more than 800 periods (‘ticks’) 
 
 
Figure 2. Disrupted aggregated behavior of the system, with average values of input 
variables of the model (instance). The system went through a disruption and regained 
stability after about 700 periods (‘ticks’) 
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These simulation results indicate that the model of the financial derivatives industry is 
relatively ‘open ended’ to different possible trajectories. The model is not deterministic as it 
includes some random components, which especially relate to the randomness included in 
the initial values of some features of the agents – such as amount of credits, assets, and 
reserves – and to the configuration of the original network. This feature of the aggregated 
behavior of the system seems relevant with respect to the conduct of financial derivatives 
industries: indeed, as the Great Financial Crisis showed, the industry of financial 
derivatives can be relatively stable over time, but occasionally it may be disrupted in ways 
that reconfigure the number of actors and their relationships. 
 If the input variables of the model include relatively low number of banks (Number 
of banks = 10), ceteris paribus, then the aggregated behavior of the system is relatively 
stable over time (Figure 3). An interpretation of these results is that, with relatively few 
banks with respect to the number of credit protection sellers, any credit default loss can be 
easily ‘absorbed’ by the network of credit protection contracts. If the model is set at a 
relatively high number of banks (Number of banks = 50), instead, then – ceteris paribus – 
the system may experience some disruptions before reaching a stable arrangement at a 
lower number of credit protection sellers (Figure 4). An interpretation of these results is 
that, with relatively many banks with respect to the number of credit protection sellers, 
credit default losses are more likely to erode assets of a particular credit protection seller 
and therefore making it bankrupt (especially if, because of the particular and random 
pattern of connections, several credit defaults happen to hit the same credit protection 
seller).  
 
 
Figure 3. Relatively stable aggregated behavior of the system, with relatively low number 
of banks at the outset (instance). The system is stable after more than 800 periods (‘ticks’) 
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Figure 4. Disrupted aggregated behavior of the system, with relatively high number of 
banks at the outset (instance). The system went through a disruption and regained stability 
after about 200 periods (‘ticks’), with a lower number of credit default sellers than at the 
outset. 
 
The simulation also shows that the aggregated behavior of the system is relatively 
little sensitive – ceteris paribus – to the number of credit protection sellers instead. If the 
input variable of the number of credit protection sellers is set to a relatively low value (e.g., 
2) or high value (e.g., 20), the simulation results in relatively stable configurations (while 
the number of banks is kept at a relatively average level, i.e., 25). An interpretation of these 
results is that any number of credit protection sellers can arguably confront a moderate 
amount of credit default losses. It is relevant, instead, to highlight the different behavior of 
the system under extreme joint condition related to the number of banks and credit 
protection sellers. If the input variables of the model include both high number of banks 
(50) and high number of credit protection sellers (25), then the system is exposed to some 
moderate disruption but it can promptly regain stability (Figure 5). If the input variables of 
the model include both low number of banks (10) and low number of credit protection 
sellers (2), then the system looks stable and hardly disrupted (Figure 6). An interpretation 
of these results is that – not surprisingly – in a relatively ‘small world’ made of a few banks 
and credit protection sellers, if there are moderate credit defaults then financial institutions 
do not incur any serious risk of large losses; in a highly fragmented system populated by 
relatively many actors, instead, it may happen that multiple credit default losses hit the 
same financial institutions and result in some of them going bankrupt.  
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Figure 5. Relatively stable aggregated behavior of the system, with relatively low number 
of banks and of credit protection sellers at the outset (instance). The system is stable after 
more than 2,000 periods (‘ticks’) 
 
 
Figure 6. Moderately disrupted aggregated behavior of the system, with relatively high 
number of banks and credit protection sellers at the outset (instance). The system went 
through a moderate disruption and regained stability after about 400 periods (‘ticks’), with 
a lower number of credit default sellers than at the outset. 
 
 If the input variables of the model include – ceteris paribus – high level of 
connectivity of banks (i.e., index of connectivity of banks = 10), then the system exhibits 
sources of instability that result in the reconfiguration of the industry at lower number of 
credit protection sellers (Figure 7). In some simulations, the financial derivatives industry 
may be relatively stable for some periods, but – if enough time is allowed – disruptions 
may occur. An interpretation of these results is that the high level of connectivity (i.e., 
number of credit protection contracts, like swaps) between banks and credit protection 
sellers results in making the system more exposed to the risk that a random concentration of 
credit defaults results in losses on particular credit protection sellers. A relevant insight 
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from these results is also that disruptions to the system may originate ‘suddenly’ even in 
period when the system seems to have reached an apparent stability. 
 
Figure 7. Occasionally disrupted aggregated behavior of the system, with relatively high 
level of connectivity between banks and credit protection sellers (instance). The system may 
experience sudden disruptions between periods of relative stability. 
 
 If the input variables of the model include – ceteris paribus – low level of 
connectivity of banks instead (i.e., index of connectivity of banks = 0), then the system can 
be disrupted in ways that force most of credit protection sellers out of the industry (Figure 
8). An interpretation of these results is that the low level of connectivity (i.e., number of 
credit protection contracts, like swaps) between banks and credit protection sellers results in 
making the system exposed to the risk that any random credit default (or a few subsequent 
credit defaults) that hit a particular bank can result in losses on the particular credit 
protection seller of the bank. A stable configuration may be reaches (for example, with only 
two credit protection sellers left) depending on whether the occurrence of credit default 
losses is moderate and compensate by the assumed tendency of the credit protection sellers 
to regain some assets for the continuation of their business activity. 
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Figure 8. Disrupted aggregated behavior of the system, with relatively low connectivity 
between banks and credit protection sellers at the outset (instance). The system went 
through a disruption and regained stability after about 300 periods (‘ticks’), with a lower 
number of credit default sellers than at the outset. 
 
 Additional relevant insights are gained from the manipulation of the input variable 
related to the connectivity of the credit protection sellers. If the indicator of connectivity of 
credit protection sellers is set to high level (10), then the system – ceteris paribus – may be 
disrupted and regain stability at a lower number of credit protection sellers, but it is 
noticeable that disruption takes place after a considerable longer period of time than at a 
lower lever of connectivity of credit protection sellers (Figure 9). An interpretation of these 
important results is that, if the simulated financial derivatives industry includes high level 
of connectivity between credit protection sellers, than credit default losses can be 
‘attenuated’ within the network of credit protection contracts and result in a relatively 
‘dispersed’ impact on the assets (and reserves) of the credit protection sellers – which are, 
therefore, in the position to keep operating in the industry for relatively longer time periods 
than in scenarios where they have less protection for their losses from other credit 
protection sellers. 
 
Figure 9. Disrupted aggregated behavior of the system, with relatively high connectivity 
between credit protection sellers at the outset (instance). The system went through a 
disruption that took place relatively slowly and after a relatively long period of stability 
(about 1.500 ‘ticks’), resulting in a lower number of credit default sellers than at the outset. 
 
The scenario where the connectivity of the credit protection sellers – ceteris paribus 
– is relatively low (0), instead, results in a quite different outcome. The system, in this case, 
is tends to exhibit a disruption that takes place relatively quickly and rapidly and that 
results in a lower number of credit protection sellers than at the outset. We can interpret 
these results by arguing that, if credit protection sellers are relatively little connected with 
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each other, than a random credit default (or a few subsequent credit defaults) can rapidly 
force a credit protection seller out of the industry. 
Not surprisingly, input variables that relate to the probability of credit defaults (both 
general and bank-specific) have important effects on the aggregated behavior of the system. 
High levels of probability of credit default result  – ceteris paribus – in the rapid erosion of 
assets and reserves of several credit protection sellers, while low levels of probability of 
credit default may result  – ceteris paribus – in relative stability of the system. Also not 
surprisingly, the incidence of credit default (i.e., the percentage of credits of a bank that are 
lost if the bank is hit by a credit default event) also affects the behavior of the system, 
where relatively high incidence (e.g., default incidence = 30% or more) results  – ceteris 
paribus – in the rapid extinction of all credit protection sellers (Figure 10) while relatively 
minimal incidence results  – ceteris paribus – in the preservation of the original industrial 
structure.  
 
Figure 10. Total extinction of credit protection sellers when the incidence of credit default 
events is relatively high (instance). All credit protection sellers went bankrupt in a 
relatively short time period (about 30 ‘ticks’). 
 
 
7.3 The Simulation of Model B (with Central Counterparts) 
The analysis of the behavior of the model of financial derivatives industry when the 
industry includes central counterparts provides some insightful results. First, we review the 
results of the simulation the model while all input variables are set at intermediate levels of 
the arbitrary scales that have been set (number of banks = 25; number of credit protection 
sellers = 10; connectivity of banks = 5; connectivity of credit protection sellers = 5; 
indicator of probability of general credit default = 5; indicator of probability of bank-
specific credit default = 5; and incidence of the default = 5). Under these conditions, the 
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results of the simulation are consistently stable, i.e., the simulated industry retains the same 
number of actors that are set at the outset (Figure 11). These results are strikingly different 
from those obtained from the simulation of Model A under the same conditions, where the 
simulated financial derivatives industry exhibited the typical traits of complex systems with 
either stable patterns or sudden disruptions that result in a lower number of actors. These 
results can be interpreted as a confirmation of the functional role of central counterparts to 
enhance the stability of the financial derivatives industry, at least in the conditions that are 
set at the average values of the input variable scales. 
 
Figure 11. Relatively stable aggregated behavior of the system in Model B, with average 
values of input variables of the model (instance). The system is stable after more than 3,000 
periods (‘ticks’) 
 
 If the input variables of the model include relatively low number of banks (Number 
of banks = 10), then the aggregated behavior of the system is relatively stable  – ceteris 
paribus – over time. If the Model B is set at relatively high number of banks (Number of 
banks = 50), then the system still exhibits  – ceteris paribus – a remarkable stability. Also 
these results are in contrast with those obtained from the simulation of Model A, where the 
high number of banks could result in some disruptions before the system reach a stable 
arrangement at a lower number of credit protection sellers. Again, we can interpret this 
result in relation to the presumed function of central counterparts to enhance the stability of 
the financial derivatives industry, that seems to retain the original number of players even if 
– given the higher number of banks – the sources of instability that originate from credit 
default events are higher. 
Similarly to Model A, also Model B results in a simulation where the aggregated 
behavior of the system is relatively little sensitive – ceteris paribus – to the number of 
credit protection sellers. Differently from Model A, however, in Model B the system is 
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stable also when both the number of banks and the number of credit protection sellers are 
relatively high. In Model B, moreover, the system appears stable also irrespective of the 
level of connectivity of banks and of credit protection sellers. The behavior of the simulated 
financial derivatives industry with the central counterparts seems to retain stability even if 
both levels of connectivity of banks and credit protection sellers are relatively high. If both 
of their connectivity indicators are low, the system is relatively stable but it may happen 
that the industry disaggregates into separate networks of credit protection contracts (Figure 
12).  
 
Figure 12. Relatively stable aggregated behavior of the system in Model B, with low values 
of connectivity of banks and of credit protection sellers (instance). The system results in the 
disaggregation of the financial derivatives industry into separated networks of credit 
protection contracts. 
 
A relevant result of the simulation of Model B is that the system remains stable even 
with relatively high values of the probabilities of credit default events, both generally and 
bank-specifically. An interpretation of these results is that the simulated financial 
derivatives industry gains remarkable stability with the inclusion of central counterparts, 
which are evidently able to assist the execution of credit protection contracts also when it is 
likely that banks experience default events (either systemically or specifically). Similarly to 
Model A, however, the aggregated behavior of the system is sensitive to the incidence of 
credit default events: if the default incidence is higher (e.g., 10% or more rather than 5%) 
then the system may be disrupted and results in a lower number of credit protection sellers.  
With respect to the results obtained from Model A, where relatively high levels of default 
incidence may lead to the extinction of all credit protection sellers, the simulation of Model 
B provides more comforting conclusions: although the simulated financial derivatives 
system is seriously hit by relatively high percentage of losses on credits because of default 
events, the system may result in a relatively stable aggregated behavior at a lower number 
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of credit protection sellers after the disruption takes place (Figure 13), and only if the 
default incidence is higher (e.g., 20% or more) then the trajectory of the system may 
terminate (as in Model A) in the extinction of credit protection sellers. 
 
 
Figure 13. Relatively stable aggregated behavior of the system in Model B after a 
disruption period, resulting from high incidence of credit defaults (instance).  
 
Last simulation of the model relates to explore the aggregated behavior of the 
simulated financial derivatives industry when initial conditions of the system include a 
different number of CCPs. In principle, a financial derivatives industry may include more 
than one CCP, which could compete with each other in providing central counterpart 
services. The simulation shows that the number of CCPs does not affect – ceteris paribus 
and in average conditions of the other input variables – the tendency to stability of the 
system. The number of CCPs does not also seem to affect the aggregated behavior of the 
system when the incidence of default is relatively higher. 
 
7.4 Comparing Model A and Model B: The Role of Central Counterparts 
The simulation of the financial derivatives industry carried out in the two scenarios results 
in some remarkable differences in the aggregated behavior of the system. Table 1 
summarizes the findings of the analysis. A general trait of the comparison is that the model 
with central counterparts provides more stability to the simulated financial derivatives 
industry, both under conditions of average value of all input variables of the model and 
under more extreme scenario conditions. While the model without central counterparts may 
be disrupted by the occurrence of credit default events in various scenario conditions, in the 
model with central counterparts it seems that the system possesses the capacity to ‘absorb’ 
credit default losses and retain the original configuration of the simulated industry. 
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 Model A 
(without central counterparts) 
Model B 
(with central counterparts) 
Average input variables Open-ended (either stable or 
disrupted) 
Stable 
Number of agents:   
High Possible disruption followed by 
regained stability 
Stable 
Low Stable (‘small world’) Stable 
Connectivity between the agents 
High Possible disruption after some time 
followed by regained stability 
Stable 
Low Prone to disruption in relatively 
short time 
Stable but the industry may 
disaggregate into separate 
networks 
Probability of credit default events 
High Prone to disruption followed by 
regained stability 
Stable 
Low Stable Stable 
Incidence of credit defaults 
High Prone to extinction of credit 
protection sellers in relatively short 
time 
Prone to disruption followed by 
regained stability or to extinction 
of credit protection sellers 
Low Stable Stable 
 
Table 1. Results from the simulation of Model A and Model B: features of the aggregated 
behavior of the simulated financial derivatives industry 
 
 It should be highlighted, however, that also the model with central counterparts is 
not immune from potential sources of disruption. Most noticeably, if the simulated financial 
derivative industry exhibits relatively low level of connectivity between agents, then the 
credit protection network may disaggregate into smaller and separated networks, each 
organized around a different central counterpart. This scenario may be not too irrelevant to 
the actual industrial organization of financial derivatives, where competing central 
counterparts may contend industry players and, if connectivity is relatively low, may result 
in segregated networks. Another potential source of disruption for the simulated financial 
derivatives industry with central counterparts is the exposure to relatively high incidence of 
default loss, where Model B – similarly to Model A – resulted in disruptions that reduced 
the number of credit protection sellers operating in the industry. Differently from Model A, 
however, Model B may not result in the extinction of credit protection sellers, a feature of 
the outcome of Model B that may corroborate the beliefs that central counterparts result in 
greater stability of the financial system. 
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7.5 Some Limitations of the Model 
The model of financial derivatives industry presented here has some limitations that should 
be duly acknowledged. The main limitation of the model originates from a critique that can 
be addressed towards all agent-based models and, relatedly, to the very simulation 
methodology: what is the relevance of the model and of the results to ‘real world’ behavior? 
This question casts the doubt that the results from the simulation may have little to do with 
actual aggregated behavior of any financial derivatives industry for a number of reasons: 
wither the model may include drivers of the conduct of agents that are different from those 
that orient the behavior of industry players; or rules that do not completely correspond to 
those that are followed in the execution of derivatives contracts; or values for the input 
variables and other parameters that are not commensurate to the magnitude of the 
corresponding characteristics of the financial derivatives industry.  
 This source of criticism is partially well founded, in the sense that the model 
developed in the present study – like many simulation models generally – does not produce 
outputs that can be related to any observed properties of any financial derivatives industry. 
The source of criticism, however, is not really keyed to the point that the model aims to 
attain, namely, to a qualitative understanding of the system dynamics of the financial 
derivatives industry rather than estimating empirical properties of actual financial 
derivatives industry. In this respect, the model fulfills its function to provide some valuable 
insights into the regulation of financial derivatives: it provides some evidence, in the form 
of simulation results, that central counterparts can enhance the stability of the financial 
derivatives industry, although they do not guarantee that all sources of disruption of the 
industry are effectively counteracted. 
 Another limitation of the model is, admittedly, the relative over-simplification of the 
complexity of the financial derivatives industry, especially in relation to the features of 
credit protection contracts and the strategic behavior of industry actors. Credit protection 
contracts are relatively sophisticated institutions, which often include several clauses, 
terms, and conditions. Replicating such sophistication into the algorithms that determine 
the allocation of losses among the actors (e.g., banks or credit protection sellers, and in 
which amount) has not been a central concern of the present study. It is possible, however, 
that the model presented here can be further developed in order to include more 
sophisticated – and, in a sense, ‘realistic’ – accounts of contractual practices in the financial 
derivatives industry. Also the strategic behavior of industry actors has not been completely 
‘captured’ by the model presented here: for example, the model does not include any role 
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for credit protection sellers’ strategy for managing their derivatives portfolio, nor any role 
for entry decisions of potential new competitors in the industry, nor the possibility that 
industry actors exchange derivatives for speculative purposes (and, relatedly, how this 
affects market prices). Again, while consideration for these features of the financial 
derivatives industry might have enhanced the sophistication and the ‘realism’ of the model, 
they have not been included for pragmatic reasons – the central concern of having 
developed the model presented here being to investigate the role of central counterpart as 
regulatory tools for the financial derivatives industry. Additional developments of the 
model presented here, however, can certainly include different – and more ingenious – 
algorithms for simulating the conduct of relevant industry actors. 
 
7.6 Venues for Future Research 
The study that has been conducted here is relatively original insofar as it employed the 
simulation approach (specifically, the agent-based method) for investigating the regulation 
of the financial derivatives industry. With respect to the scholarly debate on whether and 
how financial derivatives should be regulated, the present study provides some evidence for 
corroborating the argument that central counterparts can enhance the stability of the 
financial derivatives industry, although it also provides some evidence for arguing that, 
under particular scenario conditions such as relatively low connectivity in the industry and 
relatively high incidence of default losses, also central counterparts may not effectively 
guarantee that the financial derivatives industry are immune from serious sources of 
disruption.  
 Having said that, the present study also suggests some venues for additional 
research. First, the present study provides an instance of an agent-based method for 
simulating the effects of regulatory tools of the financial derivatives industry: as such, the 
model presented here can set a new benchmark for the development of a class of models 
intended to investigate – through simulations – the expected effects of alternative 
regulatory tools. Admittedly, the simulation approach (and in particular the use of agent-
based method) is still relatively uncommon within the finance scholarly literature (and it is 
still relatively marginalized, as other ‘heterodox’ approaches, within the field of 
economics). It is argued here, however, that the simulation approach can effectively 
complement other research strategies – especially theory-driven deductive and empirically-
oriented inductive perspectives – for providing a deeper understanding of the behavior of 
financial systems and assisting the formulation of more effective regulatory policies. 
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 Second, the present study has only focused on the role of central counterparts for 
regulating the financial derivatives industry. Additional research could be done on the 
effects of other regulatory tools, especially among those taken into consideration in the 
present policy cycle – in the aftermath of the Great Financial Crisis – oriented to re-
regulating the use of derivatives contract. The agent-based method can offer some 
promising results, in this respect, mostly if we take into consideration the need for 
regulatory tools to anticipate the joint effect of decisions taken by actors that strategically 
interact with each other, the role of unintended consequences, and the possibility that some 
actors devise ingenious strategies to bypass or circumvent those parts of the regulations that 
limit (in their perspectives) their profitability. Armed with agent-based method tools, 
financial regulators may be better positioned to design more effective regulatory tools. 
 Finally, additional research could be done on the area of the design of policy tools 
with the aim of engineering innovative instruments for steering the conduct of financial 
industry actors and, relatedly, of aggregated dimensions of the financial industry, in the 
desired way. Again, agent-based models can assist the researchers and the regulators 
because of their capacity to explore emergent strategies of financial industry actors and, if 
agents are endowed with learning capabilities, to figure out novel ways to tackle 
coordination and collaboration problems.  
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Chapter 8 
 
Conclusions 
 
This study aimed to address the issue of how financial derivatives are regulated. The issue 
gained a prominent relevance during the 2010’s, especially in the context of the policy 
reaction to the Great Financial Crisis that hit the world economy in 2007-08 and whose 
repercussions – in such terms as, for example, credit shrinkage, increased unemployment, 
and expansion of public sector debt – reverberated for several years. Part of these policy 
measures was directed to tackle what was perceived as one of the main (joint) causal 
sources of the crisis, namely the expansion of a relatively under-regulated financial 
derivatives industry. Once a relatively marginal financial product that served specialized 
needs for reducing market operators’ exposure to various sorts of risks (e.g., price and 
currency fluctuations, credit default), in the last decades of the twentieth century financial 
derivatives gained a prominent role in the global financial system. An intricate network of 
financial derivatives contracts served both hedging and speculative purposes of several 
financial operators, although the industry structure included a pivotal role for a few large 
financial institutions that resulted in the overwhelming – and largely unnoticed and 
unregulated – concentration of risk. When the Great Financial Crisis exploded, a 
concatenation of financial derivative contracts led to the emergence of unbearable losses in 
financial institutions that, because of their high level of interconnectedness with the rest of 
the industry, could potentially throw the financial systems to the knees. 
 
In the emergent policy debate, alternative viewpoints contended what role financial 
derivatives play in the preservation of the stability or the amplification of sources of 
instability of the financial system, whether financial derivatives should be subjected to 
strict regulatory requirements or their use should be left to the autonomous judgment of 
financial operators, and how exactly financial derivatives should be regulated. Among the 
policy tools that policy-makers have proposed – especially at the G20 meeting in 2009 – 
and that have been introduced in the financial regulation of several countries, an important 
role is played by Central Counterparts (CCPs). CCPs are financial institutions that operate 
as counterparts to trades of derivative contracts that take place between market participants: 
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without CCPs, two financial operators enter derivative contracts with each other; with 
CCPs, each of two financial operators enter respective derivative contracts with the CCP, 
which takes an intermediary role between the parties. CCPs perform various functions, 
including the possibility to monitor derivatives trade between parties, supervise the 
execution of derivative contracts, and act as ‘guarantor’ that financial obligations will be 
duly fulfilled. As such, CCPs are believed to improve the stability of the financial system, 
especially by containing the diffusion of losses from one financial operator to another and 
therefore ‘absorbing’ or ‘cushioning’ the impact of the risk events covered by the 
derivatives contracts. 
 
While the argument for the stabilizing role of CCPs is persuasive, CCPs may not fully 
protect the financial system from painful disruptions, which may take place depending on 
the conditions of the financial derivative industry. This study exactly aimed to address the 
questions of whether CCPs are able to effectively perform a stabilizing role when facing 
some of the actual conditions under which financial market operate, e.g., the high level of 
connectivity between financial institutions (that engage in multiple derivative contracts to 
hedge their positions and for speculative purposes), the presence of both systemic and 
institution-specific shocks, and the possibility that relatively large defaults impair the 
stability of the whole financial system. These questions have been addressed using a 
simulation approach based on agent-based modeling methodology, that is especially suited 
to investigate the aggregated behavior of complex system such as the financial derivatives 
industry. The complexity of the financial derivatives industry arises from several of the 
features of this part of the financial industry, which particularly include the heterogeneity of 
the financial derivatives industry actors, the articulation of the structure of the industry in a 
networked form, and the dynamic nature of the financial derivative industry – where past 
events have important feedback effects that influence the trajectory of the industry. With 
respect to alternative methodological approaches – such as hypothesis testing of causal 
relationship on the basis of industry time series data – agent based models allow researchers 
to explore the aggregated behavior of a system by contrasting and comparing system 
behavior under different scenario conditions that are influenced in a quasi-experimental 
design setting (the difference with an experimental design being, of course, that evidence 
from simulations is self-generated through the computations of the model rather than 
collected from controlled testing conditions on empirical subjects).  
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The results of this study suggest that the introduction of CCPs can assist enhancing the 
stability of the financial system, although not without potential pitfalls and limitations. A 
potential pitfall is the possibility that, if financial industry actors are highly interconnected 
with each other and in the presence of multiple CCPs, then the dynamics of the system may 
result in the fragmentation of the financial derivative industry into separate derivatives 
contract networks – a result that may originate from the possibility that a fortuitous 
concentration of losses makes some financial industry operators refocus their trade with a 
limited number of CCPs only. A limitation is the possibility that, if the incidence of losses 
is relatively high, then the occurrence of losses may result in the exit of some financial 
industry operators and the shrinking of the value of activity of the financial derivatives 
industry. Because of these results, it is argued here that, even after the introduction of 
CCPs, financial regulators and public authorities should remain alert of the potential threats 
to the stability of the financial system. 
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Appendix 
 
Model A code: 
;; General features of the model 
 
breed [banks bank] ;; create the banks 
breed [cpss cps]  ;; create the credit protection sellers 
 
undirected-link-breed [bank_cpss bank_cps] ;; create the network between banks and cpss 
undirected-link-breed [cps_cpss cps_cds]  ;; create the network between cpss 
 
;; Initialization of the variables 
 
banks-own [ 
  bank-credits ;; amount of credits that the bank has 
  bank-reserves ;; amount of reserves that the bank has 
  credit-default-prob ;; probability that a bank suffers from default of its credits 
  bank-credit-loss ;; the loss on credits that the bank incurs 
  bank-loss-to-pass  ;; outflow of loss on credits that the bank wants to pass to a cps 
] 
 
cpss-own [ 
  cps-assets ;; amount of assets the credit protection seller has and can sell in case of need 
  cps-reserves ;; amount of reserves that the credit protection seller has 
  cps-assets-loss ;; inflow of loss on assets that the cps should try to recover from others 
  cps-loss-to-pass  ;; outflow of loss on assets that the cps wants to pass to others 
] 
 
;; Set-up of the model 
 
to setup 
  __clear-all-and-reset-ticks 
  setup-banks 
  setup-cpss 
  network-banks 
  network-cpss 
end 
 
to setup-banks 
  create-banks bank-count [ 
    set shape "circle"  
    set color red  
    set bank-credits 30 + random 70 
    set bank-reserves 10 + random 20 
    set bank-credit-loss 0 
    set bank-loss-to-pass 0 
    ifelse prob-default-loan = 0 [set credit-default-prob 0] [set credit-default-prob ((prob-
default-loan - 1) * 10 + random 10)] 
    move-to one-of patches 
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] 
end 
 
to setup-cpss 
  create-cpss cps-count [ 
    set shape "circle"  
    set color blue  
    set cps-assets 30 + random 70 
    set cps-reserves 10 + random 20 
    set cps-loss-to-pass 0 
    set cps-assets-loss 0 
    move-to one-of patches 
] 
end 
 
to network-banks 
  ask banks [create-bank_cps-with one-of cpss] 
  repeat bank-connectivity [ask banks [if random 100 < bank-credits [create-bank_cps-with 
one-of other cpss]]]  
;; Every bank has at least one connection with a cps 
;; The higher the connectivity of a bank with cpss, the more banks search for additional 
connections with other cpss 
;; Searching for connections with other cpss is more likely if the bank has more credits 
end 
 
to network-cpss 
  ask cpss [create-cps_cds-with one-of other cpss] 
  repeat cps-connectivity [ask cpss [if random 100 > cps-assets [create-cps_cds-with one-of 
other cpss]]]  
;; Every cps has at least one connection with another cps 
;; The higher the connectivity of cpss with each other, the more cpss search for additional 
connections with other cpss 
;; Searching for connections with other cpss is more likely if the cps has less assets 
end 
 
;; The general routine of the model 
 
to go 
if not any? banks [stop] 
if not any? cpss [stop] 
 
ask banks [if bank-reserves <= 0 [die]] ;;banks fail when they are out of reserves 
ask cpss [if cps-reserves <= 0 [die]] ;; cpss fail when they are out of reserves 
 
ask banks [seek-bank-connections] 
ask cpss [seek-cps-connections] 
 
ask banks [check-bank-losses] 
ask cpss [check-cps-losses] 
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ask banks [reduce-bank-reserves] 
ask cpss [reduce-cps-reserves] 
 
ask banks [restore-bank-credits] 
ask cpss [restore-cps-assets] 
 
tick 
 
make-plot  
make-plot2 
make-plot3 
make-plot4  
make-plot5 
make-plot6 
if layout? [layout] ;; This is to run the graphic display of the financial network 
end 
 
;; The routines to check if banks and cpss have no more connections 
 
to seek-bank-connections 
  if count my-bank_cpss = 0 [  ;; if the bank has no more connections 
    if count cpss > 0 [  ;; if there are cpss 
      if bank-credits > 0 [  ;; if the bank has credits  
        create-bank_cps-with one-of cpss  ;; create a connection between the bank and one cps 
        repeat bank-connectivity [if random 100 < bank-credits [create-bank_cps-with one-of 
cpss]] ;; create additional connections depending on connectivity 
    ]]] 
end 
 
to seek-cps-connections 
  if count my-cps_cpss = 0 [  ;; if the cps has no more connections 
    if count cpss > 1 [   ;; if there are other cpss 
      if cps-assets > 0 [  ;; if the cps has assets  
        create-cps_cds-with one-of other cpss  ;; create a connection between the cps and 
another cps 
        if count cpss > cps-connectivity + 2 [ ;; if there are enough other cpss 
          repeat cps-connectivity [if random 100 > cps-assets [create-cps_cds-with one-of 
cpss]] ;; create additional connections depending on connectivity 
    ]]]] 
end 
 
;; The routines to check if there is any default and what are their consequences on the cds 
network  
 
to check-bank-losses 
  if bank-credits > 0  ;; if a bank has some credits 
    [if random 100 < (credit-default-prob / 2 + (general-default-risk * 10) / 2) ;; if it 
randomly happens that there is a default  
      [set bank-credit-loss (bank-credits * default-incidence / 100) ;; then a loss on credits 
happens 
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      ifelse count my-links > 0  ;; if there are connections with at least one cps 
        [set bank-loss-to-pass bank-credit-loss;; then take note of the loss on credits to pass to 
a cps 
        ifelse not any? bank_cps-neighbors with [cps-assets > 0] ;; if there are no links to cpss 
with assets 
          [set bank-credits (bank-credits - bank-credit-loss) ;; then compute the loss on credits 
of the bank 
          ] 
          [ask one-of bank_cps-neighbors with [cps-assets > 0] ;; else, then ask any linked cps 
with assets... 
           [set cps-assets-loss [bank-loss-to-pass] of myself] ;; that the cps takes note of 
potential loss on their assets 
           ]] 
      [set bank-credits (bank-credits - bank-credit-loss)]  ;; else, then compute the loss on 
credits of the bank 
      ]] 
    set bank-credit-loss 0  ;; reset losses on credit of the bank as nil 
    set bank-loss-to-pass 0  ;; reset losses to pass to cpss as nil 
end 
 
to check-cps-losses 
  if cps-assets > 0 ;; if a cps has some assets 
    [if cps-assets-loss > 0 ;; if the cps has some loss on assets passed by another agent 
      [ifelse count my-links > 0  ;; if there are links with other cpss 
        [set cps-loss-to-pass cps-assets-loss  ;; then take note of the loss on assets to pass to 
another cps 
         ifelse not any? cps_cds-neighbors with [cps-assets > 0]  ;; if there are no links to cpss 
with assets 
          [set cps-assets (cps-assets - cps-assets-loss)  ;; then compute the loss on assets of the 
cps 
           ]   
          [ask one-of cps_cds-neighbors with [cps-assets > 0]  ;; else, then ask any linked cps 
with assets... 
           [set cps-assets cps-assets - [cps-loss-to-pass] of myself] ;; that the cps takes note of 
potential loss on their assets 
           ]] 
        [set cps-assets (cps-assets - cps-assets-loss)]  ;; else, then compute the loss on assets of 
the cps 
         ]] 
  set cps-assets-loss 0  ;; reset losses on assets of the cps as nil 
  set cps-loss-to-pass 0  ;; reset losses of the cps to pass as nil 
end 
 
;; The routines to transfer losses on credits and assets to reserves 
 
to reduce-bank-reserves 
  if bank-credits < 0  ;; if a bank has negative credits 
    [set bank-reserves (bank-reserves + bank-credits)  ;; then reduce bank reserves for the 
amount of the negative credits 
      set bank-credits 0]  ;; reset credits to zero 
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end 
 
to reduce-cps-reserves 
  if cps-assets < 0  ;; if a cps has negative assets 
    [set cps-reserves (cps-reserves + cps-assets)  ;; then reduce cps reserves for the amount of 
the negative assets 
      set cps-assets 0]  ;; reset assets to zero 
end 
 
;; Routines to let banks and cps regain some credits and assets over time 
 
to restore-bank-credits 
  if bank-credits < (bank-reserves * 3) [ ;; if a bank can expand its credits 
    set bank-credits (bank-credits + 10)  ;; bank credits are slightly increased  
  ] 
end 
 
to restore-cps-assets 
  if cps-assets < (cps-reserves * 3) [  ;; if a cps can expand its assets 
    set cps-assets (cps-assets + 10)  ;; cps assets are slightly increased 
  ] 
end 
 
;; The following code draws the plots 
 
to make-plot 
  set-current-plot "bank count" 
  set-current-plot-pen "default" 
  plot count banks 
end 
 
to make-plot2 
  set-current-plot "cps count" 
  set-current-plot-pen "default2" 
  plot count cpss 
end 
 
to make-plot3 
  set-current-plot "total credits of banks" 
  set-current-plot-pen "default3" 
  plot sum [bank-credits] of banks 
end 
 
to make-plot4 
  set-current-plot "total reserves of banks" 
  set-current-plot-pen "default4" 
  plot sum [bank-reserves] of banks 
end 
 
to make-plot5 
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  set-current-plot "total assets of cpss" 
  set-current-plot-pen "default5" 
  plot sum [cps-assets] of cpss 
end 
 
to make-plot6 
  set-current-plot "total reserves of cpss" 
  set-current-plot-pen "default6" 
  plot sum [cps-reserves] of cpss 
end 
 
;; The following code draws the network 
 
to layout 
  ;; the number 3 here is arbitrary; more repetitions slows down the 
  ;; model, but too few gives poor layouts 
  repeat 3 [ 
    ;; the more turtles we have to fit into the same amount of space, 
    ;; the smaller the inputs to layout-spring we'll need to use 
    let factor sqrt count turtles 
    ;; numbers here are arbitrarily chosen for pleasing appearance 
    layout-spring turtles links (1 / factor) (7 / factor) (1 / factor) 
    display  ;; for smooth animation 
  ] 
  ;; don't bump the edges of the world 
  let x-offset max [xcor] of turtles + min [xcor] of turtles 
  let y-offset max [ycor] of turtles + min [ycor] of turtles 
  ;; big jumps look funny, so only adjust a little each time 
  set x-offset limit-magnitude x-offset 0.1 
  set y-offset limit-magnitude y-offset 0.1 
  ask turtles [ setxy (xcor - x-offset / 2) (ycor - y-offset / 2) ] 
end 
 
to-report limit-magnitude [number limit] 
  if number > limit [ report limit ] 
  if number < (- limit) [ report (- limit) ] 
  report number 
end 
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Model B code 
;; General features of the model 
 
breed [banks bank] ;; create the banks 
breed [cpss cps]  ;; create the credit protection sellers 
breed [ccps ccp]  ;; create the central counterparts 
 
undirected-link-breed [bank_cpss bank_cps] ;; create the network between banks and cpss 
undirected-link-breed [cps_ccps cps_ccp]  ;; create the network between cpss and ccps 
 
;; Initialization of the variables 
 
banks-own [ 
  bank-credits ;; amount of credits that the bank has 
  bank-reserves ;; amount of reserves that the bank has 
  credit-default-prob ;; probability that a bank suffers from default of its credits 
  bank-credit-loss ;; the loss on credits that the bank incurs 
  bank-loss-to-pass ;; outflow of loss on credits that the bank wants to pass to a cps 
] 
 
cpss-own [ 
  cps-assets ;; amount of assets the credit protection seller has and can sell in case of need 
  cps-reserves ;; amount of reserves that the credit protection seller has 
  cps-assets-loss ;; inflow of loss on assets that the cps should try to recover from others 
  cps-loss-to-pass ;; outflow of loss on assets that the cps wants to pass to others 
] 
 
ccps-own [ 
  ccp-assets ;; amount of assets the central counterpart has  
  ccp-reserves ;; amount of reserves that the central counterpart has 
  ccp-assets-loss ;; inflow of losses on assets that the ccp should try to recover from a cps 
  ccp-loss-to-pass ;; outflow of loss on assets that the ccp wants to pass to a cps 
] 
 
;; Set-up of the model 
 
to setup 
  __clear-all-and-reset-ticks 
  setup-banks 
  setup-cpss 
  setup-ccps 
  network-banks 
  network-cpssccps 
end 
 
to setup-banks 
  create-banks bank-count [ 
    set shape "circle"  
    set color red  
    set bank-credits 30 + random 70 
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    set bank-reserves 10 + random 20 
    set bank-credit-loss 0 
    set bank-loss-to-pass 0 
    ifelse prob-default-loan = 0 [set credit-default-prob 0] [set credit-default-prob ((prob-
default-loan - 1) * 10 + random 10)] 
    move-to one-of patches 
] 
end 
 
to setup-cpss 
  create-cpss cps-count [ 
    set shape "circle"  
    set color blue  
    set cps-assets 30 + random 70 
    set cps-reserves 10 + random 20 
    set cps-assets-loss 0 
    set cps-loss-to-pass 0 
    move-to one-of patches 
] 
end 
 
to setup-ccps 
  create-ccps ccp-count [ 
    set shape "circle" 
    set color green 
    set ccp-assets 60 + random 140 
    set ccp-reserves 20 + random 40 
    set ccp-assets-loss 0 
    set ccp-loss-to-pass 0 
    move-to one-of patches 
  ] 
end 
 
to network-banks 
  ask banks [create-bank_cps-with one-of cpss] 
  repeat bank-connectivity [ask banks [if random 100 < bank-credits [create-bank_cps-with 
one-of cpss]]]  
;; Every bank has at least one connection with a cps 
;; The higher the connectivity of banks with cpss, the more banks search for additional 
connections with other cpss 
;; Searching for connections with other cpss is more likely if the bank has more credits 
end 
 
to network-cpssccps 
  ask cpss [create-cps_ccp-with one-of ccps] 
    repeat cps-connectivity [ask cpss [if random 100 > cps-assets [create-cps_ccp-with one-
of ccps]]]  
;; Every cps has a connection with at least one ccp 
;; The higher the connectivity of cps with other cps, the more cpss search for additional 
connections with ccps 
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;; Searching for connections with other cpss is more likely if the cps has more assets 
end 
 
;; The general routine of the model 
 
to go 
if not any? banks [stop] 
if not any? cpss [stop] 
if not any? ccps [stop] 
 
ask banks [if bank-reserves <= 0 [die]] ;; banks fail when they are out of reserves 
ask cpss [if cps-reserves <= 0 [die]] ;; cpss fail when they are out of reserves 
ask ccps [if ccp-reserves <= 0 [die]] ;; ccps fail when they are out of reserves 
 
ask banks [seek-bank-connections] 
ask cpss [seek-cps-connections] 
 
ask banks [check-bank-losses] 
ask cpss [check-cps-losses] 
 
ask banks [reduce-bank-reserves] 
ask cpss [reduce-cps-reserves] 
ask ccps [reduce-ccp-reserves] 
 
ask banks [restore-bank-credits] 
ask cpss [restore-cps-assets] 
ask ccps [restore-ccp-assets] 
 
tick 
 
make-plot  
make-plot2 
make-plot3 
make-plot4  
make-plot5 
make-plot6 
if layout? [layout] ;; This is to run the graphic display of the financial network 
end 
 
;; The routines to check if banks and cpss have no more connections 
 
to seek-bank-connections 
  if count my-bank_cpss = 0 [ ;; if the bank has no more connections 
      if count cpss > 0 [  ;; if there are cpss 
        if bank-credits > 0 [  ;; if the bank has credits 
          create-bank_cps-with one-of cpss  ;; create a connectios between the bank and one 
cps 
          repeat bank-connectivity [if random 100 < bank-credits [create-bank_cps-with one-of 
cpss]] ;; crete additional connections depending on connectivity 
    ]]] 
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end 
 
to seek-cps-connections 
  if count my-cps_ccps = 0 [  ;; if the cps has no more connections 
    if count cpss > 1 [   ;; if there is at least another cps 
      if cps-assets > 0 [  ;; if the cps has assets 
        ask one-of ccps [create-cps_ccp-with myself create-cps_ccp-with one-of other cpss]  ;; 
then a ccp creates connections with the cps and another cps 
        if count cpss > cps-connectivity + 2 [ ;; if there are enough other cpss 
          repeat cps-connectivity [if random 100 > cps-assets [ask one-of ccps [create-cps_ccp-
with myself create-cps_ccp-with one-of other cpss]]] ;; create additional connections 
depending on connectivity 
    ]]]] 
end 
 
;; The routines to check if there is any default and what are their consequences on the 
network  
 
to check-bank-losses 
  if bank-credits > 0  ;; if a bank has some credits 
    [if random 100 < (credit-default-prob / 2 + (general-default-risk * 10) / 2) ;; if it 
randomly happens that there is a default  
      [set bank-credit-loss (bank-credits * default-incidence / 100);; then a loss on credits 
happens 
        ifelse count my-links > 0  ;; if there are connections with at least one cps 
        [set bank-loss-to-pass bank-credit-loss ;; then take note of the loss on credits to pass to 
a cps 
          ifelse not any? bank_cps-neighbors with [cps-assets > 0] ;; if there are no links to 
cpss with assets 
          [set bank-credits (bank-credits - bank-credit-loss) ;; then compute the loss on credits 
of the bank 
          ]   
          [ask one-of bank_cps-neighbors with [cps-assets > 0] ;; else, ask any linked cps with 
assets... 
           [set cps-assets-loss [bank-loss-to-pass] of myself] ;; that the cps takes not of 
potential loss on their assets 
           ]] 
      [set bank-credits (bank-credits - bank-credit-loss)]  ;; else, then compute the loss on 
credits of the bank 
]] 
  set bank-credit-loss 0 ;; reset losses on credit of the bank as nil 
  set bank-loss-to-pass 0  ;; resent losses to pass to cpss as nil 
end 
 
to check-cps-losses 
  if cps-assets > 0 ;; if a cps has some assets 
    [if cps-assets-loss > 0 ;; if the cps has some loss on assets passed by another agent 
      [ifelse count my-links > 0  ;; if there are links with a ccp 
        [set cps-loss-to-pass cps-assets-loss  ;; then take note of the loss on assets to pass to a 
ccp 
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         ifelse not any? cps_ccp-neighbors with [ccp-assets > 0] ;; if there are no connections 
to ccps with assets 
          [set cps-assets (cps-assets - cps-assets-loss)]  ;; then compute the loss on assets of the 
cps 
          [ask one-of cps_ccp-neighbors with [ccp-assets > 0] ;; else, then ask any linked ccp 
with assets... 
           [set ccp-assets-loss [cps-loss-to-pass] of myself ;; that the ccp takes note of the loss 
to pass 
             check-ccp-losses]  ;; call the routine of the ccp to cover inflow of losses 
           ]] 
        [set cps-assets (cps-assets - cps-assets-loss)  ;; else, then compute the loss on assets of 
the cps 
         ]]] 
  set cps-assets-loss 0 ;; reset losses on assets of the cps as nil 
  set cps-loss-to-pass 0  ;; reset losses of the cps to pass as nil 
end 
 
to check-ccp-losses 
  ifelse any? cps_ccp-neighbors with [cps-assets > 0]  ;; if there is any cps with assets 
  [set ccp-loss-to-pass ccp-assets-loss ;; then take note of the loss on assets to pass to a cps 
    ask one-of cps_ccp-neighbors with [cps-assets > 0]  
     [set cps-assets (cps-assets - [ccp-loss-to-pass] of myself)]] ;; compute the loss on assets 
of the linked cps 
  [set ccp-assets (ccp-assets - ccp-assets-loss)] ;; else, compute the loss on assets on the ccp 
  set ccp-assets-loss 0  ;; reset losses on assets of the ccp as nil 
  set ccp-loss-to-pass 0 ;; reset losses of the ccp to pass as nil 
end 
 
;; Routine to transfer losses on credits and assets to reserves 
 
to reduce-bank-reserves 
  if bank-credits < 0  ;; if a bank has negative credits 
    [set bank-reserves (bank-reserves + bank-credits)  ;; then reduce bank reserves for the 
amount of the negative credits 
      set bank-credits 0]  ;; reset credits to zero 
end 
 
to reduce-cps-reserves 
  if cps-assets < 0  ;; if a cps has negative assets 
    [set cps-reserves (cps-reserves + cps-assets)  ;; then reduce cps reserves for the amount of 
the negative assets 
      set cps-assets 0]  ;; reset assets to zero 
end 
 
to reduce-ccp-reserves 
  if ccp-assets < 0 ;; if a ccp has negative assets 
  [set ccp-reserves (ccp-reserves + ccp-assets)  ;; then reduce ccp reserves for the amount of 
the negative assets 
    set ccp-assets 0]  ;; reset assets to zero 
end 
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;; Routines to let banks, cpss and ccps regain some credits and assets over time 
 
to restore-bank-credits 
  if bank-credits < (bank-reserves * 3) [ ;; if a bank can expand its credits 
    set bank-credits (bank-credits + 10)  ;; bank credits are slightly increased 
  ] 
end 
 
to restore-cps-assets 
  if cps-assets < (cps-reserves * 3) [  ;; if a cps can expand its assets 
    set cps-assets (cps-assets + 10)  ;; cps assets are slightly increased 
  ] 
end 
 
to restore-ccp-assets 
  if ccp-assets < (ccp-reserves + 3) [  ;; if a ccp can expand its assets 
    set ccp-assets (ccp-assets + 10)  ;; ccp assets are slightly increased 
  ] 
end 
   
;; The following code draws the plots 
 
to make-plot 
  set-current-plot "bank count" 
  set-current-plot-pen "default" 
  plot count banks 
end 
 
to make-plot2 
  set-current-plot "cps count" 
  set-current-plot-pen "default2" 
  plot count cpss 
end 
 
to make-plot3 
  set-current-plot "total credits of banks" 
  set-current-plot-pen "default3" 
  plot sum [bank-credits] of banks 
end 
 
to make-plot4 
  set-current-plot "total reserves of banks" 
  set-current-plot-pen "default4" 
  plot sum [bank-reserves] of banks 
end 
 
to make-plot5 
  set-current-plot "total assets of cpss" 
  set-current-plot-pen "default5" 
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  plot sum [cps-assets] of cpss 
end 
 
to make-plot6 
  set-current-plot "total reserves of cpss" 
  set-current-plot-pen "default6" 
  plot sum [cps-reserves] of cpss 
end 
 
;; The following code draws the network 
 
to layout 
  ;; the number 3 here is arbitrary; more repetitions slows down the 
  ;; model, but too few gives poor layouts 
  repeat 3 [ 
    ;; the more turtles we have to fit into the same amount of space, 
    ;; the smaller the inputs to layout-spring we'll need to use 
    let factor sqrt count turtles 
    ;; numbers here are arbitrarily chosen for pleasing appearance 
    layout-spring turtles links (1 / factor) (7 / factor) (1 / factor) 
    display  ;; for smooth animation 
  ] 
  ;; don't bump the edges of the world 
  let x-offset max [xcor] of turtles + min [xcor] of turtles 
  let y-offset max [ycor] of turtles + min [ycor] of turtles 
  ;; big jumps look funny, so only adjust a little each time 
  set x-offset limit-magnitude x-offset 0.1 
  set y-offset limit-magnitude y-offset 0.1 
  ask turtles [ setxy (xcor - x-offset / 2) (ycor - y-offset / 2) ] 
end 
 
to-report limit-magnitude [number limit] 
  if number > limit [ report limit ] 
  if number < (- limit) [ report (- limit) ] 
  report number 
end 
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